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A NEW STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
Defining changing transatlantic security
relations
Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson
Introduction
As the 1970s turned into the 1980s, global politics were often characterized in terms
of a strategic triangle. This metaphor provided a way to conceptualize the security
relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and China. In the words of
the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:
Triangular diplomacy, to be effective, must rely on the natural
incentives and propensities of the players. It must avoid the impression
that one is ‘using’ either of the contenders against the other; otherwise
one becomes vulnerable to retaliation or blackmail. The hostility
between China and the Soviet Union served our purposes best if we
maintained closer relations with each side than they did with each other.
The rest could be left to the dynamic of events.
(Kissinger 1979: 7121)
Although global politics look very different today from what they did 30 years
ago, we believe that the metaphor of a strategic triangle can once again be fruitfully
applied to the study of international security relations. In this book, we set out to
use it as an organizing principle for studying transatlantic security relations
involving three international actors: the United States, Russia and the European
Union (EU). These three actors form a constellation that we call ‘a new strategic
triangle’ by interacting in what we here term the ‘greater transatlantic region’.2 Like
the previous strategic triangle, this new one is about power3 relations among
important international actors. There are several reasons why we have chosen to
study transatlantic security relations in the modern world. First, we believe that this
aspect of world politics has during the last decade – and particularly after 11
September – been understudied. Given the fact that the United States has embarked
upon a global campaign to try to eradicate terrorism, this has spawned a large
1
literature on US global strategy generally, and its strategies regarding terrorism and
the Middle East in particular.4 We feel, however, that in this literature the broad
scope of transatlantic security relations is often forgotten. We attempt in this book
to cover broader aspects of these relations than what recent literature has commonly
done, even if we do not forget the struggle against terrorism. Our primary motivation
for using the strategic triangle as an organizing principle to analyse security relations
among three important actors in the greater transatlantic region is that we wish to
take a fresh look at these relations from a new angle and believe that the triangle
concept enables us to better comprehend the current dynamics of the changing
relations and that it will also help us lay a better foundation for understanding the
future of transatlantic security relations.
The criterion for the existence of a strategic triangle is essentially a very simple
one: do all three actors, in formulating their policies in a given issue area, take each
other into consideration or not. If they do, a triangle exists, if they do not, there is
no triangle. According to this criterion, formalized contacts are not sufficient to
create a triangle. Formally, of course, each actor in the new strategic triangle always
considers the other two actors. In addition to the traditional meetings between the
US and Russian presidents, there are now regular US–EU and EU–Russian
summits. Long-term partnership has been mutually declared in each dyad. However,
we base our recognition of a triangular structure in the greater transatlantic region
on the practical substance of policy-making.
In addition to our analysis of relations among the three actors, our book has a
special focus on what we call the ‘actorness’ of the EU.5 Under what circumstances
can the EU act as one actor in a given policy area – does it have internal legitimacy
– and is the EU accepted as an actor by other actors in this policy area – does it have
external legitimacy? In our conception of the triangle, the actorness of the Union
is absolutely vital to the existence of a relationship among all three actors.
Our conception of security policy is a fairly broad one. It includes the traditional
issues of defence policy, military alliances and the threat of conventional conflicts.
It also includes the ties created by economic relations of various kinds, and the links
between economic issues and the traditional issues of security.
The limited geographical coverage of our new strategic triangle virtually settles
the question about its appropriate composition. Arguably, the United States, Russia
and the EU are the three most important actors in the greater transatlantic region.
While this premise may be easy to accept for this volume’s European editors, it is
far from obvious from a US perspective. It is, however, in our opinion obvious why
the United States, the world’s only superpower, must be included. This assertive
giant dominates world politics and consequently plays a dominant role in the greater
transatlantic region as well. One can even go so far as to say that the United States,
being by far the strongest of the three actors, to a very large extent determines under
what circumstances, and on what issues, any strategic triangle really exists in the
region. The inclusion of Russia and the EU may appear somewhat less self-evident.
We do recognize that Russia is much less important in global politics than the Soviet
Union was before its collapse but we believe that Russia is still a major regional
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power whose role has tended to be downplayed in research and policy analysis of
transatlantic security issues and that the triangle framework covering the greater
transatlantic region therefore should encompass Russia. Likewise, we believe that
the EU is such an important emerging international actor that it should be included
in our framework. There is a tendency, especially in the United States, to emphasize
the economic aspects of European integration and to dismiss the geopolitical
significance of the EU because it is still very weak militarily. It is our belief,
however, that a united Europe should be taken seriously as a new political entity in
the transatlantic security environment.6
Although the book is about transatlantic security relationships, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is not treated in depth. This does not mean that we
fail to appreciate the importance of the Atlantic alliance, but it reflects our assump-
tion that NATO, while possibly remaining the key organization in transatlantic
security, will play a less important role over time in this context than it has for the
past half century. One reason why we believe that NATO will become less important
is that over the years there has been an explicit link between the existence of NATO
and the growth of the European Union. The military strength that characterized the
former to a large extent made possible the construction of the latter as a civilian
power. Since 1999, the EU, drawing on its substantial economic resources, has also
been in the process of building at least some military capacity. The main argument
supporting our belief that NATO will lose importance is thus that its role will be
overtaken by the EU, at least to some extent. In addition, we feel that it is fruitful
to analyse the future of transatlantic security without highlighting NATO, as has
been done in so many studies. At the very least, such an approach opens up our
thinking and indicates that different constellations, unimaginable while NATO still
reigned supreme as the pivot of European security, may be realized. In this book,
NATO is an arena for interaction among the three actors in the strategic triangle,
rather than an actor in its own right.
As a theoretical framework, our triangle construct is, generally speaking,
modelled on the original strategic triangle, consisting of the United States, the Soviet
Union and China, but there are several differences between the triangles. One
obvious difference is that the old triangle was intended to cover tripartite relations
on a global level, whereas, in our conception, the new strategic triangle covers such
relations in a subsection of world politics, albeit a large and important one.
Incidentally, we believe that an attempt to create a model that has the same purpose
as the old strategic triangle, covering virtually all of world politics, is not worthwhile
in today’s global arena. World politics are today too multi-faceted to characterize
by way of a single analytic model.
A second difference between the two triangles is that in the old one, there was
no question about what constitutes an ‘actor’, or that all three actors in the triangle
recognized each other. In the new triangle, however, the concept ‘actor’ is more
problematic, particularly when it comes to the European Union. It is fundamentally
unclear whether the Union may be regarded as an ‘actor’ in the same sense as the
other two in the triangle are. We believe that the EU’s ability to act internationally
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depends largely on the issue at hand, a question on which we elaborate later in this
chapter. Another aspect of this ‘actor problem’ is whether or not each actor in the
triangle even accepts the premise that the other two are actors of such impor-
tance to itself that they need to be considered when policies are formulated in the
relevant realm. It is obvious that this issue is most pertinent to policy-making in 
the United States.
A third difference between the two triangles is that the power base that largely
determined great power status and hence membership in the original strategic
triangle was the possession of vast amounts of weapons, particularly nuclear arms.
In the new strategic triangle, military strength is still important, but it is less crucial
than it was in the old one. The importance of economic power and diplomatic 
skills has increased. We feel that the crucial role that economic ties, particularly
trade relations, play for modern security relations today need to be studied to a
greater extent than has been typically the case in modern literature on transatlantic
security relations.
In the original triangle, diplomatic skills were important, as the quote from
Kissinger indicates. They played a role as the three actors manoeuvred to create
alliances. However, the only power base that really counted in great power diplomacy
was military strength. In the new triangle, other strengths weigh heavily in the
diplomatic games played. Moreover, the diplomatic arena itself has gained in
significance. The new triangle is situated in a global environment, where diplomatic
processes, typically undertaken within International Governmental Organizations
(IGOs), are more significant than they were three decades ago. Even if this is
sometimes forgotten, following, for instance, the transatlantic quarrels in connection
with the conflict in Iraq, IGOs are active in more areas, and also have a larger
capacity to influence the outcomes of global politics than they did three decades
ago.7 In addition, in some policy areas, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
have also been active after the end of the Cold War to an extent that was not the case
before that time. Taken together this means that diplomatic skills, as well as the basic
approach to diplomacy, are thus more crucial for the actors in the new triangle than
they were for the actors in the old one. To state that diplomatic skills are more
important now than they were 30 years ago is not to say that diplomacy in this day
and age can be conducted without any link to other aspects of policy such as trade
or military matters. For instance, what many have termed the ‘unilateralist policies’
of the United States under the first George W. Bush administration would not have
been possible to conduct effectively without the overwhelming military superiority
that the United States has had ever since the end of the Cold War.
The assertion that military power is less important in the new strategic triangle
context than it was in the old also needs some qualification by way of differentiating
between military means. In the old triangle, the strategic nuclear dimension of
military power was by far the most important, but, in the new context, this aspect
is clearly less crucial, whereas capabilities associated with concepts such as
‘strategic coercion’ and ‘crisis management’ play a greater role.
A fourth difference between the old triangle and the new one has already been
suggested. The new triangle is asymmetrical, to a larger extent than was the case
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with the original triangle, due to the enormous military and economic strength of
the United States. Consequently, the interests of the EU and Russia in the alignments
of the United States are much greater than are the interests of the United States in
the triangular behaviour of the two other parties.8 In the opinion of the authors in
this volume, the asymmetry with regard to the critical dimensions of power does
not invalidate the notion of the strategic triangle, even if it makes the three players
approach the game in distinctive ways. This is because the new triangle in important
respects is similar to the old one. The fundamental similarity is that the three actors,
for all their differences, tend to take the policies and relations of the other two actors
into account when formulating their own policies, at least in the part of the world
that we focus upon here. Although the United States is clearly dominant, it is hard,
even for the superpower, to completely ignore the others in the delimited part of
global politics that is studied in this book. It is this basic characteristic of almost
unavoidable relationships between the three actors of the new strategic triangle that
forms the idea upon which our book is based.
The new strategic triangle also contains other asymmetries. Only two of the actors
in the triangle are European actors, the EU and Russia. The United States has since
the end of the Second World War been a European power, but this is by choice, not
because it is by necessity a European actor. Washington is the only one of the three
that has such a choice – whether or not it wants to remain a European actor. Only
two are large and important global economic actors, the United States and the EU.
Only two are military great powers in the sense that they control arsenals of strategic
nuclear weapons, Russia and the United States. Two of the actors in the triangle –
the United States and Russia – also have a choice as to how they approach the third,
the European Union. Washington and Moscow can choose either to approach
Brussels or the national capitals. This means that the dyadic relationships between
the three parties, at the very least, vary. It also means that the three actors within the
new triangle necessarily play different roles.
This book examines the central aspects of the relations among these three actors
as they attempt to find their way in a world that has been fundamentally changed
through several events and processes during the last 15 years. In promoting or
adjusting to the fundamental changes, all three actors have had reason to redefine
their geopolitical roles and ambitions. Their search for new security identities is a
major theme in this book. The book focuses on the strategic outlook and approaches
of the three actors and the resulting interrelationships. In so doing, it also covers
aspects of a domestic character within each actor, but primarily to the extent that
such aspects impinge on the relations among the three.
The profound changes during the last 15 years started with the demise of the
Soviet Union and the concomitant fall of the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern
Europe. This momentous upheaval was followed by the deepening and enlargement
of the co-operation between the states of Western Europe, in what was the European
Communities and became the EU in 1993. Next came the process leading to 
the enlargement of NATO. Then, there was NATO’s reluctant intervention in the
Balkans, spurring the development of the EU’s military capacity. After that,
terrorists carried out their unprecedented attacks against the United States on 
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11 September 2001, an event unleashing awesome displays of American military
power. Finally, the United States, with the support of the United Kingdom and some
other countries, but without the authorization of the United Nations Security
Council, invaded Iraq to topple the Saddam Hussein regime.
The preceding paragraph is merely an extremely brief overview of some crucial
events and processes that have profoundly affected the security policies pursued by
the three actors in the greater transatlantic region and hence also the development
of transatlantic security relations, and that thus need to be kept in mind if we are to
try to understand the state of current affairs in this sphere, and to lay a foundation
for trying to grasp what may happen in the future.
Employing the notion of the strategic triangle
It should be clear from the outset, first, that our use of the strategic triangle as an
organizing principle for this volume does not mean that the triangle serves as a
straitjacket imposing rigid discipline on each author or authors to subscribe to
exactly the same view on the importance of the triangle and of what ought to be
studied in their respective chapters. Instead, the editors have done their best to see
to it that each chapter makes at least some contribution towards a better under-
standing of the relationships among the three actors, even if the emphasis in some
of the chapters is strongly on one or two of the three actors.
Second, the use of the triangle might be construed to mean that all three actors
in the triangle must be treated to exactly the same extent in a book that purports to
cover the development of their security relations. We do not believe that this is
necessary. The most important reason why we do not cover all three actors equally
is that one of the actors, the European Union, is very different from the other two,
the United States and Russia. The latter two are nation-states, that is, actors for the
analysis of which there is an immense literature with different strands of well-
established theorizing. When it comes to the EU, however, things are very different.
The EU is more difficult to understand because it is an amorphous entity that defies
standard analytical categories. Moreover, it is contested in the academic literature,
as well as in practical politics, whether or not the Union is indeed an international
actor of any importance in its own right, outside the trade sphere where its role is
readily acknowledged.
For all these reasons, this book contains more chapters on the European Union
than it does on either the United States or Russia. We devote several chapters to
analysing EU actorness, that is, the ability of the Union to be an international actor.
A central subject here is the construction of EU actorness, or, to put it differently,
the internal building of the EU’s actor capacity in the area of security and defence
policy. The argument in this book is not that the EU is a fully fledged actor in this
area. We recognize that it is very much an international actor in development; 
at the same time, we believe that the development of the Union’s actorness is
absolutely vital for future relations within the greater transatlantic region. To 
the extent that the Union is coming closer to being an actor more like Russia or the
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United States than it is at the time of writing in 2005, our notion of a strategic
triangle in all likelihood becomes more applicable to additional policy areas and to
ever more issues. Thus, there is an urgent need to study the characteristics of this
new entity and to attempt to determine what might become of it in the future.
Third, the notion of the strategic triangle has very different analytical usefulness
depending on the type of policy area or even on the individual issue. This is true in
several senses. One way in which it is true concerns the role of the European Union,
whether it is regarded by other actors in the triangle as a unified actor, or whether
it is, instead, the national capitals that are the interlocutors for Washington and
Moscow. In the case of the Iraq War in 2003, the Union was unable to act as a
unified actor, and it was, instead, the capitals that each pursued its own policy
regarding the issue and the United States, the prime mover behind the invasion.
The EU fared much better in dealing with the political turmoil surrounding the
presidential elections in the Ukraine in the winter of 2004. To quote Robert Kagan’s
poignant phrase: ‘In the unfolding drama of Ukraine, the Bush administration and
the European Union have committed a flagrant act of transatlantic cooperation’.9
Regarding the Ukrainian presidential election, then, the United States and the EU
clearly co-operated with each other in a way that implied that Washington in this
case recognized the EU as a legitimate actor, with which it should interact on an
issue with clear ramifications for transatlantic security relations. Another way in
which the type of issue may play differently in the triangle is where one of the
corners in the relationship may serve as a link between the other two, such as 
the question of the destruction of Russian nuclear weapons that Russia seems unable
to handle on its own, which unites the EU and the United States in common concern.
Finally, in a non-exhaustive survey of the significance of policy areas and issues
for the applicability of the notion of the strategic triangle, there are issues where two
of the actors in the triangle are very strongly linked to each other, whereas the third
actor plays virtually no role. A case in point is international trade, where the United
States and the EU are the two most important actors in the global arena, which
means that they interact to a very large degree in this issue area, whereas Russia is
very peripheral. As we write this, in mid-2005, Russia is not even a member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).
It should also be recognized that the notion of a new strategic triangle has been
developed by European scholars. When it comes to studying the role and relations
of the United States in the triangular context, it remains to be seen if the new
strategic triangle is a notion that may catch on. In our section on the United States,
the third section of this book, we address the question of whether or not, or perhaps
rather under what circumstances, the new strategic triangle – when seen from the
vantage point of Washington – may be fruitfully applied to studying the relation-
ships between Washington, Brussels and Moscow.
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Three related actors undergoing change
As indicated earlier, we regard the European Union as the most problematic and,
at the same time, in many ways the most intriguing actor of the three we have chosen
to study from our perspective of a transatlantic strategic triangle. It is an emerging
international actor, now containing 25 member states, which is undergoing
important changes, not least in the sphere of foreign, security and defence policy.
This actor has an immense potential strength if all the assets that the 25 states bring
to the table can be utilized in international affairs.
The new emerging actor, the European Union, exemplifies, to a large extent, the
new conception of security in the twenty-first century. The general character of 
EU foreign and security policy is expressed in this way in the Treaty Establishing
a Constitution for the European Union: ‘The European Union shall conduct a
common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political
solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest
and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States’
actions’.10 In the next article, I-41, the Constitutional Treaty spells out the essence
of the defence aspects of the European Union:
The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the
common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an
operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union
may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict
prevention and strengthening international security in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance 
of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the
Member States.
(EC Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article I-41)
At the time of writing in mid-2005, the Constitutional Treaty has been rejected
in referenda in both France and the Netherlands. Despite the fact that the future of
the Constitutional Treaty looks very uncertain, we still believe that this is the most
formal expression of the projected role of the Union in foreign, security and defence
policy in Europe in the near future. The brief quotes printed above provide a clear
indication of the fact that the EU is a particular kind of international actor. It views
security differently than traditional nation-states do, and its policies are defined in
a complex interaction with and among member states.
We are aware of the fact that the European Union and the role that the organi-
zation is playing and ought to play in the greater transatlantic region is a matter of
contention among practitioners as well as scholars. British Prime Minister Tony
Blair has clearly expressed one notion of the EU and the role it ought to play in
international affairs, while simultaneously outlining the role he sees for Great Britain
in this context. In November 2004, Prime Minister Blair stated his conception of
the relationship between Europe (read the European Union) and the United States:
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‘So my contention is simple: Britain should be proud of its alliance with America;
clear in its role in Europe; and a tireless advocate of a strong bond between the
two’.11 Although Blair, in a major policy reversal, agreed in 1998 that the EU should
develop a military capacity outside of NATO, the British conception of the EU thus
envisages a union in an intimate alliance relationship with the United States.
The French Government has consistently provided the alternative conception of
an EU that is an actor with a more independent role in relation to the United States.
President Jacques Chirac expressed this second vision of the European Union in a
speech given during a visit to London in November 2004:
Europe has created a model: after totalitarianism, two World Wars, the
Holocaust and nearly 50 years of Cold War, it decided to break free of
the power games. Its peoples have established an area of peace,
democracy, solidarity and prosperity founded on the freely conferred
sharing of sovereignty. This has made the European Union an original
and exemplary international player.
(Chirac 200412)
The assessment of the actual and potential role of the EU in the strategic triangle
in this book is closer to the French conception of European independence from the
United States than it is to the British notion of transatlantic intimacy. We argue that
the EU is seeking to define its identity, at least in part, by aspiring to greater self-
reliance in matters of international security, especially in the event that the United
States is reluctant to become involved via NATO, thereby asserting more European
autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Whether the EU will counterbalance the
United States on the world stage is a different question lacking immediate relevance.
Although supportive of the EU’s security and defence policy, Germany, a third
European state of great importance for the future development of the EU as an actor
in international affairs, is apparently loath to join France in pressing the Union to
form one united counterweight to the United States. Helga Haftendorn and Michael
Kolkmann provide this perceptive analysis and contrast of the views of Berlin and
Paris on these issues during the first years of the twenty-first century:
Paris wants to develop the European Union into a counterweight to the
United States, while Berlin views a strong Europe as a reliable partner
of the United States. Germany wants to retain the Atlantic Alliance as
a transatlantic framework for action and as an instrument for crisis
management and peace enforcement.
(Haftendorn and Kolkmann 2004: 476)
We believe that the existence of varying views among the most important
members of the EU about both the future role of the Union as a global actor more
generally, as well as of the proper nature of its relations with Washington, provides
another reason for why a book such as ours ought to give more emphasis to the
study of this actor than to the analysis of the other two actors.
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Russia also is undergoing changes in its approaches to international relations in
the transatlantic triangle. After a truly traumatic experience of national decline,
Russian leaders are in the process of formulating their country’s role in the world.
The collapse of the Soviet Union was, of course, a major geopolitical shock, from
which the much weaker successor state, the Russian Federation, is now trying to
recover. President Vladimir Putin in April 2005 called it ‘the biggest geopolitical
catastrophe of the century’. While seeking to rebuild Russia as a great power and
pursuing a long-term political strategy that is conceptually incompatible with the
ambition of the current administration in Washington to preserve American primacy
in world politics, the Russian leaders have decided to co-operate with the United
States and the other democracies in the West in combating international terrorism.
In this context, it was of central importance to US–Russian relations that President
Putin reportedly was the first foreign leader to contact President Bush directly after
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 offering support. There are indications
that the personal relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin was strengthened
by Putin’s actions on or just after 11 September and remains close. This is despite
the fact that strains have recently been put on relations between Russia and the United
States by the Iraq War, Russia’s nuclear co-operation with Iran, its interference in
the Presidential elections in the Ukraine in late 2004 to preserve the power of the
autocrats, and the Kremlin’s domestic political actions to limit democratic freedoms
and centralize power in Russia, including its dismantling of the oil giant Yukos.
On the other side of the triangle, Russia also uses its ability to create linkages
across issue areas. One example is where Moscow supplies a crucial EU country –
Germany – with large amounts of natural gas. According to the Financial Times,
‘Germany already imports 35 per cent of its oil and 40 per cent of its gas from
Russia’.13 It is hard not to see a link between this dependence on oil imports and
the statement by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder that Vladimir Putin is a
‘dyed-in-the-wool democrat’.14 One may intimate that Russia uses its energy assets
to put the West European countries into a state of dependency which then decreases
the ability of these countries to criticize the Russian Government, or otherwise act
against Russia’s interests. In addition, the example may indicate that the Kremlin
uses the complex structure in the EU to sometimes interact with Brussels, other
times with the national capitals.
An example of interest for this book where Russia has interacted more directly
with Brussels is, we believe, the Russian decision to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change, made in the autumn of 2004. It is hard not to see a connection
between this decision on the part of the Russian leadership and the willingness of
the EU to support Russian membership in the WTO. In a situation where the United
States continued to refuse to adhere to the Kyoto Protocol, Russian accession
became vital for the European countries, which very much want the Protocol to
enter into effect. When Russia signed, the minimum threshold necessary for the
Kyoto Protocol to come into force was passed.15
The United States of today is a very different actor from that of 30 years ago. 
It is, at the same time, uniquely powerful as the sole surviving superpower and, at
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least, if one considers the security situation of the past century, uniquely vulnerable.
If the EU is an emergent actor trying to shape its security identity as it expands and
increases its military co-operation, and Russia is attempting to find its footing as a
much less powerful international actor than its predecessor the Soviet Union, then
the United States is also, to some extent, searching for a new role in international
security affairs, both globally and within the transatlantic strategic triangle. The
global landscape in which the United States acts has been changed by at least two
seminal events during the last 15 years: the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
and the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001.
The fall of the second superpower meant that the first, the United States, came
to dominate the global scene, to the extent that some observers characterized it as
the most powerful state in modern history. At the very apex of its power, however,
the US giant was subject to what was perceived as the first military attack on the
continental states since Great Britain burnt Washington in 1814. The 2001 terrorist
attacks precipitated an American security policy of vigorous international engage-
ment. A state that had seen itself as invulnerable within its shell – with the sole
exception of the threat of extinction in a global nuclear war with the Soviet Union
– thus went abroad to ‘find monsters to slay,’ so as to prove its continued power and
to prevent, or, at least, to decrease significantly, the risk of further unconventional
attacks on the American homeland. The US decision to go to war against the regime
in Iraq in 2003 was a crucial security policy decision. This war and its implications
for transatlantic security relations are treated in various chapters in this book.
We believe that the United States needs to be studied from several perspectives
to determine what role it plays in today’s transatlantic strategic triangle, and to
discern what the important factors are that may influence its actions in this context
in the future. One perceptive way of expressing the role of the transatlantic security
relations for Washington in 2004/5 is stated by David M. Andrews: ‘Absent the
interlocking concerns that had once united Washington and Moscow in supporting
a substantial armed American presence in Germany, Europe is no longer the
centrepiece of American grand strategy.’16 Given this fundamental starting-point,
we endeavour to examine what role Europe plays in US global affairs in the early
twenty-first century.
One such aspect that we believe we need to study is economic relations,
particularly trade, among the three actors in the triangle. It is obvious that Washington
has immensely strong links with Western Europe in this sphere, and less developed
ties with Russia. In our view, economic relations form an increasingly important
part of security policy today, both in their own right and as linked to other issues.
These economic links form an absolutely vital bedrock of the relations between the
United States and the EU, which is why it is necessary to explore their nature and
their ramifications. Russia is not linked to the other two actors in the triangle to
nearly the same extent in economic respects, even if Moscow’s role in the delivery
of oil and natural gas, particularly to some European countries, is not unimportant.
Other topics that need to be studied if one wishes to understand the role of
Washington in the transatlantic strategic triangle are to what extent and in what
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ways US policy-makers seek to preserve the dominant global position of the United
States and whether other international actors attempt to counterbalance the immense
weight of the superpower. Counterbalancing reactions are discernible. In particular,
we analyse the policies of Russia in this respect.
Economic issues and questions about military power come together in the US
debate on Grand Strategy. The only overall superpower has been searching for
overarching guidelines for its international posture ever since the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991. Instead of a broad political consensus on America’s proper role
in the world, there is an ongoing debate among American politicians and scholars
featuring a number of contending grand strategy visions. This is the reason why we
have included a chapter on the ramifications of this strategic debate after the terrorist
attacks of 11 September. Due to our focus on the transatlantic strategic triangle, one
crucial aspect of this chapter is that we analyse under what circumstances, or to put
it differently, under the terms of which Grand Strategy the decision-makers in the
United States would contemplate playing a strategic game such as the one postulated
in this book.
The structure of the book
In this book, the transatlantic strategic triangle serves as the organizing principle.
This means that our goal is to cover the most crucial issues for understanding the
current status of transatlantic security relations, as well as address the issues that
will determine the future of these relations. It also means that the chapters in our
book share a few overriding themes, while they, at the same time, also delve deeper
into issues that are specific to each chapter.
The following questions are thus the overriding ones that these chapters, to
varying degrees, address: What is the significance of the issues covered in this
chapter for the current status of relations in the transatlantic strategic triangle? What
are the implications of the analysis in each chapter for the likely future development
of the transatlantic strategic triangle, in terms of crucial developments for one actor,
for the relations between two of the actors, or for the security relations between all
three actors? What does our analyses of the ‘actorness’ of the European Union imply
for the future of the transatlantic strategic triangle as a whole? And, finally, to what
an extent, and on what issues, can the notion of the strategic triangle help understand
current and future relations between the United States, Russia and the EU?
This book is divided into three sections following the introduction. Each section
focuses on one of the actors in the strategic triangle, taking account of the actor’s
relations with the other two actors. In the first section, consisting of four chapters,
we cover aspects of the development of the European Union. How can the enlarged
EU of 25 members be characterized as an actor in the broader transatlantic region
in the early part of the twenty-first century? That is one of the overriding analytical
questions that this book wishes to address from different perspectives. Each
individual chapter of the first section of our book covers a different aspect of this
broader question.
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The two first chapters in the section devoted to the EU, Chapters 2 and 3, examine
the Union as a whole. Chapter 2, written by Magnus Ekengren and Kjell Engelbrekt,
studies the enlargement of the Union from 15 members to 25 that took place in
2004, asking whether what may be gained in terms of capabilities in the sphere of
foreign, security and defence policy may perhaps be lost to an even more important
extent in terms of reduced cohesiveness? The consequences of the enlargement
process of the Union are thus one crucial aspect of the further development of the
EU as an actor in the strategic triangle.
In Chapter 3, Arita Eriksson studies how the military dimension has been
developing in the EU since 1999. She discusses the implications of this development
for the external and internal relations of the EU. She thus addresses the issue of what
military capacity the EU has acquired during the last five years, and what its main
plans are for the future in this field. The question of whether or not the development
of the crisis management capacity that the EU has acquired really has any
importance for its role in the greater transatlantic region is raised. In addition, she
also illustrates another aspect of the development of the Union’s defence policy:
how this process interacts with and influences the defence policies of the Member
States, in this case Sweden.
While Chapters 2 and 3 concentrate on developments within the European 
Union as a more or less unified actor, Chapters 4 and 5 are case studies of four
individual members of the Union of 25. These studies illustrate a fundamental truth
about EU member states in the early twenty-first century; namely, that they are
grappling with issues of how to conduct their foreign, security and defence policy
and where to anchor these policies: nationally, bilaterally, in NATO or in the
European Union. The two chapters have the common theme of problematizing 
the relationship between the growing actor capacity of the Union in the security 
and defence sphere, and the implications that this has for carrying out security and
defence policy, traditionally the preserve of the nation-state, in four European states
in the future.
Chapter 4, written by Fredrik Bynander, asks the question: What makes some
European states assume the role of ‘trusted allies’ of the United States in the war
against terrorism in general and the Iraq War in particular, rather than align with
the Franco-German axis that strongly opposes recent US policy in the Middle East?
The chapter studies the cases of Poland and the Czech Republic in their processes
of dual accession to NATO and the EU. The term ‘instinctive atlanticism’ has been
used to describe their recent security policy, and their preoccupation with security
guarantees from the United States through the enlarged NATO has been seen as the
defining trait of its motivation. The author problematizes these unidimensional
portraits of the two maturing democracies and their quests to find a place in a
changing European security setting. This chapter thus provides us with another
angle on an aspect that also preoccupies Ekengren and Engelbrekt in Chapter 2:
What will enlargement mean for the EU as an actor in the strategic triangle? Poland
and the Czech Republic can be seen as two case studies of this problem, but they
may also represent tendencies among the other eight new members of the EU.
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In Chapter 5, the final chapter of the EU section, Adrian Hyde-Price focuses on
another aspect with clear relevance to the future of the European Union: strategic
coercion.17 He asks whether or not European nations, working as a collective in the
EU, may be getting ready to contemplate the use of the threat of military force, as
well as the practical application of such force, in situations, where diplomacy,
economic policies and non-military sanctions have proved ineffective. Or instead
will strategic coercion, to the extent that it still exists in Europe, remain the exclusive
preserve of the independent nations, particularly the United Kingdom and France?
If the British and French Governments in the future were both willing to devote real
military resources to the further construction of the European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), then this would mean the EU would become a very different actor
in the strategic triangle of the future.
In the second section of our book, we study Russia from a triangular perspective.
The broader analytical question that the two chapters in this section, combined,
seek to address can be formulated as follows: What is the role that Russia under
Vladimir Putin wants to play within the context of the new strategic triangle during
the next five to ten years? Clearly, Russia cannot afford deteriorating relations 
with either the United States or the EU. In Moscow’s view, the United States 
retains its historical role as Russia’s primary counterpart in the global security 
arena. Washington’s fierce battle against terrorism correlates well with Russia’s
uncompromising stance towards terrorists and separatists, and only serves to
strengthen Moscow’s impression that the United States counts more than any other
state in the international security system. The EU is important to Moscow for partly
other reasons. Cooperation between the EU and Russia is decisive since in the
security sphere the two parties are mutually dependent. A range of motivating forces
spur co-operation, most importantly interdependence both in the economic sphere
and as regards ‘soft threats’ in Europe. Both economic interdependence and the
need to co-operate to handle common threats to security increase with the eastern
enlargement of the EU. However, several obstacles have served to delay a deepening
of co-operation so far. This is further elaborated upon in Chapter 6, where Charlotte
Wagnsson examines the relationship between Russia and the EU. While focusing
on relations between two of the three actors in the triangle the chapter also has 
clear implications for the relationships between all three actors studied in this 
book. In this process of formulating their security strategies the two actors are
acutely aware of the importance of their direct relationship, as well as of the crucial
role for both of them played by the third party on the other side of the Atlantic
Ocean.
In the seventh chapter of the book Bertil Nygren focuses on Russia and its
relations with two of its most important neighbours, the Ukraine and Belarus.
Relations among these three countries are strongly influenced by the two enlarge-
ment processes going on in Western Europe, in the EU and in NATO. The fact that
none of these three countries has any realistic chance of entering either organization
in the medium term, perhaps with the exception of the Ukraine, means that they 
will have to adjust their foreign and security policy to the developments in both
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organizations. A fundamental question asked in this chapter is whether Russia will
use this changing situation to strengthen its ties with, as well as its dominance over,
its two neighbours. A second important question for Chapter 7 is what the impli-
cations may be for the role of Russia in the strategic triangle as a result of the
development of its relations with the Ukraine and Belarus. Together, the two
chapters on Russia thus provide at least a partial answer to what type of role Russia
wishes to play in the new strategic triangle, and, also, how Moscow envisions its
role in relation to the EU.
In the book’s third section, comprising three chapters, we focus upon the United
States and its relations with the other two players in the new strategic triangle. The
overriding theme that these three chapters have in common is an assessment of 
the United States as an actor in the greater transatlantic region. To what extent 
is the US conception of its role in global politics today consistent with the notion
of the strategic triangle? Will Washington conduct important aspects of its foreign
and security policy in the transatlantic region in a way that takes the relationships
with Russia and the EU into consideration, or will what we earlier characterized 
as unilateralism continue to be the essence of US foreign and security policy in the
global arena?
In Chapter 8, Peter Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross assess the significance 
of the new strategic triangle in grand strategy options currently available to the
United States. To what extent can this triangular relationship play any role in
shaping global US commitments and interests after the end of the Cold War?
Dombrowski and Ross place this question within the framework of the US debate
on grand strategy, which has until now often been discussed in terms of four
alternative visions: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, liberal internationalism
and primacy. Dombrowski and Ross, in their analysis of how the new strategic
triangle may be conceived in the United States, add a fifth alternative: empire. They
outline the alternatives and assess the relative importance of the triangle in each
alternative.
Jan Hallenberg in Chapter 9 focuses on the importance of economic ties among
the three actors in the triangle. The strengths of the relations among them are
assessed. In addition, the strains that the Iraq War put upon relations among actors
in the strategic triangle are evaluated.
The tenth chapter in this book, by Håkan Karlsson, looks at the asymmetrical
relations between the United States and Russia. It examines various manifestations
of the grand strategy of primacy actually pursued by Washington in recent years,
focusing primarily on the contentious international security issues of NATO
enlargement, strategic nuclear force planning, strategic arms control, and missile
defence, and studies the Russian perceptions of and responses to this US grand
strategy. Washington’s reaction to the efforts by Russia to resist US global
domination is also explored.
In the final chapter (Chapter 11), the circumstances under which the new strategic
triangle may exist are assessed on the basis of the results of the analyses in the
previous chapters. The current status and prospects of the triangle are discussed, 
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and we provide a tentative answer to the question whether the triangle concept 
in fact helps us understand the transforming security relations in the greater
transatlantic region.
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THE IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT
ON EU ACTORNESS
Enhanced capacity, weakened cohesiveness
Magnus Ekengren and Kjell Engelbrekt
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the impact of the latest European Union
(EU) enlargement on actorness in an international environment. The question of EU
actorness is of crucial importance for our understanding – and indeed the existence
– of a triangular relationship between the USA, Russia and the EU. Can a Union of
25 member states think and act strategically, and will it be attributed strategic
capacity by the two other actors making up the triangle? We begin looking for
answers by considering eastward enlargement through the prism of new security
threats, the changed significance of geography and geopolitics, the assets brought
in by new member states, along with the dual role/identity of the Union as both a
global network player and a more traditional actor. We conclude by elucidating
implications of this somewhat intricate equation, as well as of the interplay between
the EU and the other two players, in the form of four scenarios.
More than ten years have now passed since Christopher Hill raised the issue of
the ‘capabilities–expectations gap’ and found flaws with the EU as an international
actor.1 In the meantime, the Union has gained a more robust mandate in external
relations and a wider range of resources. In fact, it may be argued that several of
the previously empty spaces in Gunnar Sjöstedt’s evocative 1977 matrix, outlining
structural prerequisites for full-fledged ‘actorness’, today can be pencilled in. 
A ‘community of interests’ has been formalized in the field of foreign and security
policy, organizational units charged with the planning and execution of crisis
operations are in place, and the routines guiding co-ordination between Council
staff and the rotating presidency have been improved. On a variety of levels, that
is, institutional elements have been added to augment the Union’s ability to conduct
itself internationally.2
Still, few consider this development as being satisfactory or believe the EU’s
overall ability to work the international scene matches the term ‘actorness’. Except
for a handful of issue-areas, most notably agricultural and trade policy, the elephant
is not even run by an elephant boy, but by an ant. For a rough but mind-boggling
comparison, the annual budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
is 35 million euros, whereas the US State Department in 2004 alone spent 7.5 billion
dollars on ‘Administration of Foreign Policy and Other Appropriations’.3 Besides
the EU’s tiny budget for foreign and security policy, major obstacles to joint action
remain in terms of institutional complexity, a number of legal restrictions and the
weakness of democratic oversight.4
The elusive character of EU actorness
On the output side, the old pattern of limited European co-operation persists.
Development of joint policies has not been much advanced in recent years, despite
obvious opportunities.5 While there were as many ‘joint decisions’ in 2001 and
2002 as in the previous two years, there was in the same period a drop in ‘common
positions’ from 35 (1999) and 33 (2000) to 19 (2001) and 16 (2002), respectively.6
Among the new instruments created in the Amsterdam Treaty, ‘enhanced co-
operation’ has not been used at all, and there are only a handful of instances of
international agreements adopted via the concerted procedure under Article 24 
of the Treaty. At any rate, the low level of activity testifies to an absence of active
joint policy development and indirectly to failing actor cohesiveness. The same
could be said about the voting patterns of EU member states in the United Nations
General Assembly.7
To be sure, the term actorness has prompted a fair amount of confusion and
misunderstanding in EU literature.8 Countless analysts have noted that the
underlying comparison with a powerful nation-state and its ability to operate in the
global political environment is wrong-headed. In fact, even Hill and Sjöstedt hinted
at an awareness of this problematic assumption. On the other hand, the alternative
conceptualizations of the EU on the international stage advanced by scholars are
plentiful, though not necessarily more appropriate. To recall only a few of them,
the EU’s external affairs policy has been described as ‘post-national’, ‘post-
modern’, ‘post-Westphalian’ and characterized by ‘network governance’ or mere
‘presence’ rather than by agency.
While individually creative, the combined weight of these conceptual innovations
also has a tendency to subvert or displace the original question. Instead of addressing
the related issues, the literature has at times used the EU as a prop to discuss the
nature of contemporary globalization, the pervasive influence of transnational flows,
or trends of political and cultural fragmentation (or, conversely, homogenization).
Arguments in the vein of the early discussion on actorness have been less common.
Drawing on the well-established literature on principal–agent relations, Rittberger
and Zelli usefully suggested that EU actorness can be derived from two sets of
circumstances, namely that a mandate either has been delegated to an ‘agent’ (for
instance to the Commission) or that it stems from a substantive agreement among
the ‘principals’.9 Analytically pertinent too is the observation that the Union’s
international performance is increasingly characterized by the multi-level European
polity, making the assessment of actorness dependent on the layer in focus.10
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In a straightforward manner, this analysis will describe actorness as a function
of capacity and cohesiveness. Capacity is understood as arising from the various
resources the actor may be in a position to employ. Different from the term
‘capability’ applied in much earlier literature,11 ‘capacity’ has an aggregate quality
that its individual components may actually lack. Furthermore, capacity does not
exclusively concern capabilities that are constantly at the disposal of an actor, but
constitute resources that can potentially be mobilized for a particular end.
Cohesiveness, meanwhile, is contingent on a significant degree of similarity in
perceptions of values, identities, interests or threats. Needless to say, it is highly
unlikely that all of the kinds of perceptions mentioned will ever fully coincide. Yet
cohesiveness is therefore an appropriate term for that ‘sticking-together’ proclivity
that actorness requires, not least when the going gets tough in world politics and
other players seek to weaken the unity of EU member states.
The added complexity of enlargement
Whereas many in principle agree that implicit comparisons with Great Power
actorness are misleading, much of the current debate about the implications of EU
enlargement indicates that misconceptions are still deeply rooted in scholarly
assumptions. By adding ten new member states, a common claim is that the EU will
be significantly weakened as an international actor.12 Besides a few references to
the long-standing discussion on actorness, however, these claims are rarely
explicated or systematically addressed. We would argue that, at the very least, such
sweeping assertions regarding the repercussions of eastwards enlargement warrant
serious scrutiny.
New members bring new capacity to the EU in part by adding areas of interest,
history, geography, natural resources, population, economic assets, environmental
problems, cultural values and political positions. However, they also contribute
with their own skills and networks of external relations and diplomatic legacies,
traditional bilateral ties and other constellations. For example, the first enlargement
introduced a range of trade issues related to the British Commonwealth and
Denmark, streamlining various areas of divergence between them arising out of
the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and the Common Commercial Policy
of what was then the European Community (EC). 
United Kingdom membership, in particular, implied a new dynamic in the EC’s
relations with the US and the developing countries. In one stroke the EC’s external
relations acquired both a Northern European and truly ‘global’ dimension. More
recently, the fourth enlargement widened and deepened the geopolitical concerns
on the part of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. Following
the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland, the Union notably came to share a
common border with Russia.
Like the fifth enlargement, the (negotiated but not yet ratified) sixth and possibly
seventh rounds of expansion will inevitably extend the EU’s commitments all 
along its Eastern frontier. While the previous enlargement mainly precipitated the
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development of a ‘Northern dimension’ with significance for the approach to
agriculture, fisheries and Russia,13 it seems safe to assume that the new accessions
will forge an ‘Eastern dimension’, which might transform the character of the entire
Union. Judging from the May 2004 Commission strategy paper in particular, the
eastwards enlargements ought to compel the EU to adopt more robust and elaborate
policies with respect to all neighbouring countries, in the Mediterranean region as
well as in the Black Sea area, the Caucasus and the part of Eastern Europe bordering
on the new member states.14
As opposed to earlier enlargements, however, there are two extraordinary
challenges to EU cohesiveness this time. First, the sheer number of new entrants is
staggering. The inclusion of ten new member countries in May 2004 is far more than
anything previously attempted, with implications ranging from steeply rising
translation costs to the prospects of successfully applying the so-called Community
method and traditional harmonization strategies. Second, the diversity of the
individual countries has never been more overwhelming. Somehow the earlier
expansions have tended to group countries with certain similarities in historical
background, economic profile and political outlook. The 2004 accession, and those
which may follow within the next decade, lack such facilitating conditions. What
can Poland and Malta, or Estonia and Cyprus for that matter, be said to have in
common other than their EU membership?
The unprecedented diversity among the new member states renders all predic-
tions of common external policies of the future enlarged EU more difficult. True,
the majority of new entrants are ex-communist countries. In terms of an Eastern
dimension it is clear that the EU gains both knowledge and a complex heritage of
entanglements when it comes to Russia and Ukraine, through the accession of the
three Baltic states and Poland, and Turkey, via Cyprus. To the extent that Moscow
and Ankara seriously pursue closer relations with the EU, this should be to their
benefit. The same is presumably the case with applicant states in the Western
Balkans and other countries in the Caucasus and the greater Black Sea area with,
among others, Lithuania and Slovakia now on the inside.15 But what are the likely
consequences of enlargement on the external policies of the EU? In particular, what
are the implications of EU ambitions to bolster its actorness in international affairs?
As in the case of earlier enlargements, the interplay between new capacity and
challenges related to cohesiveness will to a high degree depend on the historical,
global and institutional context. We hold that predictions of a dilution of EU actor-
ness due to enlargement may be misconceived due to insufficient analysis of these
contextual conditions. For example, the challenges to cohesiveness in the first
enlargement were subsequently outweighed by a renewed partnership between the
Community and the US. The same could be said for the challenges associated with
the fourth enlargement, coinciding with fundamental transformations in world
politics at the end of the Cold War. In order to pay sufficient attention to the context
of world politics, we will therefore examine the possible effects of the most recent
enlargement on EU actorness by answering the following three questions: What
international environment will an enlarged Union be facing? What external policies
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will an enlarged Union pursue? What EU actorness and, indeed, what kind of
international entity, will the new capacity and challenges of cohesiveness give birth
to in a rapidly changing environment?
The outlook from Brussels
From the distinct vantage point of the EU and its key joint institutions, the present
external environment could be described as characterized by three different factors.
First, there is an incipient security landscape, born from the spoils of the Cold War
arrangements and sharpened by the 11 September attacks and their consequences.
Second, geography is taking on a new meaning, weakening the significance of
borders and distance while inserting a novel geopolitical dynamic. Third, there is
a transformed agenda of global issues facing all major actors and institutions
operating on the international scene.
Against this backdrop, the enlargement has provided the EU with a powerful
impetus in a forward direction. While still absorbing ten new members and adapting
its routines, EU institutions appear to be exploring ways of translating the
enlargement into additional capacity. At the same time, there is an intense quest for
joint policy within an agenda that seems to be expanding at the same pace as
enlargement itself.
The EU in a new security landscape
In recent years, scholars of international relations have criticized ‘traditional’
theories of the international system for depicting it as made up of autonomous actors
among which the Union will take its place. Such approaches, they argue, fail to
grasp today’s transformed international environment and the new kind of entity
that the EU constitutes.16 Others hold that this may not be a problem when assessing
the character and practices of the Union. The EU can be treated as an entity able
both to further co-operation in networks and to possess traditional actor capabilities
vis-à-vis other – national as well as international – players. It is perhaps even this
combination, it is argued, which makes its experience unique. The EU’s roles are
simultaneously operational at two levels, or rather in two dimensions.17
Wæver argues that the EU is a security actor due to its four roles of ‘keeping the
core intact, ensuring there is one core rather than several in Western Europe; silent
disciplining power of ‘the near abroad’; the magnetism working already in East
Central Europe; a potential role as direct intervenor in specific conflicts’.18
The first of these roles is closer to the Union’s network character, the latter to 
the one of a traditional actor. William Wallace has defined the frontiers of Europe
as ‘boundaries of networks’, within which the Deutschian ‘sense of security
community’ is to be found.19 A ‘Network Europe’ has been conceptualized as a
region, a platform, a value space – as part of a network that is already becoming
genuinely global. Here, the role of the EU consists in the creation of exchanges and
interdependencies between poles or nodes within this network. On the basis of the
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growing collection of case studies of the Union’s external actions,20 it seems safe
to assume that, due to its strong network character, the EU has been – and probably
will remain – politically strongest within and on its own frontiers. In this perspec-
tive, the Union’s greatest security value may be the European unity it can wield at
the time of its biggest enlargement ever.
At the same time a remarkable development has, during the last decade, taken
place with regard to the Union’s actor capacity. After the horrifying Balkan
experience, the Union set up a basic crisis management mechanism. This type 
of crisis, it was asserted, should never be allowed to recur. In the aftermath of 
11 September 2001, and the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq, many in the Union 
began proposing an autonomous defence capability in order to be able to carry 
out the same type of global power politics and retaliation as the US. The unratified
EU constitution would have opened up ways of introducing more flexibility into the
actions of the Union outside its territory. The focus in that document is very much
on the willingness and ability of member states. The EU is treated as an arena which
provides suitable institutions for intergovernmental co-ordination. The Madrid
terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004 displayed with brutal clarity the close inter-
linkages between internal and external EU security. As an answer to this challenge,
the Union in March 2004 adopted a solidarity clause for the prevention of and
protection against terrorist attacks.
Thus, the new dynamics in global and European security have had a significant
impact on the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This has been the case not only with regard
to policy disagreements within the CFSP, such as the one over the Iraq conflict and
the unipolar and US-led world. However, it has also taken place in terms of a more
fundamental transformation in the form of new threats (above all terrorism), the
erosion of the boundary between external and internal security and the decreasing
importance of territorial defence. This dimension of change is now affecting the
CFSP/ESDP just as it has affected national foreign and security policy.
The Security and Defence Articles that were planned to be included in a new EU
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would for the first time have implied
a codification of the ESDP. Instead, the long-term development of the ESDP became
more uncertain after the failure of the member states to ratify the Treaty in 2005–6.
Even though many of the proposals in the Draft Treaty, such as the establishment
of a European Defence Agency, can still be implemented within the framework of
the existing Treaty, the issue of whether a ‘common defence’ still is the goal for the
Union remains unsolved.
Meanwhile, the question is often raised: whose security are we referring to if 
not primarily the territorial security of the state? Many recent domestic reforms in
the European states are a response to 9/11, such as the establishment of new bodies
aimed at strengthening societal security in the field of emergency and vulnerability
management. Tentatively labelled ‘functional security’,21 such practices are aimed
at minimizing a host of possible threats ranging from weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and dangerous materials in the former USSR, to transatlantic bioterrorism,
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container security, cyber-terrorism, power cuts and forest fires.22 A vivid expression
of this mental change is the blurring of the traditional border between internal and
external national security. Analysis and planning are preoccupied with crisis
situations and the prevention of conflicts and crimes rather than traditional wars.23
European co-operation is becoming a prerequisite for functional security and
national defence in the context of transnational threats and risks. The EU’s objective
within the broad sector of ‘non-territorial’ security – an objective developed in 
all three EU pillars – has been to minimize societal vulnerabilities and the number
and impact of emergencies by establishing comprehensive systems of crisis
management.
In December 2003, the Union adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS)
proposed by CFSP High Representative Solana. The first threat mentioned in the
security strategy is terrorism. The second is WMD proliferation, a scenario that
might result in power cuts, water supply problems and a breakdown in basic
infrastructure.24 The other three threats are essentially structural and non-military:
regional conflicts, failing states and organized crime. Discussions on whether or not
to incorporate the realm of the Union’s third pillar, justice and home affairs (for
example personnel and threat identification), indicates wide acceptance for a broad
security approach to the ESDP as well. For internal as well as external security
reasons, many demand better co-ordination between civilian ESDP activities,
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the Commission. It has also been suggested
that security thinking should be ‘mainstreamed’ into other areas of EU co-operation.
The EU should, according to the solidarity clause, make the most of its multi-
sectorial character – including military instruments – in action on its territory.25
Transcending geography
The EU is, according to many analysts, now acting in a transformed international
system breeding new types of borders and identity, post-modern ‘zones of peace
and turmoil’ and global network(s).26 Some suggest that the system is likely to
develop into a loose network of primarily economic co-operation between poles/
regions.27 The role of the EU would in this system be to strengthen the exchange
and interdependence between the different poles. For example, the euro has, as a
reserve currency, strengthened the position of the EC as the largest trading bloc. This
is of great significance for the possible creation of a new world order based on a
‘tripolar’ monetary network (dollar, yen and euro zones, respectively) and an
accompanying system of three trading regions (for further treatment see Chapter 9
of this volume). Former Commission President Delors saw as one of the goals 
of la grande Europe as becoming a ‘geo-economic ensemble’ in the globalization
process.28
Internally, the EU is poised to begin dissolving the traditionally geographic or
geopolitically oriented foreign policy of its member states. For example, the blurring
of clear demarcations between national and EU affairs, due to the evolving EU
polity, alters the very nature of foreign policy in Europe.29 The development is
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basically a result of pragmatic, result-oriented sector policies and horizontal
problem-solving. One may predict that also the Union’s external policies will 
be similarly characterized by horizontal issues that bypass the geopolitical logic.
The Union presently stands for a multilateral approach projecting civilian influence
rather than (military) power to the outside world.30 Even though this role has 
been questioned due to the large number of troops deployed abroad by the EU
member states,31 the main instruments of the EU in global affairs remain economic
and ‘soft’ instruments, such as humanitarian aid and environment policies. Some
believe that only by preserving its civilian character will the Union continue to
exercise its ‘normative power’ and project its role as a model for other regions 
in the world.32
Some observers envisage that an enlarged Union to an increasing degree may also
transform the European and international environment. Precisely the Union’s
internal structure and its lack of traditional foreign policy means is thought to
engender a new outlook that goes beyond the traditional nation-state way of
assessing the global challenges.33 On this view the Union’s external policies would
help shape the international environment and decrease the importance of geo-
politics in the Union’s relations with other parts of the world. One question is to what
extent security, economic and monetary systems actually can be ‘regionalized’.34
For instance, the security and economic wealth of Europe will continue to largely
depend on political stability and oil imports from the Mediterranean area and the
Middle East. Another issue is how the Union would actually go about bolstering its
influence in global networks, given the existence of more than one global power-
centre.35 In this vein, the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, has
called on Europe to ‘invent a new atlas, not just reform the road map’.36
The widened global agenda
Globalization is likely to continue to alter the structure and functioning of European
economies, the way of preparing and making policy and moulding our societies. The
EU is at the same time an expression, a promoter and a regulator of economic
globalization. Even if national policies and domestic economies remain critical,
European economic regionalism has increased the EU bargaining leverage in global
economic negotiations, increased the competitiveness of European firms and
facilitated the pooling of resources and formation of regional corporate alliances.
The inter-relationships among the three major economic regions – the EU, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
operation (APEC) – will presumably be increasingly decisive for the global political
economy, although individual players such as China and India are also likely to
assert themselves. The question is to what extent the three economic regions could
found a sufficiently robust common ground for the building of governance structures
and international institutions able to govern the global economy.37 The weakness
of the EU in this game is that the gap between economic and political integration
has been growing wider during recent years.38
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The global agenda also encompasses climate change and global warming, which
could precipitate expansion of deserts and increase the number of people in the
world that are exposed to extreme weather conditions. As a result, the number of
humanitarian crises around the globe is likely to rise, in their turn triggering large-
scale migratory movements. Sustained high population growth rates may cause an
increasing number of people to compete for food, energy, water, land and clean air
– and thus pose a major potential for conflict. By the same token, global health
concerns are likely to gain increasing importance; the spread of transmittable
diseases is already causing concerns. This can only increase in the future, as
epidemics such as HIV/AIDS cause life expectancy to plummet and to hollow out
the productive classes, in particular in developing countries, with important
implications for long-term stability.
More so than individual member states, the EU has the potential to effectively
address several of these global challenges. Its external policy areas can today be 
said to include: trade policy, the external dimension of financial and economic
policy (the external dimension of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)), aid and
development co-operation, common foreign and security policy, the external
dimension of policy on police and judicial affairs, and the external dimension 
of asylum and migration policy. In one way or another, on a global scale the EU
has to respond to growing income inequalities, persisting poverty, the spread 
of transmittable diseases, the need to create a level playing field for our industries
to compete internationally, and the risk of ‘downward’ regulatory competition
(taxation, environmental or labour standards).
Closely linked to these challenges is the need to help reshape the global
institutional architecture to new realities, reducing the risk of regional economic
crises impacting on Europe’s economy, responding to international terrorism, illicit
drugs and arms trade, illegal immigration, cyber warfare, and the threat of nuclear
proliferation.39 In a sense, these are all defensive measures necessitated by the
vulnerabilities of modern European societies. Another institutional agenda is 
more offensive, benefiting from new technologies and opportunities created by
democratizing societies and free markets. The latter includes the need for the EU to
lower its tariffs and make other rich countries follow suit, but also to help build inter-
national coalitions to fight poverty, to develop novel approaches to aid (embracing
good governance, the rule of law and basic human rights), to sustain energy security,
to halt environmental degradation (natural disasters, energy consumption, migratory
movements) and to develop the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’).
The impact of enlargement: readjusting external policies
In this section we revisit the three dimensions of the EU’s external environment
outlined in the previous section, focusing on the policy agenda of the newcomers
and prospects for applying the new skills and resources to external challenges in the
coming years. But before turning back to foreign and security policy, a few remarks
on diplomatic practice and economic interests may be in order.
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Once outside the orbit of Moscow domination, the Central and East European
(CEE) states rapidly rebuilt their skills in the realm of multilateral diplomacy. If the
room for manoeuvring had been severely limited under constraints imposed under
commitments to the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA), post-1989 realities opened new opportunities for bargaining on the inter-
national scene. CEE activism contributed to revitalizing several branches of the
United Nations family of international organizations, with the IMF, the World Bank
and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assuming a direct interest
in the problems of transition societies. With the exception of accession negotiations
– which remained bilateral in the formal sense – the multilateral activities of CEE
states in Europe spawned into most aspects of foreign policy. The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, NATO,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU
provided new venues for diplomatic and political co-operation and, given the
widespread interest in problems of transition societies in the early 1990s, CEE
governments found themselves in a position to influence the agenda of international
organizations.
From the outset, the EU influenced candidate countries towards a less legalistic
approach with a distinctly regional and multilateral flavour. As ‘objects’ of the
common policy emanating out of the 1993 Copenhagen Council, CEE governments
found that it was in their mutual interest to co-ordinate some of their actions vis-à-
vis the powerful Union. Moreover, Brussels openly encouraged formal co-operation
among candidate countries, such as the so-called Visegrad group drawing on an
historic experience of co-operation between Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. The Central European Initiative, the Council of Baltic Sea States, the
Quadrilaterale, the Black Sea co-operation group and others, can be added to the list.
On the other hand, due to the polarization of international relations in the Cold War
era, post-communist countries often maintained connections in precisely those parts
of the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and Asia where West European
governments kept a modest presence. So even if some post-communist governments
wished to thoroughly overhaul their countries’ foreign policy, such ties proved
simply too useful to be discarded and could now be mobilized for EU purposes.
Some continuity in ‘substance’ is thus likely to carry over into Europeanized
CEE positions. When it comes to the economy, it similarly appears probable that
the Union’s emphasis will, at least temporarily, tilt towards agriculture, due to the
lower level of urbanization in the majority of new member states. Poland, and in
the next round Romania, represent the main cause of that shift as eight million
farmers will be added to the Union’s current seven million.40 The widespread
reliance on Russian oil and gas deliveries will accentuate vulnerabilities in energy
supply for the Union as a whole, though with Poland as a major consumer.
Meanwhile, the higher rates of economic growth throughout Central and Eastern
Europe will somewhat help offset stagnating figures in the western portions of the
continent.41 Levels of foreign investment are also comparatively high in, above all,
the Baltic countries, Hungary and Slovakia. Overall, prices, wages and costs are
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growing but will remain substantially below those of Western Europe for the
foreseeable future.
However, these are aggregate effects and do not always reflect common features
or interests on the part of the acceding states. For instance, the economic structure
of Cyprus and Malta has little in common with that of the former communist
countries in Central Europe. But even among the CEE countries, there are both
historically contingent variations and cleavages resulting from post-1989 flows of
foreign investment, government or NGO aid, as well as enrichment or depletion 
of human capital resources. For example, Romania’s initial advantage in lacking a
significant foreign debt was swiftly dwarfed by the vast inflow of foreign capital in
neighbouring Hungary. Also, the absence of a range of economic and political
institutions in newly independent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania may in retrospect
be regarded as a blessing, as entirely novel modern structures could be created from
scratch after 1991.
Security: new and old conceptions
While reforming the defence and security forces in Central and East European
countries in connection with EU and NATO enlargements, post-communist
governments embraced a broader security agenda. Defence forces were given a
broader mandate so as to be able to assist civil emergency units in case of natural
disasters, but also for general emergency planning purposes. In readying for NATO
enlargement in particular, border disputes and other bilateral issues were solved or
permanently set aside. Working with EU bodies such as the Commission, the
European Parliament and the Council, a wider conceptualization of security and of
threat was gradually integrated into the foreign policy of candidate countries.
Supporting roles were played by the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
The new threat perceptions derived from mass-scale terrorist attacks challenged
the foreign and security policies of all European states (albeit not as massively as
in the US). Several of the new EU members were in fact quite responsive to calls
on counteracting terrorism and to do so by coercive, partly military means. It could
be argued that an initial incentive to do so was the unfinished US ratification process
regarding NATO accession. Others, though, argued that the experience of post-
communist societies is different from that of Western Europe in that many believe
the defence of liberty may require sacrifices. Despite ambivalence among the
population as to the rightfulness and effectiveness of military intervention as a tool,
some new member states – notably Poland – assumed important commitments in
Afghanistan as well as in Iraq.
An obvious sign that most CEE governments are more concerned about classic
military, territorially based, threats is the unambiguous preference for NATO as a
security instrument on European soil (on conflicting loyalties of CEE countries see
Chapter 4 of this volume). Some simply view it as the only truly effective security
organization in the region, unrivalled by any new acronyms the EU has thought up
over the past years. Others equate NATO to US security guarantees, which they
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believe are useful not only to prevent a future Russian threat but something that
keeps Germany at bay. The mixture of confusion and anxiety on the part of all CEE
governments when the ESDP was launched in the late 1990s seems symptomatic;
all immediately declared that they were deeply opposed if this new co-operation 
in any way threatened to undermine NATO and US involvement in European
matters.42 In accordance with the same logic, with Warsaw leading the way they
have as EU members made the Union ‘tougher’ vis-à-vis Russia and Belarus but
been careful not to harm the US–Russia relationship, which in turn might have
repercussions on their own ties with Washington.43
Still, the traditionalist views are not matched by adequate military resources. All
new member states spend well below 2 per cent of GDP on defence. Due to NATO
commitments, a slow rise should be expected over the next couple of years. Some
of the countries are nevertheless starting from (literally) zero. The Baltic states have
in fact built up a defence force with equipment and advice from, above all, the
Nordic countries. Looking at the modest pledges made to the European Rapid
Reaction Force (and in some cases ‘double-hatted’ to NATO Rapid Reaction
Forces), the newcomers are hardly poised to assume major commitments under 
the ESDP, for the most part offering to dispatch a company or a battalion. Poland,
with a population larger than the other nine accession states put together, stands 
out in earmarking an entire framework brigade, along with police and search and
rescue units.44
Anyway, it seems uncertain whether the widened notion of security always
translates into a deeper recognition, or appropriate conclusions being drawn, among
the new member states. It also remains to be seen if the lack of implementation
stems from lack of knowledge of deeper EU values and methods, or if the new
members simply differ in their foreign policy ‘disposition’. The same uncertainty
applies to the ‘national bias’ of foreign policies in several countries. Poland’s ‘Nice
or Death’ slogan during the December 2003 European Council may have stunned
West European governments, but expressions of similarly assertive and ‘self-
centrist’ policies are not uncommon among the newcomers.45 The rejection of the
UN plan to unite Cyprus by the Greek population in the south of the island, on the
eve of the republic’s accession, represented an analogous disappointment to many
EU officials. Sensitivities on minority issues clearly linger in several new member
states and most governments pursue an active relationship with the Diaspora
community. For example, Hungary, despite international criticism, persists in 
its protective stance with respect to Hungarians in neighbouring territories, and
Latvia has declared ties with the national Diaspora as one of its five top foreign
policy priorities.46
A ‘post-national’ EU less likely?
It may therefore be said that the majority of new entrants share certain distinct
features of a more ‘traditionalist’ foreign and security policy than that of the West
European states. Having gained real sovereignty and autonomy some fifteen years
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ago, and experiencing a form of national rebirth in the meantime, it would probably
be strange if most of the new members did not feel a wish to bolster both state and
nation.47 The ‘Back to Europe’ slogan partly means ‘away from communism 
and Russian dominance’, though partly ‘Back to Normalcy’. With normalcy, a
prosperous, democratic, but also sovereign condition is intended.
Nationalism remains a powerful force in Central and Eastern Europe, and right-
wing political parties – viewing themselves as the guardians of national dignity and
integrity – will continue to be sensitive to any perceived retreat from sovereign
positions.48 They will help keep alive, beyond formal agreements, what they view
as historical injustices and skewed power relationships between majorities and
minorities. To the extent that disputes between ethnic and religious groups cannot
be solved or are aggravated, these national sentiments could be mobilized anew.
More than the persistence of geopolitical reasoning in European politics, it is a
legacy of geopolitical rivalries in the nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth century.
The lingering of ‘national issues’ may evidently make the transition to a ‘post-
modern’ or ‘post-national’ state of EU regional or global policy less likely. The
intricate multilateralism of European politics is something the new members already
have become accustomed to. But the experience is more of inter-governmentalism
than of political forms oblivious of borders, space and ethnic identity. The kind of
activism which Spanish, German or Italian regions display in EU settings will take
time to develop in the new member countries, not least because of their communist
centralist legacy. Like most small EU countries, they are likely to be assertive about
safeguarding the standing of their language and culture.
Conversely, there are, as of yet, few signs that the new members will be comfor-
table in pursuing ideas of the EU as a model, or a ‘normative power’, in conducting
foreign and security policy. First, the high-strung rhetoric of the communist
predecessors has made the ground particularly weak for ‘model’ idealism. Second,
the sometimes useful but rather annoying paternalism of the EU Commission
towards the former candidate countries is presumably not something they would
want to emulate.49 Third, for several of the CEE governments the US provides a
better model in some policy-making areas. Fourth, there is principled disagreement
as to the effectiveness of the EU’s institutional capabilities to match the rhetoric,
as well as to the political desires which might ensue from such self-praise.
Fitting the global suit
As in the case of previous enlargements, it will take some time before the ten new
member countries, all ‘small’ or ‘middle’ powers in realist theory terminology, get
used to wearing the new global suit. It is not the suit of a ‘great power’ actor in the
sense that heads of government can exert the kind of direct influence that they are
familiar with from the domestic context. The newcomers, however, will now be
sitting at a table, with a voice among several others, at which policies with, at times,
global repercussions are actually forged. By comparison, CFSP policies have a
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much wider scope than those of NATO, where Hungary, Poland and the Czech
Republic already have several years of experience. To the extent that the new
member states have ambitions to be part of that process, they will need to rapidly
develop skills and competences on issues and about parts of the world which so far
have been of marginal interest to them. Considering problems more close to home,
on the other hand, accession will multiply the opportunities to yield influence
through that of the EU’s overall stance.
In terms of the EU’s present and future global agenda we have already noted 
that the new members are positive towards free trade but may strengthen the
conservative position of the Union on the important question of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and trade in agricultural products. The greater reliance
on the farming and foodstuffs sector in Central and Eastern Europe is likely to make
countries like Poland, Slovakia, and later, Romania and Bulgaria potential allies of
France and protectionist lobby groups in Brussels in this subsection of Union trade
policy.50 Combined with a fear of further social dislocation and higher unemploy-
ment resulting from additional waves of economic restructuring, the possibility
cannot be excluded that this conservative bias under certain conditions may weaken
overall EU support for liberal world trade arrangements.
More likely, however, is that the new members will continue to benefit greatly
from growing trade within and outside the internal market, and therefore work with
Western European governments to restructure their economies and modernize the
farming sector so as to reduce its dependence on subsidies. Several countries, such
as the Baltic states, Hungary and Cyprus, have economies which are already deeply
intertwined with the rest of Europe and they will no doubt be forceful proponents
of further liberalization of international trade. Even if the EU through the Eastern
enlargement will become more self-sufficient in trade terms, from 19.4 to 17.7 per
cent share exchange with non-EU partners,51 most governments tend to maintain a
position on global trade arrangements which is consistent with their stance on free
trade within the internal market.
More of a contradiction between old and new EU members is likely on envi-
ronmental issues. It is true that basically all post-communist states have activated
a number of the international conventions and other agreements which their
predecessors had, typically, signed but not ratified or effectively implemented.
Symptomatically, despite their alleged sympathies for US foreign policy, all new
members and candidate countries have both signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol
on reducing carbon dioxide emissions.52 Overall, though, the commitment to
environment-friendly policies is shallower than that of many ‘old’ EU members.53
All new member states negotiated long phase-in periods in this area of the acquis
communautaire, and environmentalism as a social movement only gained ground
in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s (and at first mainly as a relatively
safe channel of political protest).
The same can be said about the prospects of new member states becoming deeply
involved in the health approach pursued globally by the EU in recent years.
Unaccustomed to active participation in the richly woven fabric of international
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co-operation on welfare matters, not least due to the fact that the EU, the US and
Japan in the past set the agenda in this realm, there is limited experience and political
energy to mobilize on global health issues. On certain concrete problems, which
concern the region more directly, co-operation prospects are brighter. While the
HIV/AIDS issue only recently began to seriously affect CEE countries,54 trafficking
in women and teenage girls and boys already constitutes an acute problem. A related
issue, which is beginning to impact new members, is immigration. Whereas West
Europeans mainly fear a large-scale labour force influx from Central and Eastern
Europe, immigration into the new member states is in some cases rising steeply.55
This increase should represent a powerful incentive to help forge an effective EU
policy on immigration and migration, regionally as well as globally.
The nature of the (actions of the) beast
The latest EU enlargement should, as mentioned above, result in a new balance
between capacity and cohesiveness, which does not necessarily translate into
weakened actorness, though it might change the nature of the EU’s character and
actions. The capacity of the Union draws strength from knowledge and assets
brought in by new members, but it is also bolstered as a consequence of extending
economic co-operation, trade and network governance beyond the EU’s formal
borders. At the same time, cohesiveness could weaken through the internalization
of an increased number of ‘national issues’ and be additionally undermined by the
establishment of a new set of demanding security and defence aims. The overall
implication is that the contours of the enlarged Union appear differently in each of
the three dimensions – or ‘historical trends’ – that we have extrapolated and then
allowed to inform our study.
European capacity augmented
By extending and enhancing the importance of European networks through
enlargement, the Union is extending the frontiers within which it is at its strongest.
It extends the level playing field where it is profoundly influential, i.e. within
European and global networks. In this way, the EU acts a promoter of the exchanges
and regulations in European networks for dealing with ‘horizontal’ questions, such
as environmental degradation and organized crime. The Union projects its ‘internal’
functional approach to security ‘externally’ in a system with no clear apex or
centre.56 The blurring of the internal/external security division is expected for the
EU itself (not only between the member states) as a consequence of the extended
co-operation with new candidate and neighbouring states beyond the new circle of
members.57 The European Neighbourhood Policy launched in May 2004 is a good
illustration of how the EU operates in this vein to build relationships and project
stability in its vicinity.58
On the other hand, failures and problems for enlargement would challenge the
Union’s identity as a model for regional co-operation. In the light of the preceding
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section, it seems as if actor capacity will be bolstered due to increased resources and
greater weight in multilateralism and international organizations. In the European
Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, Javier Solana put the total number of
foreign affairs professionals working for the then 15 member states at 45,000.59 To
the degree that the world’s largest ‘army’ of diplomats can be mobilized for a
particular purpose, the Union is indeed a traditional world actor, since mid-2004
gathering 25 states behind its negotiation and bargaining positions. Add to that, EU
Commission delegations in 125 countries. In this dimension, the Union has an
awesome capacity – agency – to move issues. Moreover, it provides a powerful
platform for common or co-ordinated actions of an increasing number of member
states vis-à-vis other actors.
Will the Union then be able to speak with one voice and act cohesively in the
world through a ‘single machinery’?60 Clearly it will not be able to do so on every
issue, or all the time. According to many observers, there has until now been too
much of a focus on the actor side – and its shortcomings – shadowing the Union’s
long-term stability promotion through the creation of international networks. The
expectations have been based on a conception that the EU would develop traditional
foreign and security policy aims and instruments: it was expected to become a
nation-state on a larger scale.
Perhaps a more pertinent question is whether one of the two dimensions of the
Union – actor or structure – will become more important than the other in an
enlarged Union and an increasingly globalized world. The Union will presumably
continue to promote the two as complementary tracks. Can the Union, though,
explain to other international actors and to public opinion what it does at both levels,
and to the US and Russia in particular? Here, the serious image problem of the
Union may become greater due to enlargement and weakened cohesiveness. At
least for the purposes of political symbolism, larger organizations tend to demand
a stronger centre.
Recent research suggests, however, that a’Europe of several layers’ is developing
and that it generates a new type of international relations where the EU is involved.
At the ‘lower’ level, there is a Union that conducts networking activities on a global
scale (related to trade, co-operation and governance structures). At a ‘higher’ level,
this work is supplemented by common (foreign) policies, bilateral relations between
EU member states and non-governmental external relations. If sufficiently influ-
ential, ‘EU visionaries’ feel, this multi-layered external identity might be promoting
a paradigmatic shift in international relations, towards a situation in which the
balance of power logic between autonomous units will be downplayed.61
The challenge of cohesiveness
With regard to the CFSP, the second enlargement (Spain and Portugal) complicated
the EC’s discussions on Eastern Mediterranean issues, given Turkey’s membership
aspirations. The fourth enlargement meant a new emphasis on crisis manage-
ment and conflict prevention – the Petersberg tasks – in the CFSP, introduced by
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new non-aligned member states (Austria, Finland and Sweden). This brought 
about a new focus for the security policy of the EU: from defence matters to crisis
management. Between 1998 and 2001 the institutions of the CFSP evolved at a
rapid pace, further leading to the establishment of the ESDP, military and civilian
crisis management capabilities, and a conflict prevention policy (on the military
dimension see Chapter 3 of this volume).62 So far the increase in the number of
members has not, defying many predictions, resulted in EU bodies becoming
bogged down in endless discussions and inefficiency. In fact, the early experience
suggests that stricter rules for interventions are applied in order to allot repre-
sentatives of all 25 member states a fair share of the total meeting time.63
This does not mean that there are not substantial forces of divergence at work.
The failure to ratify the Draft Constitution in 2005 also implied a missed chance to
establish the post of a Foreign Minister for Europe. This will most probably have
negative repercussions on the cohesiveness of Union foreign and security policy,
not least on the intra-institutional relations between the member state-oriented
Council and the supranational European Commission. Moreover, it has been
suggested above that most CEE governments are more concerned with military
instruments and collective defence than were the EU15.
In order to depict the emerging security identity more clearly, it is nevertheless
important to link such policy preferences to the overall constitutional developments
of the Union. The possibility of including a mutual defence clause in the Treaty has
repeatedly been discussed in the EU. However, it was never realized due to strong
resistance from many member states. The enlargement has now inserted a new
dynamic into this matter. The focus on strong conditionality of a possible mutual
defence clause in the 2003–2004 discussions on a new Constitution may have begun
to shift the debate in a new direction. The CEE members, first and foremost firmly
committed to NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees, would be in a position to
change the balance in favour of so-called flexible integration and unconditional
mutual defence obligations among a subset of members. They are unlikely to do so
by engendering consensus on autonomous EU defence, but rather by restating the
negative argument for flexibility: we can’t wait for all 25’.
This development could already be seen in the drafting of a ‘structured co-
operation’ Article during the elaboration of a new Treaty in 2003–4. The aim of this
Article was to provide for a framework for those member states that are both willing
and able to participate in more demanding military capability co-operation. Here
the EMU is the model, with its convergence criteria for membership (i.e. with
corresponding requirements for military equipment and crisis management
readiness) which have to be fulfilled by the member states wanting to participate.
The model generates pressure on all states to strengthen their military crisis manage-
ment capacity and to create a better trustworthiness and efficiency for Petersberg
missions (peace enforcement, peace-keeping, crisis management). The underlying
rationale is an implicit expectation that member states will increase spending on new
military equipment (satellites, combat aircraft, aircraft carriers) and an improved
division of labour between the member states based on their comparative advantages
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regarding the production of needed material. The overall aim is a genuinely
European crisis management capability.
A possible structured co-operation on defence capabilities in the future could be
seen as ‘back-door’ erosion of national autonomy. No country wants to be denied
participation in any future operation in which it might want to participate. The new
form of co-operation will compel member states to fulfil the EU capacity criteria
in order to retain their freedom of manoeuvre for possible participation in future 
EU missions. The CEE states will ask themselves to what extent they want to
allocate resources to both NATO’s rapid reaction forces and the EU’s military crisis
management, including structured co-operation. It requires little imagination to
forecast that this new form of flexible integration may also, in the medium term,
precipitate new divisions among the EU member states.
Thus, the new trends in the area of defence could potentially weaken cohesiveness
and lead to differentiation and possibly even rifts among the member states. One
can discuss whether this is a natural development or something prompted by an
enlarged Union of 25 to 30 member states. What seems clear is that the issue of
flexible integration in EU defence matters will always trigger debate among the
member states. EU25 will probably be as sceptical about the idea as EU15. The
question is whether strong division over the issue will add another dynamic to 
a larger circle of members with a variety of security traditions and preferences. 
The UK and non-aligned EU member states will always have difficulties with
differentiation in this area, as they see no need for flexibility clauses. Other states
want to see a more autonomous European defence and military crisis management
power on the world scene.
However, there are also signs of counteracting developments in the area of
security and defence, of significant forces of convergence. The Solidarity Clause –
a political declaration adopted in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings in 2004 –
could be a way forward to forge a sense of unity among 25 member states. Also,
the clause indicates that the Union, due to its transnational character, is able to think
about transboundary threats in a way that is difficult for nation-states. It states that
the Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including military
resources, in order to: prevent terrorist threats; protect democratic institutions and
civilians from terrorist attacks; on request, assist member states on their own
territories in the event of a terrorist attack. To that end member states need to co-
ordinate their actions in the Council. In turn, the Council will be assisted by the
Political and Security Committee and by a new standing Committee on Internal
Security. The European Council, finally, is tasked with regularly assessing the
threats facing the Union. In that sense the Solidarity Clause has the potential of
bridging the two main views on EU defence: collective defence, on the one hand,
and crisis management and security through networks on the other.
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Geopolitical object/subject
Many observers estimate that the eastwards enlargement will pose formidable
problems for EU actorness, since there lies a crucial difference between the fifth and
previous enlargements in the number of candidates. We question the logic behind
the reasoning about the importance of the number of actors, and possible dilution
of integration, by dividing up the actorness concept into capacity and cohesiveness.
Thus, we should now be able to make distinctions on the basis of the dichotomy with
regard to the impact of numbers. Do, for example, numbers matter in the global
networks of primarily economic co-operation between poles/regions, as envisaged
by some? Maybe on the contrary: the extension of the European ‘pole’ of the global
network into Eastern and Central Europe, which also radiates into Russia, can be
advantageous for the EU’s external role. It will bind the continent together into a
web of contacts, exchange and common rules.
It is more difficult to discuss the possible problems of numbers when focusing
on the cohesiveness of the EU as an actor vis-à-vis other global players, including
the triangular constellation explored in this volume. Here it may be fruitful to try
and understand the net effect in terms of centrifugal forces, affecting the cohesive-
ness in a negative way, whereas others are centripetal forces, working to promote
common external policies. Strömvik believes that the net effect of enlargements 
is determined by, among other things, the ‘shadow of enlargement’ and ‘size
adjustment’. The fear of a greater difficulty in reaching decisions after enlargement
would then have persuaded old member state governments to finally decide on
matters that without the ‘shadow of enlargement’ were nearly impossible to solve,
such as institutional reform (as illustrated by the Draft Constitution provisionally
adopted in June 2004 but not accepted by French and Dutch voters). There have
actually been steps towards developing the procedural framework for the EPC/
CFSP in connection with each enlargement.64
An alternative way of approaching the problem of cohesiveness is to follow
Rittberger and Zelli in framing it as a principal–agent relationship.65 The entire
integration project can be couched in the principal–agent theory by highlighting the
role of the Commission as an agent, mandated and acting on behalf of member state
governments and legislatures, in executing jointly decided policies. In the field of
foreign and security policy, however, this analogy has become more relevant as a
result of the opportunities provided by current treaties to charge the CFSP High
Representative with important tasks on a case-by-case basis, as well as by the (still
unexploited) possibilities of applying qualified majority voting. Given the political
will of principals, the shrewdness of the High Representative, and a big enough
crisis or threat to European interests, it is no longer so difficult to imagine a situation
in which EU bodies are granted a robust mandate to resolve a specific problem.
With 25 member states instead of 15, arguably, this prospect may in fact appear
closer at hand.
As mentioned, the EU has most effectively responded to its boundary area not
as a traditional foreign policy actor, but by extending its internal structure (‘network
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governance’) and integrating external actors and resources into the policy-making
processes.66 In other words, it has done so by projecting the Union’s ‘internal’
methods of crisis and conflict prevention externally. Thus, one of the tasks of 
the new actor capabilities of the Union is to manage crisis and conflict in an area
where it is already functioning as a transboundary network. The EU aims at being
a better-equipped foreign policy (external) actor in the same boundary realm as it
increasingly constitutes a domestic (internal) European structure. The forthcoming
enlargements of the Union only serve to underline the complex EU security role in
a boundary realm ‘moving’ eastward.67
One implication of this is that numbers may matter less than commonly expected
when considering our definition of actorness. Thus, EU enlargement is perhaps
rather a question of ‘the more the merrier’ than ‘wider but weaker’. If economic co-
operation is the main feature of the EU’s external relations, enlargement is likely
to strengthen the position and influence of the CFSP as well. The problem remains
that the lack of strong political leadership may even be aggravated in a more
diversified union. Will the enlarged EU develop into an international actor able to
make strategic choices, for example vis-à-vis Russia? Will it be an actor with
political autonomy reflecting at least part of the aggregate capacity that EU member
states possess individually? That is, is the EU able to begin to change from a geo-
political object or presence on the international scene, to a subject?68
As a civil world power and defence union, the EU will perhaps not contribute to
a multipolar world. Instead, a theoretical possibility is that the Union’s successful
internal dissolution of a geopolitically oriented foreign policy, and of balance of
power behaviour between member states, will be transposed into the international
environment of its extensive relations. Like European foreign policy in general,
EU defence might be set up according to a functional approach. Its focus will
continue to be ‘horizontal’ questions, such as environmental degradation, human
rights, and international terrorism and information warfare. The Union can in this
context be described as an innovative ‘platform’ for international co-operation, a
‘network’ and a ‘democratic space’. This is demonstrated by the fact that it is
strongest within, and on, its own frontiers. The Union’s enlargement policy may in
this respect be its optimal external strategy.
The EU may therefore not need not to resolve the tension between Network
Europe and ‘l’Europe Puissance’. Instead it should try to exploit the duality to a
maximum. In this way the Union may contribute to a redefinition of the global
security landscape. The new outlook goes beyond the traditional nation-state’s way
of assessing the global security challenges and can be conceived as a truly European
‘post-nation-state’ outlook. Given this admittedly ambitious objective, one of the
EU’s primary tasks would be to comprehensively understand and explain – to public
opinion and its partners in the world – the innovative value and inherent potential
of this duality. In other words, EU institutions would be shaped so as to reframe
globalization from being perceived as a threat to looking at it as a structured,
regulated network based on multilateral organizations with the Union itself as one
possible model.
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Four scenarios
The fear that actorness would be undermined by eastwards enlargement seems
exaggerated. The overall capacity of the EU will grow even though many of the
individual capabilities are not substantially enhanced. This is not well understood
by political scientists, but perhaps better by decision-makers. In a poll taken at the
Davos summit in 2004, only 4.7 per cent of the participants believed the latest EU
enlargement would weaken the influence of the Union in the world; 69.8 per cent
of the participants responded that it would be strengthened.69 Cohesiveness is clearly
the major challenge, but it remains to be seen to what degree political differentiation
will represent an actual impediment to the Union’s political autonomy. For instance,
it is striking how extraordinarily few exceptions were made by the new entrants
when they acceded to the CFSP acquis and policy positions.
The level of cohesiveness may very well depend on what concrete issues the
Union is confronted with over the next few years. Politically, it would appear that
two aspects are likely to have overarching significance. First, will the EU face
serious security threats which require military responses? Second, will the US be
intimately engaged in the most important external relations challenges of the EU?
Regardless of all other circumstances, the persistence of the status quo appears
unrealistic. Considering the huge aggregate capacity amassed by the enlarged
Union, the ‘capabilities–expectations gap’ has grown accordingly. The expectations
of the new members are not necessarily oriented in a particular direction, or focused
on a specific set of issues, but the historical opportunity of ‘returning to Europe’
implies that people inevitably pin hopes on European institutions. Not applying the
capabilities at the disposal of each member of this group of states, at least in part
forged as a value community, would sooner or later undermine the EU as a political
project. Therefore, with regard to EU actorness and its implications on the strategic
triangle discussed in this volume, four different scenarios appear feasible.
The first scenario can be termed modest Europe. The EU and its external relations
objectives revert back to a situation similar to that before the Balkan wars of the
1990s. The Union scales back ambitions to shape the global agenda in the fields of
trade, environment, health and others. It is induced by the new member states, as
well as by the threat of mass terrorism, to work with a narrower conception of
security and to reaffirm bilateral ties to the US. Most probably, Europe revitalizes
the transatlantic link, but this also allows for a partial ‘renationalization’ of the
ESDP and the CFSP. Traditional geopolitical thinking may linger and negatively
affect ties with Russia, though global trends in economic relations and technology
will not permit international relations in Europe or elsewhere to shift back to 
the forms of the twentieth century. The Union remains, above all, the world’s largest
marketplace.
The second scenario may be labelled assertive Europe. The EU develops security
and defence capabilities and, in parallel, the decision-making structures and
procedures which allow them to be used. Put differently, the Union forges
interrelated foreign, security and defence policies for EU25 (plus). It increases its
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activities in a number of global policy fields and reinforces its reputation as a
powerful promoter of international justice, prosperity, welfare and human rights.
In the realm of security, the Union continues to operate with a broad understanding
of security, but this notion is supplemented by development of a substantial military
capability. Building on the aggregate capacity which in several policy areas and in
crisis situations can be mobilized for common actions, the EU for the most part
continues to be supportive of US strategy. Yet as Washington is turning its attention
towards Asia, the EU is, in its own proximity, sometimes also able to more or less
offset the influence of the world’s remaining superpower. The latter is a develop-
ment which Russia, under its present leadership, is likely to embrace.
The third scenario is called ambivalent Europe. It entails a Union which has
developed a range of external relations capabilities, including military instruments,
as well as the relevant decision-making procedures, but remains deeply divided
about how and when to apply them. It has gone along part of the path outlined in
the assertive Europe scenario, but stopped short of reaching consensus on the policy
implications. The result is a vacillating Europe which has problems finding a
workable equilibrium. One outcome may be to stick primarily with the Union’s
considerable ‘soft power’ instruments, but with the danger of several of the larger
countries temporarily breaking off collaboration to launch their own missions.
Either the Union’s formal unity retains priority for all and ‘ambivalent Europe’ is
more or less entrenched, or a smaller number of activist, transatlanticist or ‘you-
have-to-crack-eggs-to-make-an-omelette-minded’ member states will eventually
forge a federation – a United States of Europe. European ambivalence would then
have been institutionalized. Meanwhile, the US, Russia and other international
actors will have to live with the unpredictability of EU policy-making.
The fourth scenario can, for lack of a better term, be entitled New Atlas Europe.
As in the vision of Prime Minister Juncker, the Union invents a new set of instru-
ments and approaches altogether, drawing on its unique experience and character.
‘New Atlas Europe’ no doubt envisages a high profile in most realms of global
governance and norm-setting. It includes a focus or ‘specialization’ of EU security
policy on stability-projection, echoing the first point of the 2003 strategy document
developed by Solana’s team. Whereas stability-projection has a clear geographical
element, the Union will go on working to pull out the rug from beneath traditional
security conflicts over military capabilities, territories and borders, ethnic tensions
and so forth, by manipulating political and economic incentive structures. It will
also try and do so at an early stage, by preventive action, instead of putting out the
fire afterwards. Since there is no historical precedent of such actorness, it is
exceedingly difficult to predict the repercussions of this scenario on the other key
entities in world politics. Suffice it to say that New Atlas Europe will have to create
its own, novel diplomacy to go with its innovative external relations approach.
At this point we leave the reader to consider the feasibility of the four scenarios.
Throughout the investigation, we have tried to suppress biases, except in one limited
respect. In developing the four dimensions above, a theoretical goal of ours has
admittedly been to explore the feasibility of the fourth path. This does not mean that
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we believe it more likely than the others; actually, rather the contrary. But in case
‘New Atlas Europe’ should have any relevance beyond rhetoric, it will need to be
developed at the conceptual and political levels. What kind of actorness is envisaged
by advocates of a stronger EU presence on the international stage? Given that
several members are wary of the Union becoming a nation-state on a grand scale,
what does their vision really look like?
It may seem unsatisfactory to end the analysis with another set of questions,
although this is unavoidable. The EU is arguably the world’s biggest ‘work-in-
progress’, today just as in the past decades. Given the tremendous weight of some
of its policies and its still unexploited aggregate capacity, the Union must sooner
or later come to grips with the growing role it is playing in its own neighbourhood
as well as in the world at large.
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THE BUILDING OF A 
MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
Some internal and external implications
Arita Eriksson
Introduction
One of the main questions for the assessment of the usefulness of a strategic triangle
as an analytical concept for understanding security relationships in the transatlantic
area concerns the role of the European Union. The aim of this chapter is to provide
some insights for understanding the role of the EU, in particular concerning the
development of its military capability. In order to do this, we first need to investigate
how member states within the EU view this process and what role it plays in the
national context. Only with an understanding of the internal significance of the EU
in this area may we assess its external importance.
The development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has made
the EU an actor with a military capability. Thus, the EU may be said to have reached
a higher level of actorness.1 The purpose here is to give an empirical overview of
key aspects of the process within the EU and to discuss some internal and external
implications of it. For the assessment of internal implications, Sweden will be 
used as an illustrative example. The process, which will be analysed in terms of
Europeanization, focuses on the period 1999–2004.2
Since the decisions in Helsinki in 1999 the developments have been remarkable.3
What in the beginning of the 1990s was only a vision in the Maastricht Treaty has,
since Helsinki, been filled with more and more substantial policy, structure and
common action in the form of military operations. It may therefore be argued that
a process of Europeanization is taking place within the area of security and defence
policy.4 The extent of and the pace at which this development has taken place is
perhaps unique in the history of European integration.
The Europeanization perspective is used here in order to analyse the ESDP
process and its consequences. Traditionally, security and defence have been policy
areas dealt with mainly within (national) public policy or international relations.
With security and defence policy brought into the European Union, new theoretical
and analytical perspectives may become applicable for studying this policy 
area. The Europeanization perspective is one such perspective.5 In particular,
Europeanization allows a focus upon the embeddedness of the member state, and
an analysis of the ‘internal’ consequences of the ESDP, that is, within the European
Union and within member states. The analysis of external consequences is usually
not part of the research on Europeanization,6 though this process may have
important external effects. External consequences will here be elaborated upon on
the basis of the results of the analysis of the Europeanization process and its internal
significance.
Many different definitions of Europeanization exist in the literature of this area.
The focus might lie either on the effects on domestic structures and polices, and/or
on the effects on the European process that has been developed.7 Within the area
of security and defence Europeanization is (or at least was up until 2004) at a stage
with few formal demands and where co-ordination, harmonization and adaptation
may take place informally and without evident governance from the European 
level. EU member states are themselves taking part in developing a policy process:
it is not something that is imposed upon them from ‘above’. Therefore, a
Europeanization process is here viewed as a constant, dynamic interaction between
these levels, which implies an embeddedness that has different types of effects on
the state.8 The content and form of the interaction in a Europeanized policy process
is seen as an empirical question.
The literature considers the following domains of Europeanization:9 domestic
structures (political structures and structures of representation and cleavages),
public policy and cognitive and normative structures. Three means by which trans-
formation is driven are identified by Radaelli. First, the existence of a ‘European
model’ may be understood as positive integration, which may spur change through
coercion or mimetism by its adaptational pressure. Second, negative integration
occurs when no model exists but change is driven by regulatory competition 
or domestic opportunity structures. Finally, framing mechanisms may be at 
work in the form of ‘minimalist’ directives, which confer legitimacy on change, by
convergence around policy paradigms and, if the balance of power does not exist,
through an understanding of governance.10
In this chapter it is not possible to go into detail on the claims by the literature
on Europeanization presented above. However, some of the domains of European-
ization in the area of security and defence will be described together with an attempt
at identifying the mechanisms present in the process. Indications of effects upon
member states are also made.
The content of the Helsinki decisions
The decision in Cologne (summer 1999) to develop a European crisis management
force was developed further in Helsinki on 10–11 December 1999. The European
Council in Helsinki took on the task of creating a crisis management force in a
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comprehensive manner, providing political direction on aims and capabilities, the
institutional framework to be established and general guidelines for further work.
The tasks of defining and implementing this decision would prove to be great and
it took several years before the EU’s crisis management capability could finally be
declared (more or less) fully operational in May 2003.11
Concerning military capabilities for the Petersberg tasks,12 it was decided that the
EU member states should work towards being able, by 2003, to put together (on a
voluntary basis) an EU-led military self-sustaining force consisting of 50–60,000
men. The force should be able to deploy within 60 days’ notice and be capable of
functioning for at least one year. This political goal constitutes what would be called
the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG). Besides the HHG, it was also decided in
Helsinki to develop collective capability goals, for example strategic airlift. The
HHG has constituted a basis for further work within the ESDP since its adoption
up until 2003, and most policies within the policy area are more or less connected
to the defining and implementation of it. It was in the summer of 2004 followed by
a second one, Headline Goal 2010 (discussed below).
The EU’s new ambitions in this area required an autonomous decision-making
capacity. Appropriate political and military structures needed to be set up within
the EU system. Therefore, it was decided that permanent political and military
bodies should be established within the Council structures; a standing Political and
Security Committee (PSC), a European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and
a European Union Military Staff (EUMS). For several years, the newly formed
actors were occupied with the task of developing the structures and procedures
necessary for an autonomous EU decision-making capacity in this field.
The development of military capabilities
The implementation of the Headline Goal started soon after the Helsinki decision.
The Headline Task Force (HTF),13 supported by the interim military body (future
EUMC), produced a document outlining the military strengths necessary in relation
to crisis management scenarios. This document, indicating the overall capability
needs, was presented in the late autumn of 2000. Next, a Capabilities Commitment
Conference was held, where member states committed national military resources
to the EU – capabilities that were collected in a force catalogue. At this time over
100,000 soldiers, 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels were listed. However, it
seemed that the EU would be in need of more qualitative assets such as strategic
intelligence, strategic air and naval transport capabilities.14 As a starting point, 
a progress catalogue was created and work on developing capacities was initiated.
A Capabilities Improvement Conference was held in November 2001.
The issue of how to deal with the problems concerning capabilities was difficult.
The need for an evaluation mechanism was discussed but no agreement was found.
It would take almost a year until concrete work on dealing with the shortfalls was
initiated – within the framework of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP).
The principles of this plan were:
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• Enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of European military capability efforts;
• A ‘bottom-up’ approach to European defence cooperation;
• Coordination between EU member states and cooperation with NATO;
• Importance of broad public support.15
In the beginning of 2002, the ECAP started its work within the framework of the
HTF in order to provide a more organized framework for dealing with capability
shortfalls from a military expert viewpoint. All possible solutions were to be
investigated, including, for example, the leasing of capabilities. Within ECAP, 19
panels were activated (as of December 2002), each dealing with one specific
shortfall. The ECAP produced a report on the progress of its work, consisting of
recommendations, by 1 March 2003. In NATO a process parallel to ECAP was also
initiated, called the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). The PCC builds on
national commitments and is being handled in working groups. The shortfalls are
to a large extent the same for the two organizations. Not until the spring of 2003
was an agreement finally reached on a capabilities development/evaluation mech-
anism within the EU. By then, the capabilities process had already been informally
institutionalized. However, the Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM) was
important as it regulated the interrelationships between the actors in the process
and also between the EU and NATO.16
The next phase of the ECAP concerned implementation of the solutions drawn
up by the panels. To this end, ECAP project groups (PG) were started. Since spring
of 2003, 15 ECAP project groups have been established.17 Several ECAP project
groups cooperated very closely with corresponding groups within NATO’s PCC.
Activities included, for example, the NBC PG which aimed at the creation of 
a multinational NBC battalion and the Strategic Air Lift PG which aimed at 
the creation, in 2005, of a multinationally coordinated air transport resource. 
A Memorandum of Understanding on this was signed in June 2004. Different types
of EU Coordination Centres, for example regarding strategic sealift, were also
discussed as well as a pool of experienced staff officers.18 This shows that by 2004,
the capabilities issue was moving not only from being a national problem to a
European one, but from a problem with many separate national solutions to common
European solutions. However, the ECAP project groups would not be able to deliver
all shortfall capabilities, instead work had focused on qualitative aspects such as
defining concepts, organizations and procedures. By 2004 some of the project
groups were closed, as no further progress was considered possible.
The capabilities issue is closely connected to other policy areas, in particular the
defence industrial area, in which economic and industrial interests, both national
and European, are at stake. This related dimension seems, by 2003, to have become
actively involved in the capabilities development process, although the first part of
the ECAP did not involve the defence industry. The capabilities issue within the
ESDP thus seems to have contributed to the spread of the armaments issue across
policy areas within the EU, from the market field within the Commission where the
defence industry policy area had been located so far, to the defence field of the
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ESDP. The armaments and defence industry issue within the defence field has
earlier been Europeanized primarily outside of the EU.19
Following the first phase of the capabilities issue within the EU, where the focus
was set on harmonizing requirements and finding national or common solutions to
current problems, actors within the process seemed to realize that forward-looking
political decisions on the capabilities issue are important, considering the long
timeframes in this area. In most cases it will take years before the capabilities
decided upon today are operational. The capabilities issue also gives rise to more
general strategic questions that need to be dealt with at the political level. Finding
forms for the future development of capabilities was complicated. Something more
needed to be done in order to achieve a common approach in this area. The idea of
the creation of a European Defence Agency appeared at this moment, first within
the context of the work of the European Convention, working on a future European
Constitution. In July 2004 the European Council adopted a Joint Action on the
establishment of the European Defence Agency.
The Agency is to deal with defence capabilities development, research, acqui-
sition and armaments. Headed by Javier Solana, it will receive political guidance
from the defence ministers of the Council and cooperate both with the Commission,
defence industries and existing defence industrial structures in Europe. In the 
2005 work programme, a number of areas are set up in which the Steering Board
expects to see the Agency handle initiatives by the end of 2005, for example
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target
Acquisition and Reconnaissance Equipment (ISTAR), advanced European jet 
pilot training, command control and communications, defence test and evaluation
base rationalization and armoured fighting vehicles (initiatives already exist for
some of these issues). The Agency should also look into possibilities for a role in
areas such as the development of a future naval defence technological and industrial
base, air-to-air refuelling and the A400M (a major project concerning strategic
transport).20 It remains to be seen what effect the Agency will have on the issues it
is set to develop and how it will be able to incorporate or cooperate with existing
structures in Europe. It also remains to be seen what effect the Agency will have
on NATO. It could be assumed that from the point of member states, the importance
of the EU as a capabilities development institution will grow. The question of a
future common market in the area of defence equipment is also important in relation
to this development.
The EU goes operational
In January 2003, the ESDP process entered its operational phase, which finally
transformed the ESDP into a practical instrument of the CFSP. Joint action in
military crisis management now made the EU an external actor in this sphere.21
This phase began with a civilian police operation, the European Union Police
Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 31 March 2003 the first EU
military operation followed, Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic
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of Macedonia (FYROM). The operation was taken over from NATO. Small, but
symbolic, the operation in FYROM was followed by a more demanding military
rapid reaction operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June 2003
(until August 2003). In this operation, named Artemis, France acted as ‘Framework
Nation’. In this role, France provided the nucleus operational planning capacity
and exercised military leadership under the political and strategic control of the
EU. In June 2004, a rule of law mission was set up in Georgia. In December 2004
the EU took over the SFOR from NATO in Bosnia Herzegovina (named Operation
Althea). This was the largest EU operation thus far, making the EU involved in the
country with both civil and military means. Operation Althea makes use of NATO
assets through the Berlin Plus arrangements and has eleven contributing third states.
In December 2004 the EU launched a police mission in the DRC, and further
initiatives were taken concerning the DRC in the spring of 2005.22 Other possible
missions include a takeover of KFOR in Kosovo and a joint EU/Russia mission to
Moldova.23 In the case of Kosovo the role and ability of the EU as a strategic actor
in the transatlantic arena might really come to be tested, and in the case of Moldova
the relationship with Russia will have to be substantially developed for the first
time in relation to ESDP. With respect to Iraq, the European Council has agreed that
the EU could contribute with an integrated police, rule of law and civilian
administration mission.24
The EU’s operational phase started out quite intensely with three rather different
civil and military operations in only about six months. Following these initial
operations there will be continuous evaluations and ‘lessons learned’ that will
probably lead to a revision of structures and procedures. Indeed, there seems to be
great pressure upon the EU to take on tasks in the field of civil and military crisis
management. The EU has a particular role to play in the area where future member
states are situated, in particular the Balkans. Here, its involvement is likely to
intensify. The other area of interest for the EU is Africa. In December 2004 an
action plan for ESDP support to peace and security in Africa was adopted, and
involvement is likely to grow here as well.
It remains to be seen in each situation whether it will be possible to use the 
EU military capacity for substantive joint policy. So far, member states have been
able to agree on the establishment of operations and have been willing to submit
the forces and resources necessary. In the end, it is a question of national decisions
although well-functioning ESDP structures may help in other ways. The Headline
Goal 2010 (see below) indicates that a development has taken place as regards the
view on which capabilities that are needed for EU crisis management as well as 
the conditions for deployment. The lessons learned from the initial operational phase
have probably contributed to these conclusions. Some kind of informal flexibility
system may develop among member states related to these kinds of operations, as
some countries are more eager and capable to supply rapid reaction and planning
capacity than others. The conduct of more EU operations may result in common
understandings and experiences that in the long term may produce more European
convergence across the spectrum of strategic levels.
BUILDING A MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE EU
49
A new phase
During the spring of 2004, the ESDP found itself in a transitional period, further
developing structures, awaiting new initiatives in the area of ESDP and new member
states. These important events together with developments in autumn 2003, for
example the adoption of the EU Security Strategy,25 indicate that the CFSP/ESDP
is entering a new phase.
With the ESDP operational, there is a tendency for a shift in power from the
member states to the Council Secretariat. The entering into an operational phase also
suggests that more informal flexibility will be seen within the ESDP process. The
development within the capabilities area and the enlargement strengthen this
impression.
The adoption of the EU security strategy in December 2003 suggests the
development within the ESDP not only consists of regulatory norms (that define
standards of appropriate behaviour), but also of constitutive norms (that express
identities and define interests and through these affect behaviour).26
Capability requirement goals changed during the spring of 2004. In the winter
of 2003–4, the ESDP structures started working on the development of a new 
rapid response element, based on the so-called ‘Battle Group’ concept. A Battle
Group is:
a specific form of rapid response. It is the minimum military effective,
credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-
alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The
Battlegroup is based on a combined arms, battalion sized force and
reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements.
A Battlegroup could be formed by a Framework Nation or by a
multinational coalition of Member States. In all cases, interoperability
and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A Battlegroup must be
associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational
and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics.
(Military Capability Commitment Conference, Brussels, 
22 November 2004, paragraph 9)
The Battle Group would become an important element of a new capability goal,
the so-called Headline Goal 2010. Headline Goal 2010 emphasized qualitative
aspects, compared to the Helsinki Headline Goal, which was very much focused
on the quantitative dimension. The need for further elements of pooling and
possibilities for the sharing of assets was also introduced.27 It is stated in the
Headline Goal 2010 outline that:
This approach requires Member States to voluntarily transform their
forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability,
both at technical, procedural and conceptual levels. Without prejudice
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to the prerogatives of Member States over defence matters, a co-
ordinated and coherent development of equipment compatibility,
procedures, concepts, command arrangements and defence planning
is a primary objective. In this regard, commonality of security culture
should also be promoted. Deployability, sustainability and other crucial
requirements such as force availability, information superiority, engage-
ment effectiveness and survivability will play an immediate pivotal role.
(European Council 2004a: B8)
With the new capability goals, a new phase of implementation starts all over
again. This time the EDA will be engaged together with Council bodies. At the
military capabilities commitment conference in November 2004, it was stated that
the EU would have initial operational capability in 2005 and full capability in 2007.
Member states indicated their commitment to form a total of 13 Battle Groups and
several states announced that they would offer niche capabilities.28
Another aspect of this new phase is that the new Headline Goal also took a
broader approach to EU crisis management tasks, involving, beyond the original
Petersberg tasks, joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in
combating terrorism and security sector reform.29 The European Security Strategy
inspired the adoption of these tasks. The new rapid reaction forces for fast crisis
management will function in parallel with the old requirements of the HHG and
tasks such as post-conflict management.
The EU’s transformation into a military power/actor in the wider transatlantic
region and on the European and global scene has not been finalized. It could be
argued that the EU is still very much in a process of change in this respect, and that
the main development of the military dimension within the EU may not be seen for
several years yet.
A process of Europeanization
As has been shown, a dynamic policy process has been firmly established at the
European level. Member states take active part in an intense cooperation at different
levels, involving different national actors and domestic structures. As the process
started, it was goal- and policy-oriented. However, the initial political guidelines
have been rather vague, as no substantial guiding document has existed. In principle,
European Council conclusions and the Petersberg tasks have been the main guiding
principles. Europeanization of policy gradually expanded and the need for further
related policies due to the first one was identified. This dimension can therefore be
said to have ‘grown’, increased in scope and been filled with more aspects of
security and defence policy during the period 1999–2004. The movement from
regulative norms to constitutive norms that may be a result of the EU Security
Strategy could have implications for Europeanization, which may be deepened.
Possibly, this will change the impression of the ESDP as an ad hoc, practice-driven
process, as the security strategy will become a basis for the development of policy.
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The security and defence issue within the EU has been framed (on framing, see
also Wagnsson, Chapter 6)30 as crisis management, concerned with Petersberg
tasks. At the time of the Amsterdam Treaty, and perhaps still today, framing ESDP
as dealing solely with crisis management was probably the only way forward for
the EU in order not to duplicate NATO. However, one may ask if and to what extent
the content and practice of Europeanization within this area in the EU is indeed
qualitatively different from non-Article 5 issues in NATO.
Another domain of Europeanization is the creation of structures that have
institutionalized interaction between member states. Structures have been a
prerequisite for the continued Europeanization of security and defence policy and
for the implementation of the Helsinki process. New actors have been created that
have become players in the new defence policy arena.
The capability development process, in particular the ECAP project groups,
contains efforts to harmonize military requirements. With the Agency functioning
common acquisition may be undertaken. This is a form of regulative effort at the
European level – a mechanism of Europeanization – although it is definitely very
‘soft’ and bottom-up in its approach. The Helsinki Headline Goal did not contain
any formal obligation to submit forces to the EU registers. The pressure to take part
in the development of capabilities, and to eventually deploy forces, was instead
political. Force requirements were broadly defined, and member states could offer
what they wanted to submit to the EU registers. Commitments did not contain any
assurance that the forces submitted to registers would actually be available and able
for deployment. The new Headline Goal 2010 is much more closely specified, both
when it comes to force and deployment requirements. Indeed, the term ‘benchmark’
is used repeatedly in the document, indicating stronger pressure upon member
states. As will be discussed below, the Battle Group concept is likely to have effects
upon the force planning of small and medium-sized member states. This makes it
possible to argue that in terms of Europeanization mechanisms, a ‘European model’
is being established. This would indicate a new phase in the Europeanization of
security and defence policy where negative integration increasingly seems to be
transforming into positive integration.
With the ESDP becoming operational in 2003, Europeanization has reached a
stage where it results in common action. This has, in different ways, reinforced
policy and structures and thus it has become a dimension of the ESDP dynamic. 
The EU operations are a domain of Europeanization, of ‘common practice and
experiences’, that might be added to Radaelli’s list.31 This domain is, however, not
only driven by an internal logic – external events with security implications are
important sources of pressure.
Another aspect, addressing the external dimension of Europeanization is that the
whole process can be seen as the result of careful triangular diplomacy (see Chapter
1). The inescapable relationship with the US and NATO is evident in the process
studied. Russia does not seem to have the same place in this context as concerns
the development of the ESDP and a EU military capability; however, it may become
more important as the focus of the EU moves eastward. The relationship to NATO
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has, however, been crucial. Politically, it has affected the development of ESDP and
its structures and on an operational, ‘military level’ it has constituted something of
a model – the EU in the development of its crisis management capability has used
many of NATO’s standards.32 Europeanization within this area thus contains
obvious elements of institutional copying, something that has been called mimetic
isomorphism.33 Sometimes, for example as regards the use of NATO standards,
this method has been used in order to legitimize Europeanization and avoid
duplication. In other cases, as regards institutional structures, it has been a natural
starting point, but realities have shown that changes are sometimes necessary in
order for the structures to fit into the EU context.34
Internal implications – the example of Sweden
Since the end of the Cold War, security and defence policy has changed in all
European states. Transformations of the military forces have started in order to face
a new reality. To what extent has the growth of the EU as an actor been important
for member states in the development of new defence policies? In this section
implications of Europeanization within security and defence policy for EU member
states are discussed, with Sweden as an illustrative example. The analysis builds
upon some of the preliminary results from a research project on the Europeanization
of Swedish defence policy 1999–2004.35
Swedish security policy has, during most of the post-Second World War period,
been characterized by a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. The policy of
neutrality was officially considered as being dependent upon three factors: national
defence, public support and general foreign policy orientation.36 Sweden has hence
maintained a strong defence during the Cold War, and worked in order to keep a
national defence industry to supply this force with materiel in case of war.
The events taking place in the second half of the 1980s and at the beginning of
the 1990s fundamentally changed the conditions for Sweden’s security policy. Non-
alignment turned into military non-alignment and Sweden joined the EU in 1995.
During the same period of time cooperation with NATO intensified, mainly within
the framework of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Planning and Review Process
(PARP). This development was of great political importance, and a significant
international influence on the military forces. It helped Sweden develop inter-
operable forces for multinational peacekeeping missions.
From the beginning of the 1990s and in particular since 1999–2000, the Swedish
military forces have been going through a process of reorientation and reform. In
1999, the Parliament decided that the threat of invasion was so low and the security
policy situation so fundamentally changed that the defence could reorient, from
being focused on countering an invasion threat, towards having international
operations as one of its main tasks.37 At the time of the commencement of the
development of ESDP in 1999, Swedish defence policy was a strictly national
business. International influences only affected small parts of the defence policy and
the defence structures. The internationalization envisaged for 2000–4 in the 1999
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Defence Review was to take place mainly on national terms. The EU dimension had
no prominent place in this decision.
However, the Europeanization process that started due to the ESDP increased the
embeddedness of policy and structures in the European process. Initially, a small
core of people in the Permanent Representation to the EU, the Foreign Ministry, the
Defence Ministry and the Swedish Armed Forces handled ESDP issues more or less
separately from other issues in the policy area. Soon, however, the deepening and
pace of the process made integration of EU issues in the ordinary policy process
necessary.38 In terms of practical influence on the military forces, the first years
with the ESDP were focused on contributions for fulfilling the Helsinki Headline
Goal by 2003. The government committed military forces from all defence
branches. Large costs were associated with this commitment, in terms of making
the units interoperable and maintaining the necessary readiness. Participation in
the ESDP became an important driving force for the internationalization of the
Swedish Armed Forces.39 Sweden also played an active role in the capability
development process, in areas where a particular interest was identified.40 As the
first EU operations were launched, Swedish participation was considered very
important. In the summer of 2003, Swedish Special Forces were sent on a
demanding mission to Congo in Operation Artemis, something that has since been
assessed as being of great importance, both within the political and the military
sphere in Sweden.
In 2004, a significant shift may be seen in Swedish defence policy when it comes
to the importance of the EU to Sweden. For the first time since the Europeanization
process started, the national and international (EU) starting-points and requirements
seem to become more or less fully integrated.41 The report issued by the Defence
Commission in the summer of 2003 indicated an increased international influence,
but not to the extent that it did a year later.42 In 2004, civil servants felt that the ESDP
had become ‘mainstream’.43 Only about six months before the Swedish defence
review that was planned for December 2004, the Battle Group concept was launched
and the Headline Goal 2010 developed. In February 2004, the Swedish Armed
Forces were just about to submit to the Ministry an evaluation of estimated
consequences given certain economic levels and had to bring this development into
calculations.44 In presenting the main content of a complementary evaluation in
late April, the Chief of Defence, General Håkan Syrén, said that development at the
European level had reached very far beyond what he could imagine only two months
previously. The Chief of Defence made the estimation that EU requirements would
become the most important factor in developing the Swedish military forces during
the next couple of years and that the whole body of the Swedish Armed Forces
needed to become adapted to the EU concept in order to make participation possible.45
This understanding seems to be shared also by the political establishment.
According to the Swedish Minister of Defence, the development within the EU is
a driving force in the process of transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces.46
Thus, it can be said that ESDP has begun to affect not only aspects of policy but
also substantially influence the development of defence structures. In addition, the
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Europeanization process becomes part of the national logic and has effects upon all
aspects of policy.
It is reasonable to conclude that the ESDP has had influence in the Swedish case.
It provides a tool for participation and influence. Increasingly, it is also an instrument
for reforming the military forces, and it could be said to have promoted an
integration of the national and international dimension of the military forces.
Europeanization concerns not only policy, structures and implementation of related
issues, such as capabilities at a political-strategic level, but also political and military
leadership of operations, operational planning and military personnel acting together
at a military strategic and operational level. For those EU members that are not
members of NATO, this is a new dimension, taking part in the whole multi-level
chain of work concerning crisis management.47
Given the development and implementation of the Battle Group concept small and
medium-sized member states are likely to become even more integrated with respect
to defence policy, not only with the European level process, but also with each other.
As these states will have difficulties setting up an autonomous Battle Group, multi-
national cooperation will be necessary, which in practice will imply long-term, close
cooperation with other member states in the development of military units. Inherent
in this concept are both political and military requirements, and its implementation
is likely to have integrative effects. The effect will perhaps not be as great on the
large EU states that do not have to set up multinational Battle Groups in order to be
able to participate. However, the larger EU states may set up Battle Groups in
cooperation with other member states as well, in order to achieve legitimacy. Taken
altogether, this development suggests that in the long term multilateralism in
defence cooperation, as well as at the military strategic and operational levels, may
become settled as a feature of the military dimension within the EU.
External implications in the context of the strategic triangle
As has been shown by Ginsberg the EU’s foreign policy has an external impact far
beyond what is usually assumed, even on the superpower the United States.48 What
external implications can follow from the development of EU’s military capability?
It is still too early to fully assess these questions, though some indications may be
discussed. The most apparent consequence of the EU becoming a military actor is
the new, closer relationship between the EU and NATO.
EU–NATO relations are central for the development of an EU military capability.
Most states agree that the organizations should be complementary and not compet-
itive. There are, however, several dimensions of this relationship and it has been a
constant theme in the development of the ESDP, as some states disagree in their
interpretation of particular aspects of this problem. Dialogue with the US has been
important in the development process, and Britain has had a crucial role in this
context, as a bridge between Europe and America.49 The fact that membership in
the two organizations is not similar also causes difficulties, with new problems to
solve as institutional cooperation becomes operational.
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The most important agreements regarding practical EU relations with NATO is
called Berlin Plus. For several years negotiations on this agreement were stopped
from being concluded by the US and France, as well as there were divisions between
Greece and Turkey. The contents of Berlin Plus were formulated in Washington.
More detailed negotiations on the arrangements followed and the agreement could
be finalized in time for the launching of the EU’s first military crisis management
operation in March 2003.
The issue of capabilities and the development of capabilities are also important.
The problems concerning shortfalls have been similar, and efforts to deal with the
shortfalls have also been conducted in close cooperation. A question for the future
is what function the Agency will have in this respect and what a possibly tighter EU
process of capability development will mean for the process within NATO. It is
possible that the development process within the EU will become more focused and
dynamic than the one within NATO. However, benefits from either of the processes
should enhance both organizations with respect to capabilities. Essential to the
capabilities development are the new requirements of the Headline Goal 2010 and
the NATO Response Force (NRF).50 To what extent are these requirements
compatible and what is the difference between the two approaches? What will be
the inter-relationship between them? It is still too soon to fully answer these
questions, as these new targets have only recently been defined. Views may also
differ as regards these issues.
Although NATO’s assets are important, especially in planning and command
and control, the EU has shown that it may conduct autonomous operations such as
Artemis. Furthermore, the ‘NATO’ option does not seem to be the main choice in
the Battle Group concept, but instead it appears to rely on the EU Framework Nation
concept. Perhaps NATO had a more important function as a model in the build-up
phase and the EU is now ready to act more autonomously in the development of its
military capability. If this is correct, the future relationship between the two
organizations will perhaps not so much be characterized by EU dependence on
NATO, but on mutual interdependence.
US Strategy and the role of NATO in this is a decisive factor in determining the
future role of NATO. Indirectly, this also affects the EU, as the functioning of
NATO will have repercussions on the development of the EU’s role as a military
actor. If NATO is not used in situations where a common transatlantic interest may
be identified, the EU option is likely to grow in importance for the Europeans. Here,
important dynamics between two of the poles in the triangle are at work. As
demonstrated by Smith,51 external factors have been important for the development
of European foreign policy cooperation. It is reasonable to assume that the same
factors may be at work in the defence area. Furthermore, the increasing relevance
of the CFSP and the multinational cooperation in defence that is the likely outcome
of further Europeanization within the EU will also create European demands for
multilateral solutions. These demands may, if they are not embraced by the US
within the framework of NATO or in dialogue with the EU, lead to a situation where
the US and the EU will both increasingly be acting alone.
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It is clear that in the development of an EU military capability the relationship
between the EU and Russia has not had the same importance as the one between
the EU and the US. Politically as well as practically, Russia seems to have been little
engaged in this process – though a framework for dialogue has been established (see
also Wagnsson, Chapter 6). This lack of interest has probably been mutual; the EU
has not considered Russia very important for the development of its military
dimension, at least not in the first phase that was concerned with policy, structures
and capabilities. Russia has been more concerned with the enlargement of NATO,
and developing relations with the US through NATO. Perhaps Russia has seen the
EU as a military midget, not worthy of its attention. However, as shown by
Bynander (Chapter 4), Russia has had an indirect effect on the ESDP through its
relationship to some of the new member states. This relationship has led these
member states to prioritize NATO over the EU in this area, although they seem to
have stepped on to the EU track after having become members in 2004. The
relationship between the EU and Russia may change in the future, however. As the
EU grows to become a more important actor, in particular with regard to its eastern
neighbours, it may have to act also with military means and thus would have to
become engaged together with Russia. The growing responsibility that the EU
shows in the Balkans may also make the two actors more inclined to interact (see
also Wagnsson, Chapter 6). The relationship between the EU and Russia will
probably grow more strategic in the years to come. This may make the EU and
Russia poles of the triangle on the transatlantic area more important to the United
States as well.
Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to shed some light on the role of the development of
EU military capacities within the strategic triangle. It was argued in the introduction
that in order to do this, it is vital to assess what importance EU member states attach
to this Europeanization process. Europeanization has taken different forms within
this area. First, it has consisted of the establishment of policy. Second, it has taken
the form of a structural build-up and institutionalization of security and defence
policy at the European level. Finally, the ESDP has reached a stage where it consists
of joint operations.
The internal consequences of this Europeanization process have been discussed
here on the basis of the Swedish example. It is important to note that it is complicated
to generalize from this case only, given the increasing diversity between member
states, new and old, large and small. The results should be seen as an indication of
one way of approaching these issues, though there may be other ways, as shown for
example by Bynander in Chapter 4 in this book. The Swedish case shows that
though this member state has not had a history of international cooperation in this
area; the ESDP has gradually been adopted more and more into the national logic.
Participation in this process seems, at least from 2004, increasingly to have been
used as a tool, a model, for reorienting and developing the armed forces. This
BUILDING A MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE EU
57
tendency is likely to increase as the process deepens with the implementation of the
Battle Group concept. Given the importance of the defence industry in the Swedish
context, it will be interesting to see what role the European Defence Agency will
have in the future. However, it is quite clear that the ESDP and the building of an
EU military capability are very important to Sweden, both as an internal process in
the EU and as a tool for enhancing the EU’s overall capacity in reaching out beyond
the borders of the EU.
What can be said about the external implications of this process for the relations
within the transatlantic area and the strategic triangle? From the above it is clear that
the EU is an actor of importance to its member states, and that Europeanization
seems to deepen. Externally, the EU has only recently become an actor with 
a military capability. The EU’s actorness in this area is certainly a problem, as it
does not fit into the traditional conception of an actor with a military capability.
Numerous essays and articles have criticized the EU’s military dimension, pointing
towards its flaws and inefficiency.52 The EU is often judged on either the criteria of
a military organization, with NATO standing as a model, or a nation-state – with
the United States as a comparison. The development of the ESDP and a military
capability of the European Union, do not, however, make it a military organization
in the traditional sense. Neither is the EU a nation-state that has the same interests
and uses force in the same way as the USA.
For analytical purposes this chapter has, in a sense, brought the military
dimension out of its overall EU context. Foremost, at the strategic level, an EU
military capability should be seen as one of several tools in a toolbox. It will increase
the possibilities of conducting an effective CFSP. For the time being, the military
capability of the EU should be seen mainly within this context, and the EU should
not be seen as a military actor equal to the US or Russia. The seed for creating, in
the long term, a military organization is part of the larger integration force of the
European Union. This process may, however, very well earn support from the
Europeanization process currently taking place, in particular the closer cooperation
concerning the development and acquisition of armaments that may be a conse-
quence of the European Defence Agency.
The above concerns the special character of the EU as a military actor. The other
question is how does this process of developing a military capability affect the
relationships within the strategic triangle? The role of NATO has been highlighted
in this chapter as the most obvious concern. However, the build-up of an EU military
capability does not in itself constitute a threat to NATO in terms of capabilities. The
Europeanization of security and defence within the EU may, through the reform of
the European Armed Forces it spurs, also serve to strengthen the European pillar
of NATO (though some say it doesn’t,53 and others that it is the other way round54).
However, in the long run the fact that the EU, and not NATO, aims at creating a
common security and defence policy may be of importance. This is perhaps
primarily because it may shift the focus within member states from NATO to the
EU. Thus, it could be said that the Europeanization process itself is threatening to
NATO – as it may lead to integration closer than ever achieved within the Atlantic
Alliance, something that may in the future decrease the importance of the latter.
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Concerning the issue of task-sharing the greatest challenge for NATO is probably
to become used as a political tool. If an organization is not used, it will in the 
long run inevitably lose importance. Here, US policy plays an important role. 
The military capability of the EU (and thus its member states, perhaps with the
exception of Britain and France) is growing distinctly multinational in composition.
In order to make use of this force, political legitimacy is likely to require a multi-
lateral setting.
Neither the US nor Russia currently seems to place much emphasis on the EU as
a military actor. The enlargement of the EU and new ambitions within the
framework of the ESDP may, however, change this picture. The EU may grow to
become a partner both to the US and Russia in security matters of concern, in the
short run probably mainly within the transatlantic area, but in the long run also on
a global scale.
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POLAND AND THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC
New members torn between the EU and NATO
Fredrik Bynander
Introduction1
What makes some European transitional states assume the role as ‘trusted allies’ to
the United States in the war against terrorism in general and the Iraq war in
particular, in sharp contrast to the Franco-German axis that vehemently opposes
recent US policy in the Middle East? Why was Europe not more closely knit as a
political entity than to allow the disarray that followed the US and UK initiatives
regarding Iraq, which seriously damaged the cohesion of NATO and the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy?2 In order to begin answering these questions,
this study investigates the basic principles and policy ideas underlying the foreign
policy of two increasingly central, yet surprisingly overlooked, actors in modern
European politics – Poland and the Czech Republic.3
This chapter is exploratory in the sense that several possible sources of Polish and
Czech foreign policy decision-making are being probed and juxtaposed against
contextual factors that may affect the outcome of the policy-making process.4 The
aim of this chapter is to explicate the actual choices made under the pressure of
‘Western’ disagreement on the way forward concerning Iraq. A secondary aim,
which is allowed to guide the presentation throughout the study at hand, is to
describe the dilemma faced by Poland and the Czech Republic (along with other
fellow accession states) in the simultaneous adaptation to two separate institutions
with partly overlapping competencies, and partly opposite policy agendas. Of
course, describing the differences as having sprung out of the institutions themselves
is a gross simplification and the complexity of national positions and intersecting
bilateral relations are elaborated. The third aim is to use a comparison between the
countries as a tool for analysing the factors that drive foreign policy in institutional
cross-pressure. Ultimately, this practice adds to the unfolding tale of the EU as a
foreign policy actor and thus a leg of the strategic triangle envisioned in this edited
volume. It also directly targets the complex relationship with the two ‘significant
others’ in the triangle by emphasizing the national view of the triangular relationship
and its strategic component.
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Nevertheless, the EU/NATO institutional divide exists, and it is especially
troublesome for the new members, and this fact grants opportunities to find clearer
evidence of its repercussions in the policies (and policy debates) of those countries.
For the accession states, a very concrete issue where they have come to consider
themselves between a rock and a hard place is the strong conflict between NATO’s
calls for higher defence expenditure and EU’s demands for budget deficit
reductions. In the Czech Republic, this has caused severe criticism from NATO, as
the government is planning to cut the defence budget in nominal terms.5 Another
issue is the development of EU capabilities in areas that have traditionally been 
the sole responsibility of NATO, such as the EU rapid reaction mechanism or the
proposal of a European military planning unit, both opposed (to some degree) 
by the United States. The pressure in these areas usually emanates bilaterally from
the US, but the repercussions for the accession states are institutional, as their
bargaining positions are generally weak and they are in need of flexibility from
both organizations to be considered in accordance with their respective central
regulations.6
In addition, there is a distinct difference of institutional political logic between
the two organizations. NATO is a military alliance created at the dawn of the Cold
War to counter the Soviet threat, now transforming to meet new threats, but
essentially geared to foster effective military cooperation and resolve hard security
problems. The EU approached the continent’s age-old security dilemma from
another direction by founding the Coal and Steel Union on cooperation outside the
core of national security, hoping that collaborative solutions would spill over and
tie the European states into a strong institutional framework of cooperation. The EU
thus became an ‘issue magnet’ ever incorporating new policy areas into its sphere
of regulation, whereas NATO’s military security core was diligently protected from
dilution by its largest power, the United States.
As NATO is now starting to look beyond a major war as its principal contingency,
considering the terrorist threat and potentially other major cross-boundary sources
of instability and with France and others pushing for a higher security profile for
the EU, clashes are inevitable. The EU tends to agree generally on and announce
grand ambitions first, and only then starts to worry about how to realize them. This
is primarily the case for putting in place the EU rapid reaction force, and this has
been the general development of its Common Foreign and Security Policy.7 NATO
usually works by different standards. The Cold War lesson of guarantees for member
states to deliver its required resources has produced strong pressure and strict codes
to ensure the performance of its member states, although the end of the Cold War
led to large cuts in defence expenditure.8 In security terms, and especially with the
accession states, this produces expectations that NATO is more likely to withstand
serious security challenges. The EU’s ambitions are viewed with more scepticism,
in terms of the collective political will to face military threats, as well as the
complicated decision-making process required to manifest that will. However, the
structure of EU commitments in this area is changing, and the strengths of the Union
in other areas may also make it an increasingly attractive tool for security needs.
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We cannot understand Polish or Czech political influence and decision-making
within the European security structures without a broad outline of how the latter 
are constituted, which is why this chapter will cast the national cases against the
emerging regional security climate and its linkages to the global scene. It considers
the tensions that have been apparent in transatlantic relations since the run-up to the
Iraq war, but that has reasons and repercussions broader than that conflict. Most
involved states can discern scenarios for their own positions directly tied to
increasing discord across the Atlantic and within Europe, which can certainly feed
risk perceptions of marginalization as well as opportunity incentives for increased
influence by, for example, strategies of bandwagoning or aggressive bargaining 
on key political issues.9 These perceptions can partly be based on the careful
assessment of what is in each state’s national interest,10 but also on ideas of political
belonging, the strength of various bilateral relationships, domestic political dynamics,
and attempted contributions to the long-term political stability and integration in
Europe. Needless to say, the stakes are seen as high and the situation as pivotal for
some of the newly inaugurated Central and Eastern European states in their quest
to secure influence, legitimacy and trust as actors on the European arena.
The consequences of the institutional ambiguity for security in these countries
make them uneasy participants in a strategic triangle. For many reasons, a strategic
dyad with their own states firmly embedded in the Western node would be
preferable. Nevertheless, forced to take part in a transatlantic interaction of both
cooperation and conflict, their strategies have varied over time and the EU/NATO
balance has been struck differently as the countries have gone through quite distinct
phases of membership negotiations and accession procedures. This chapter
illuminates those national deliberations under pressure. But it also shines a light on
the triangle from an angle often overlooked. The common Western European
perspective is that the new members have much to learn and that, once they are
‘educated’, their long-term policies will not differ much from their Western counter-
parts. This chapter makes credible that this may not be the case and that, in fact, the
Western security communities may be what are changing in order to correspond to
new realities, as Russia and its ‘near abroad’ become the primary counterparts in
building European security.
The Czech Republic
The turbulence of the demise of the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) came to mean more to Czechoslovakia than emancipation, self-rule, and the
gradual reintegration with Western economic and political institutions. It became
the trigger for a largely amicable secession process, where Slovakia slipped out 
of the federation creating few objections from the Czech majority – the ‘velvet
divorce’.11 The remaining Czech state possessed the lion’s share of the federation’s
industrial capacity, its armed forces and financial resources. With just over 10
million in population, and an economy second only to Poland’s among the accession
states, the Czech Republic is set to find itself in the middle range of EU members.12
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It looked immediately to the West for both opportunities for economic growth as
well as military security – there was no doubt that the Czech Republic was on a path
to integration.
Czechoslovakia had had a slower start to the rapprochement to Western Europe
than the early frontrunners Poland and Hungary, partly due to the scepticism of the
highly conservative communist regime up to 1989, and it was left out of the PHARE
programme for technical assistance, signed between the EC and the reforming
regimes of Poland and Hungary. Rather soon after the first euphoria over self-rule
had stabilized, however, Czechoslovakia approached the EC, concluding a Trade
Cooperation Agreement in March of 1990 and soon after joining PHARE. The
forming of the Visegrad group with Poland and Hungary (and eventually Slovakia),
designed to foster a coordinated approach to European integration, cemented the
Czech position as a leading reformist in Central Europe.13
The Václav Klaus government that came to power in 1993 changed the face of
Czech politics forever. Within months, the Czechoslovak federation had split into
two sovereign states, and the Klaus government came to rule a republic on the fast
track to NATO and the EU. The image portrayed was that of having lost a shackle
in spawning off Slovakia, and the lightning reform period that followed was
designed to establish the Czech Republic as a candidate for early accession to the
EU. Klaus brought the country into the OECD and GATT/WTO. The idea was not
to knock ceaselessly on the EU front door like some other CEE countries, but to
become a political asset for the main EU states quickly and slip through the back
door as a future European political power. Klaus abandoned the Visegrad strategy
as a means of approaching the membership negotiations concertedly with the others,
and pursued a more exceptionalist policy that included a harder line in negotiations
with Germany over border issues and criticism of the EU for being overregulated
and inefficient.14
The withdrawal from the Visegrad collaboration and the new hard line of the
Klaus government was met with forceful reactions from the other Visegrad
members as well as from leading EU and NATO members. Klaus softened his
approach somewhat, but kept stating the ambition to be the first former Warsaw Pact
(successor) state in the EU. Klaus’s success was evident when the Czech Republic
joined the OECD as the first former communist member in 1995 and as it was
invited for accession negotiations with the EU in 1998 along with five other states.
In terms of security, successive governments in the 1990s were modestly
committed to early accession into NATO. There was no great sense of urgency,
since the break-up of both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had left the Czech
Republic geographically removed from Russia and increasingly close to the unified
Germany. However, the prospect of early NATO entry was not squandered as the
country joined Partnership for Peace on its initiation and serious security
cooperation with Germany and the US commenced. This lined the Czech Republic
up for a strong position in the early enlargement talks in 1995–6, further reinforced
by a Czech rapprochement to Poland, which had been lent further security
importance by the velvet divorce.15 The last achievement of a fragmenting and
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electorally weakened Klaus government in 1997 was to receive an invitation to join
NATO at the Madrid summit. Since then, social democratic governments have
succeeded one another in promoting integration through the accession processes.
In 2003, Václav Klaus succeeded Václav Havel as President and brought his
Eurosceptic agenda to the highest, but largely symbolic, office of the Czech
Republic.16 He has, since then, continued his firebrand rhetoric against further EU
integration and is set against the adoption of the EU constitution, which he feels will
extend Brussels’ power too far into the affairs of the member states. The image of
a Eurosceptic Czech Republic created by its President is to some extent balanced
by a much more cautious cabinet. Under the past three social democratic premiers,
Zeman, Spindla and Gross, EU integration has been a major priority and deficit
reduction measures have taken precedence over NATO requirements on defence
spending. The Social Democrats have opposed Klaus’s Civic Democrats on their EU-
sceptic policy proposals and have been more lukewarm about NATO accession.17
Poland
Poland’s ascendancy as a regional European power, as well as member of NATO
and the EU, is a source of political change in Central and Eastern Europe, and a
marker of the shift in security cooperation towards the east within the previously
Western security complex.18 With 38.5 million citizens and one of Eastern Europe’s
largest economies, Poland is potentially a major player now that the political 
map of Europe is being redrawn after the Iraq war of 2003, partly by the parallel
processes of the ESDP and NATO’s Membership Action Plan.19 Its rapprochement
with the United States, and its open disagreements with major continental European
powers over the logic and legitimacy of the Iraq intervention has cast Poland as a
politically autonomous actor, not readily intimidated under the auspices of European
unity or the dominance of the Franco-German axis in European politics. The
possibility of what US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has labelled a ‘new’
Europe, and Poland’s leadership status within it, could be seen as a divide in
European political worldviews, intimately connected to concerns regarding American
projection of power and the basic principles of the European security structure. Of
course, we have only seen the first major ripples of such a wave and much can still
happen to reconcile the main players in Europe.
Historically, Poland’s location between Russia/the Soviet Union and Germany
has been its defining feature as a regional actor and the root to most (or all) of its
security problems. When Poland gradually forced its way out of authoritarian 
rule and claimed full independence from Moscow, several old issues surfaced that
had been contained by the Cold War and by the inclusion of East Germany in the
Warsaw Pact. With German reunification, the old border issues were again polit-
ically viable, and the position of the German minority in Poland became politically
burdensome. Polish suspicion of a united Germany was initially rather high, but
quickly subsided as several potentially thorny issues were handled diplomatically
(such as the German acceptance of the Oder–Neisse line), and the problems of
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reunification came to the fore, calming some fears of an instantly successful and
powerful juggernaut in the centre of Europe.20 Germany’s continued commitment
to NATO and the EU, including the process which produced widespread support
across Western Europe of its reunification, reassured the Polish government that
German dominance of the region would be at most economic, but never military.
This led to a policy of engagement with Germany and the rest of Western Europe,
as well as vigorous Polish attempts to secure EU and NATO membership. The
enlargement of those organizations seemed to many Poles to be a way of embedding
Germany further into the confines of European integration.21
The relations to Russia were more painstakingly thawed as the new Polish
democracy aimed at ridding itself of debilitating political and economic ties parallel
to the internal reform process, which at times created turbulence domestically.22 The
failed Moscow coup attempt in 1991, the sometimes difficult negotiations over
troop withdrawals, and the fate of Russian ‘near abroad’ on Poland’s borders, all
caused Polish governments to balance their policies towards the nation’s large
neighbour carefully.
Shifting to the West
The domestic urges in Poland to seek security by approaching the Western political
structures were not unopposed during the nineties, although they proved convincing
as the reformed socialists slowly accepted the call for NATO membership. In
February of 1992, Polish Defence Minister Jan Parys had declared Poland’s
intention to seek membership and the process was increasingly cast as depending
on the willingness of core NATO countries to welcome members from the former
Warsaw Pact. The Czechs had achieved a greater sense of security by the secession
of Slovakia as it no longer bordered to the former USSR (Ukraine), but when the
alliance moved towards enlargement, Czech governments intensified their political
efforts to be included in the first round of accession. In this light, the creation of the
Partnership for Peace in early 1994 was widely seen as a way by NATO members
to postpone enlargement.
However, the integration and coordination that followed PfP membership 
has since proved vital for the reform of both the Polish and Czech armed forces,
which paved the way to full membership. When the 1995 ‘Study about NATO
Enlargement’ was presented, opportune reform was already under way in Poland
to modernize and strengthen the military to meet NATO standards. The most impor-
tant change was a division of the forces into mobile units for NATO operations and
traditional territorial defence units.23 The Czechs have typically moved with less
urgency, partly because their military forces were more updated to begin with,
partly because they felt that their position was too good for NATO to exclude them.24
Surprisingly, perhaps, throughout these trials and tribulations over domestic
politics, the mainstream of Polish and Czech politics steered straight for NATO
and EU accession. One reason for élite attraction to Western integration was the
externally imposed discipline it brought regarding, for example, the deregulation
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of important domestic markets and remaining commitments to large public expen-
diture. The other major reason for Poland was, quite clearly, a sense of urgency to
escape the strategic void that had been created with the collapse of the Warsaw
Pact in 1991 into the warmth of the Article V security guarantee.
Of course, reforming the armed forces to become compatible with NATO
missions and coordinated with NATO standards is an enormous undertaking,
especially considering that both economies can still be considered transitional. The
Polish conscript defence of 1989 counted 400,000 standing troops. In radical cuts
over the years that number has been lowered to 165,000 in 2002, with a further
reduction of 15,000 in the works for 2006.25 More troubling is the fulfilment of
NATO requests that defence expenditure should equal 3 per cent of GNP. The real
figure has hovered around 1.95 per cent and it is showing no sign of rising in the
near future.26 The military budget is bogged down by sizable costs for salaries and
pensions, preventing further modernization of the defence structures and acquisition
of modern weapon systems. The 2001–6 reform programme designed to meet
NATO standards is increasingly looking like a failure.27
The Social Democrats in the Czech Republic are, for various reasons, one of
them being their domestically focused constituency, not a security- and defence-
oriented party. In the choice between easing social disruptions in their transitional
economy and spending scarce resources on reforming their defence forces, they
will opt for the former every time. This tendency has been reinforced by the
economic difficulties that started in 1997, which have further slowed down reform.
Also, the Czech Republic has a strong tradition of pacifism, often cited as deriving
from the fact that the last Czech/Bohemian army to fight a battle in defence of its
homeland was in the Thirty Years’ War. After the 1993 break-up of Czechoslovakia,
the Czech Republic embraced a ‘shock therapy’ approach to defence reform and
became the first Central European state to place its military fully under civilian
control, which it accomplished by the summer of 1994.28 Its troops have been
reduced from 107,000 in 1993 to 61,000 in 1999. The projection for 2007 is 35,000
soldiers.29 In terms of military spending, the Czech military budget has been stable
for years at 2.0–2.1 per cent of GDP, which is in line with the 2 per cent goal that
was declared upon membership negotiations, but it is down from 2.2 per cent in
2000 and it is causing criticism from the NATO secretariat. The situation is not
improving according to many observers and indeed according to Minister of
Defence Tvrdik, who resigned in June 2003:
The Czech defence minister has resigned after the government decided
to scale back plans for defence spending in the face of mounting deficit
in public finances. ‘I know I look like an idiot, but better [to be an idiot]
for one day than for the rest of my life.
(Zapletnyuk 2003)
In Poland, the eagerness to contribute to operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and,
by assuming responsibility for an occupation zone, in Iraq, has overcome the
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shortcomings of the modernization of its armed forces, to a large degree with direct
American aid. Although other Central European states, like the Czech Republic
and Slovenia, may be further ahead in reforming and supplying their militaries,
Poland’s mere size and strategic location makes it, alongside Turkey, NATO’s most
important member state to the East, which guarantees the continuing support from
important allies.
US shifting to the East
With the deterioration of NATO unity on the handling of the Iraq problem and the
creation of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to oust Saddam Hussein from power and
install a US-led occupation force in Baghdad, the future of NATO as the institution
of choice for US security policy is unclear. With US interests increasingly turned
towards the Middle East and the Eastern European allies rallying to aid American
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, even as Germany is a reluctant host to the bulk of
US troops in Europe, the United States is shifting its military weight in Europe
eastwards.30 The reform pace of NATO and US military capabilities pushed by
Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld, and represented by the establishment of the NATO
Response Force, is causing drastic cut-backs in the large numbers of troops based
in Germany.
An accompanying development is the adoption of wider responsibilities for the
armed forces, notably in the ‘war on terrorism’. The ‘wider security concept’,
previously thought to mean a move towards ‘softer’ security issues, has become an
important part of the strategy for fighting terrorism as well as the geopolitical (‘hard’
security) push in the Middle East that the Bush administration has initiated. To a
large extent, Central and Eastern European countries have answered the call to
contribute troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, including Poland and the Czech Republic,
but also Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, Slovakia and
Ukraine.31 This is a stark picture of a shift to the East of US military cooperation if
anything. In the effort to portray international support, the former Warsaw Pact
countries deliver – the Western allies do not with a few exceptions.
The new situation gives Warsaw some hope of becoming a prominent regional
actor, providing the institutional and geographical link to the East. It seems the
main obstacle is the continued suspicion in the relations with Russia. In order to be
the go-to option in the war on terror for the United States, an important characteristic
is to be able to work with Moscow, thus relieving friction in the region by furthering
NATO interests in Eastern Europe.32
However, Polish unease with Russian regional advances is deep-seated and
cooperation does not come easy. This is the core of what some experts call ‘the
double catch’,33 – the paradox that appeared as several Eastern European states
joined NATO to enjoy Article V as a deterrent and protection from Russian
domination, only to find that ‘new NATO’ was more complex in several respects,
partly as a consequence of the enlargement.34 The 11 September attacks had several
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consequences for the alliance, not least being the first ones ever to invoke Article
V. However, the lukewarm US response, and its subsequent preference for ‘coali-
tions of the willing’ in Afghanistan and Iraq, sent the signal that the war on terror
was different from the collective defence situation that NATO was created for. The
choice for those states was between joining America in the campaign against
terrorism, or going along with the more cautious approach of Germany and France
– risking US disengagement from Europe and increased Russian influence in the
region.35
For Poland to cooperate so fully with the US as to send a substantial force to the
Persian Gulf is a recognition of the need for an American presence in Central and
Eastern Europe, and a clear signal that the Franco-German approach does not extend
beyond the Oder–Neisse line. Even though out-of-area operations are not what
Poland signed up for, and though their military structures are not designed for
deploying Special Forces in unfamiliar terrain such as Afghanistan or Iraq,36 this is
a price that the country seems very willing to pay for continued US commitment to
European security. It seems that the logic is one of bargaining with the superpower,
exchanging international legitimacy in Iraq for a strengthening of Article V
relevance in the face of serious tension within the alliance. Also, American ad hoc
partnerships in the Caucasus and Central Asia are tolerated by Russia at a political
cost – for Poland this may be another reason for keeping in step as a reliable ally.
Having stated the high level of commitment by the Polish government to the Iraq
operations in particular, it is necessary to point out the new signals communicated
by the Belka government in 2004. Domestic pressure and the lack of constraints on
a new cabinet led to the announcement of reductions of Polish troops in Iraq during
2004, possibly phasing them out altogether by the end of 2005. This is quite
disturbing news for the Bush administration, adding to its woes in the run-up to the
US presidential election, and creating more security concerns with an Iraqi election
already called into question by the widespread insurgency on the ground.
At the core, still, are the relations with Russia with whom Poland shares only the
border to the Kaliningrad Oblast, but which is the looming presence in Polish
security concerns. Not only does that relate to classic threat perceptions of Russia
as an expansive state, but also to a host of potential new threats that may diffuse out
of its vast territories and the dominated small states that it calls its ‘near abroad’.37
For Poland, regional stability requires a possible development in Ukraine and
Belarus, both of which are subjected to heavy Russian influence.38 The pressures
of guarding the external border of the European Union towards Ukraine and Belarus
will weigh heavily on a country used to looking in the other direction. With Belarus
in decline and isolating itself from Western influence and Ukraine partly retreating
after disappointing signals regarding NATO and EU integration, Poland has reason
to worry about its position as the last outpost for those institutions.39 The emerging
EU focus on soft security and the trafficking of drugs, arms and illegal aliens will
not be easily maintained in these border regions. It is also apparent that Russia will
be needed as a stabilizing factor, especially with regard to Belarus, in a way that
will require Polish diplomatic skills and possibly concessions in regional affairs.
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The Czech position on these issues is considerably more complex. The small
degree of attention to external security paid among Czech voters is causing leaders
to play down military cooperation and stay clear of unpopular foreign policy
adventures. Simultaneously, the strong pressure to be a reliable ally to the United
States in Afghanistan and Iraq has forced consecutive Czech governments to strike
a fine balance in providing symbolic troop contributions and political support for
those missions, yet staying clear of all-out commitment that would alienate domestic
support as well as important European partners. The deployment of 110 troops in
Iraq makes the Czech Republic number 19 on the list of contributors to the US-led
operation (for which countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Mongolia committed
larger numbers of troops).
There is, however, a strong sense of commitment to coalition stability and Czech
officials often echo US sentiments on terrorism and the conflict in Iraq as in Foreign
Minister Cyril Svoboda’s speech to the UN General Assembly:
[The terrorists’] ideology is aggressive and expansive and they do not
recognize terms such as ‘conciliation’ or ‘co-existence’. Therefore each
offer we make to negotiate, each sign of unwillingness to defend
ourselves is seen by them as further proof of our weakness and, by
extension, their ‘right’ to assume control of a declining society. In the
fight against terrorism, nobody can stay neutral.
(Czech Embassy to the United States 2004)
After the Spanish Zapatero government had decided to withdraw Spanish troops
from Iraq, then Minister of Interior Stanislav Gross argued: ‘Spain’s decision to pull
its soldiers out of Iraq would only support the idea that goals can be reached through
terrorism.’40
Czech foreign policy is thus increasingly under fire for being evasive and often
inconclusive, especially from the sizable leftist opposition, but also from several
continental European states. A major row followed the exclusion of the accession
states from the 17 February, 2003, EU emergency summit meeting to discuss the
growing crisis over Iraq. Outgoing President Havel had recently co-signed the first
open letter by European leaders in support of the US effort in Iraq,41 and French and
German leaders clearly wanted to punish the CEE countries for their overt pro-
Americanism. Foreign Minister Svoboda added insult to injury at a Czech–German
forum on 15 February by stating that he was ‘not sure Germany had staked out a
good path by insisting on more weapons inspectors [in Iraq]’.42
The continued relevance of Europe
Any talk of a shift of military weight is incomplete without the mention of the
North–South dimension that has become apparent after the cessation of large-scale
hostilities in the Balkans. Remaining forces have entered the twilight of post-conflict
inertia, with the political focus moving elsewhere, and costs for troop deployments
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becoming less attractive to bear. The new theatres in the Middle East are signifi-
cantly more ‘acute’ and the security problems that the forces are to address more
pressing to the coalition(s) they represent. The military focus of attention is thus also
moving South.43 Having cited Poland’s and other Eastern European states’ desire
to keep the United States engaged in the region, this is also a factor that is diluting
the perceived essence of Central and Eastern European security. The continued
global relevance of European security issues being narrowly defined, and Central
and Eastern European ones in particular, is in the interest of several of the weaker
actors in those areas.
Neither the Czech Republic nor Poland have been completely opposed to the
growing of soft security items on the European security agenda, at times citing 
the Petersberg tasks as important for the integration of CEE into a more robust
pattern of security cooperation at a societal level.44 To the extent that these can be
attributed with some weight within NATO, other small states in the region are
interesting partners in furthering them. Especially with regard to the problem that
was previously defined as central to Polish success as a partner of the US in Europe
and the evolving relationship with Russia, the soft security matters can be used to
make progress and create bilateral trust. They can be functional in the effort 
of developing ties that are far from the delicate substance of hard security dealings
with Russia, possibly facilitating a more constructive dialogue and creating the
impression of benevolence in Polish–Russian relations.45 It is, however, a complex
issue for all former Warsaw pact states to allow Russia into cooperative structures,
which was manifested as Western NATO states sent conciliatory signals to Russia
after 11 September; and Prague, Warsaw and Budapest had clear misgivings, fearing
NATO concessions in the accession process. The United States came to the aid of
the Visegrad three, and the 2001 North Atlantic Council meeting toned down the
proposed radical cooperative approach to Russia.46
For Poland the Baltic Sea dimension is the most natural hub for such an approach,
especially since a greater sense of stability has already been reached there with the
imminent accession of the Baltic States into NATO. Also, this is aided by the fact
that far-reaching cooperation between those states and the neutrals on soft security
is already underway and also by the fact that Poland has access to most of the
institutional arrangements that are being used to further these ambitions. The mid-
term great bounty for Poland – better relations with Russia – is also in accord with
most of those states. As long as one does not expect to see Poland as fully committed
to the all-out soft security agenda, relying on international cooperation over societal
‘strains’ as a reliable path to military security, it is reasonable to expect a higher level
of attention to such matters. After all, Poland knows Russia and the workings of
Kremlin power politics, suggesting an ever-sceptical approach when it comes to
national security.
An especially delicate matter for Poland is the Kaliningrad enclave that has been
the source of serious disagreement between Russia and the EU, with potentially
great consequences for Lithuania and Poland encircling the enclave. Russian
concerns have been grave, as the EU has refused special arrangements for allowing
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Kaliningrad free access to Schengen territory, effectively cutting it off from Russia
proper. Kaliningrad’s already weak economy and social disarray would probably
further deteriorate in a EU-enforced isolation from Russia.47
Poland and the Czech Republic in the Union
When Poland and the Czech Republic joined the European Union as full members
in May 2004, it was still unclear what that Union was, pending the postponed final
negotiation of the EU constitution. Although the new members have full disclosure
of that process, it is likely that they will not be entirely happy with the result, nor
with the other concessions forced upon them in last-minute membership negotia-
tions that ultimately led to the Copenhagen summit accession decision.48 For those
states, and particularly for Poland being the largest among them, the EU as a result
of second-best compromises and clashes of strong national sectoral interests is not
an ideal organization to join or an organization to which it has long-standing
commitments that need defending. It is therefore likely that the approach of the
new members will be considerably less sentimental and more status quo-oriented
than those of the founding members of the Union. The burden of proof may,
considering the relatively large addition of states, shift towards justifying the
legitimacy of separate policies, rather than the relative acceptability of the whole
cobweb known as EU institutions to a variety of national interests.
It is likely that Poland will assume a leading role in such advocacy of re-
examination of EU policy. This policy of scepticism is combined with a staunch
stance on the voting structure in the Council, trying to preserve the relatively large
proportion of votes allotted to the medium-sized states Poland and Spain.49 In these
and other areas, Poland has not made many friends over the period of accession,
which has at once cast the country as an uncooperative and an influential tough
negotiator.50
On areas relating to the ESDP, the two states have had similar reservations to
some EU developments, even if Poland had the more extreme view. The proposed
incorporation of the West European Union (WEU) functions into the EU and
misgivings about the St Malo initiative caused the two countries, together with
Hungary, to try to negotiate a common standpoint. The talks broke down because
Poland wanted to try to completely block the WEU-EU process and veto any EU
access to NATO assets, which was too tall an order for the Czech Republic.
Eventually, all three moderated their views as EU membership approached and a
more comprehensive influence on these processes was anticipated.51
The Czech Republic is more amicable in its EU strategy, having secured most of
its core objectives in the membership negotiations and expecting to achieve rapid
economic success as a result of joining the Common Market and the EU subsidy
system. The main problem for the country in the run-up to the accession was a
public argument with Germany over the so-called Benes decrees. President Benes
of Czechoslovakia expelled between 2 and 3 million Sudeten Germans after the
Second World War, and Germany has advocated reparations to the descendants of
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those displaced. An agreement with Germany and Austria was hindered for many
years by the Czech Communist Party’s success in playing the ‘German scare’ card,
especially in the election of 2002, forcing a harder stance by the democratic parties
(Klaus’s Civic Democrats in particular).52 A European Parliament legal opinion in
October 2002 concluded that the decree should not be an obstacle for the Czech
Republic to join the EU, and the issue was transferred to the diplomatic back-
burner.53
When it comes to security policy and the relationship of the ESDP to NATO, a
similar approach can already be seen as commented on above. The fact that several
large Western European countries are also critical of plans for a more autonomous
European posture in defence matters adds weight to the integration sceptics, and
pressures the Europeanists in Paris, Berlin and Brussels to forge stronger alliances
in the centre-field of EU security cooperation.54 With EU accession completed, the
threat of membership negotiation trouble is out of the way, and several CEE
countries are basically free to promote an Atlanticist agenda if they want to. The
US influence on several of the new member states erects a large barrier for the 
EU to expand its cooperation and autonomy in terms of security and defence.
Negotiating a further deepening of the security dimension will almost certainly
have to include a considerable measure of voluntary commitment and multiple-
track solutions that imply large risks for the main integrationists.55
The danger of dividing the Union on security issues and creating a tug-of-war
with NATO is real and may cause major ripple effects in other areas for cooperation.56
For example, persuading Poland to accept reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy that would mean significant cuts in the prospected support to its large
agricultural sector, in a situation where it is under pressure to accept larger European
security autonomy, will be a very tall order for the integrationists in Paris and Berlin.
A further complication is represented by other causes for resistance such as the
reluctance of the (former) neutrals to join far-reaching defence initiatives, or states
enjoying special NATO attention, such as Greece, to accept further dilution of
NATO political cohesion. To continue pushing for policy change in this environ-
ment, which is primarily directed against US dominance and designed to increase
the influence of the Franco-German axis, must be deemed risky and doomed 
to fail.57
Furthermore, the bargaining structure that has emerged since the enlargement is
not fully understood yet. Traditionally, even a shaky alliance between Germany,
France and the UK would be certain to carry the day. Now, the Blair government’s
uneasy endorsement of a European military planning unit separate from NATO
may not be enough to sell it to sceptical CEE allies. The latter can elect to work
inside both the EU and NATO to foil such plans, making far-reaching demands on
the activist Western governments to safeguard NATO commitment in Europe,
ultimately making an autonomous capacity impossible or so watered down that it
becomes irrelevant.
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Poland and the Czech Republic as European security actors
At the core of the items probed here as pertinent for assessing Polish and Czech
foreign policy seems to be the prospect of how it will ‘fit’ into the previously
Western conceptual thinking on security and its relation to Russia. The short answer
is that Poland is on much more familiar terrain with the recent unilateral tendencies
of the United States and the increased transparency regarding regional power
structures it has created. For a country squeezed between two large neighbours for
the best part of the last 500 years, EU-style multilateralism may be attractive as a
model for economic growth and social development, but it is hardly a reassuring
foundation for national security. NATO, on the other hand, is. Considering Poland’s
outlook on European security based on Russia as a remaining potential security
threat and continental Europe as politically and militarily uncommitted to Central
and Eastern European security, American involvement under the binding conditions
of Article V is the sole guarantee for long-term stability. This is why Polish interests
are focused on creating incentives for deeper US engagement in Eastern Europe by
providing political and (modest) military support for out-of-area missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
The difference between this dimension of Polish security thinking and the
participation in emerging frameworks for soft security cooperation and regional
development schemes designed to further security is real and should not be under-
estimated. Recent political experiences of the European states put different emphasis
on power capabilities and integration factors, affecting expectations of other actors’
behaviour and substantial issues of regional stability. The newly independent states
can reasonably be anticipated to be suspicious of EU-style non-security integration
as a safeguard of national security, yet gladly participate in it as long as it can deliver
other benefits without posing a threat to perceived core interests. To the extent that
the EU can act as a united force in European affairs, Poland seems willing to
participate all-out, but its focus on regional stability in combination with the opening
transatlantic rift and its secondary effects on European unity provokes caution on
the part of several incoming members of the Union.
In terms of regional cooperative structures, the outlook for Polish involvement
with Russia seems reasonable given a continued substantial US presence in Central
and Eastern Europe. The EU’s Northern Dimension can be a vehicle for creating
essence in those structures, provided that basic political and financial requirements
are being met – a responsibility mainly located with the central institutions of the
EU. In this sense the opportunity costs seem rather low, and the chances high, of
reaching progress in a complex area of EU external relations, which is increasingly
important as the enlargement process proceeds. A more direct approach on the
Kaliningrad issue could bolster the likelihood for success and upgrade the agenda
to focus on more important tasks in stabilizing the Baltic Sea region by calming
Russian concerns about EU heavy-handedness in its Schengen work. The mere
style of EU politics, with its multi-faceted ambitions and ambiguous wordings of
agreements, is an obstacle to progress in its relations with Russia. Here also, the new
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member states can be of service, making EU initiatives transparent, and brokering
deals with a tighter focus and less ‘meandering’ consequences.
The Czech Republic shares much of the basic analysis of the Polish political
élite, but it has several shock-absorbing factors at play. Clearly, being removed
from Russia, geographically, politically and psychologically has been a major factor
in its more growth-oriented, EU-centred policy. The NATO insurance was thus not
passed over, but the economic incentives inherent in the European Union have long
been the big price for Prague. A second factor that has been of growing influence
is domestic public opinion. The Czech public attitudes towards a host of political
and economic issues have steeply converged with those of a consolidated democ-
racy over the past few years to a much larger extent than is the case for Poland and
other CEE countries, with the exception of Slovenia. This has produced a political
climate regarding the role of the US, NATO and the legitimacy of the Iraq war that
is similar to that of Western Europe. For example, when asked by the Pew Global
Attitudes Project about preferences for ‘democratic government’ or a ‘strong leader’,
the Czech replies came in at 91 per cent and 7 per cent, whereas the Polish numbers
were 41 per cent and 44 per cent.58 In every similar category, dealing with the
preference for political freedoms, market economy and globalization over political
stability and government intervention, the Czech public scores higher on the former
than other CEE countries.
This development has generated a much higher sense of élite vulnerability to anti-
war sentiments in the Czech Republic. Leading up to the Iraq invasion, public support
in the Czech Republic for the war fell from an even split to a 12 per cent support
for an invasion without a UN Security Council resolution and 22 per cent with such
a resolution.59 The overwhelming numbers apparently helped turn incoming Prime
Minister Spidla around on the question of whether to authorize NATO commitments
in Iraq in May 2004.60 For Prague, the political cost of paying tribute to the
transatlantic link has become too high domestically as well as in the EU context.
The Czech Republic has scheduled its withdrawal of the 100 police officers in Iraq
for February 2005. Poland, with its 2,400 soldiers, started reducing its presence in
January and intends to completely withdraw its troops by the end of 2005.61
Which Europe?
The distinct differences between the respective ‘institutional option packages’ of
our two study objects has some easily identified explanations. The Czech Republic
lies geographically sheltered between benign neighbours in a largely tranquil part
of Central Europe. It is a small state with its ambitions for influence over the
European political space lying exclusively in becoming a rapidly modernizing state,
which serves as an example for other transitional East and Central Europeans.
Poland’s sense of vulnerability towards its Russian-dominated north-eastern areas
produces a very different political environment that emphasizes more classical
security issues. Its size and economic potential breeds an element of entitlement as
it acts on the EU stage.
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The Polish orientation towards NATO at the expense of the EU is a product of
the EU’s low credibility on military security. ESDP and CSFP notwithstanding,
historical reference in Poland advises against trusting Western European allies over
the US. The Second World War analogy is alive and well in Polish politics and
putting the security ‘eggs’ in the exclusively European basket seems risky from
that perspective. The US has brought stability to Western Europe during the post-
war era and Poland works actively to tie the superpower into the continent for the
foreseeable future by being a reliable ally. An autonomous EU security identity
would be detrimental to transatlantic cooperation and undermine the legitimacy of
any military solidarity clause sans les Américains from this standpoint.
One might ask what the EU would have to prove politically to be the credible first
choice for a state in Poland’s position. It would not be enough to have the military
hardware accessible (which arguably is being assembled under the auspices of the
ESDP, see the analysis in Chapter 3 in this volume) – it would have to be legitimate
in terms of rapid decisions in the event of severe regional discord, which would be
part of any crisis involving Russia, including a reasonable possibility of forcing
reluctant large European powers to commit politically and militarily to a decisive
policy in support of a common objective. In the eyes of sceptical Central and Eastern
Europeans, this is a pipedream. The gap in military capability between the EU and
the US only serves to weaken the attraction of such an option, as any larger crisis
in Europe’s periphery would have to include US involvement at some level. So, as
long as the US has a remote interest in Europe, it will be one of the continent’s
main players in security terms – at least until the major powers of Europe form a
stronger alliance than present-day NATO and start to close the enormous divide in
military spending between Europe and the US significantly.
Correspondingly, as long as Poland strives for security guarantees, the association
with the US will be more important than the EU link in this area. However, 
if integration (and developments in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) transforms Polish
expectations to downgrade threat perceptions and upgrade the anticipation of
security effects of European integration, then Poland is likely to move towards a
more activist stance on European cooperation as well as on hard security issues. 
If that scenario carries worsened transatlantic trade relations, Poland’s choice may
well look very different from today and geo-economics could prove more convinc-
ing than geo-strategy as the underlying rationale for the ‘new’ European (on this
point, see also Chapter 7 in this volume).
The Czech Republic’s stance is similar to that of many other small members of
the Union, partly due to the lack of a realistic security threat, partly due to the
economic realities of small industrialized countries that emphasize market oppor-
tunities over traditional ‘national interest’-based considerations. The Czech attempts
to have it both ways on Iraq are symptomatic of the small state’s preference for
institutional stability. In the forced choice between two political extremes, the small
state is surprisingly likely to choose both in an effort to avoid disloyalty to
institutional partners. Of course, this is a political act of (self-) deception, and in the
Czech case the chips ultimately landed in the interventionist corner, even though it
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made concerted efforts to soften that image by criticizing the war and trying to
exclude itself from the list of active partners of the US and UK.
Given that the Czech Republic is a reluctant ally of the US in the Iraq war, the
inclusion of former neutrals and the traditionally coy NATO allies Denmark and
Norway in the ESDP (Norway being an associate member), is a reason for the Czech
preference for intensified integration there. Increasingly, the Czech Republic is
finding its closest partners in that group, choosing the Swedish combat aircraft
Gripen over the US F-16 to modernize its air force and teaming up with Austria (and
Hungary and Italy) to form the Central European Initiative designed to help pull the
Balkans back into economic growth. From this perspective, the EU path is desirable,
not only for the furthering of core economic interests, but also for building a
coherent security policy under an institutional umbrella that includes likeminded
states.
However, one threat to the perceived efficacy of the Czech approach is the risk
associated with long-standing rifts in the European security community. The main
tool for the small and medium-sized states is deliberation in conditions of political
stability, especially in the EU framework where the negotiation framework is
conducive for small-state influence when they can present middle-of-the-road
alternatives under benign circumstances. When the larger powers are at odds, small
states generally find themselves on the sideline. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this
logic would fundamentally challenge the Czech strategy of finding broad coalitions
within the EU camp rather than narrow ones in NATO, although conflict-ridden
issues may be compartmentalized in the same manner as the Iraq intervention.
In comparison, the two Central Europeans are deeply influenced by their
respective focus powers – for Poland Russia, and for the Czech Republic Germany
– which alter their commitment to a distinct European security identity, and thus
their interest in a fully fledged triangular alignment of the transatlantic security
structure. Dealing with Russia as a potential threat is perceived as requiring hard
security safeguards that only NATO’s Article 5 can bring in the short term 
and medium term. Coupling that with a Polish sense of opportunity in increasing
its NATO influence by participating in out-of-area missions, while old-member
resistance and relative economic weakness in the EU context dampens its prospects
there, the logic seems to clearly stake out a NATO/US emphasis for now. For the
Czechs, Germany is the influential actor most likely to affect their political situation.
The one instrument deemed to be effective in keeping German national ambitions
low is the European Union, and it is natural that Czech policy will rest on that
institution rather than on a NATO that constantly forces domestically controversial
decisions regarding defence spending and coalition participation. Balancing Russia
in Central and Eastern Europe is certainly perceived as important from the Czech
perspective, but seen as beyond Czech political resources and thus left to more
influential actors within the region and outside it.62
In sum, the dual integration seems to foster a movement away from traditional
security concerns across the continent, disrupted at times by acute international
crises that create discord across Europe but not significantly altering the path
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towards a more institutionalized Union. For the more recent members, this process
is volatile, since they lack a track record that fosters stable expectations of how the
state and its immediate environment will act. Thus, balancing the numerous
interlinkages in the forming security community of the Northern Hemisphere is
especially difficult and ridden with many traps. As the transitional phase is coming
to an end for these countries and the actorness of the EU is changing, the logic of
being a Central European member state will certainly transform as well. It would
not be shocking if the states with the fewest vested interests in the legacy of
traditional EU and NATO values were the ones to succeed in modernizing both
institutions to reflect the demands of a post-enlargement world. For the European
Union as a leg in a strategic triangle, cohesion may not be all that it is cracked up
to be as the mere strength of the common market grows and European commitment
to the Middle East and other important regions rises. However, the EU as a distinct
actor in a strategic triangle, acting independently on all transatlantic security areas,
requires a common distancing from the bilateral embraces of the United States. For
Poland, this is not likely any time soon.
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In order to understand the strategic and political implications of the use of military
force in international politics, it is helpful to begin by analysing the structural
distribution of power at both the global and regional levels. Understanding the
global and regional distribution of power is important because this establishes the
parameters of expected state behaviour and identifies the systemic pressures that
‘shape and shove’ strategic interactions between key foreign policy actors.
In this respect, the demise of Cold War bipolarity is of decisive importance. It
has significantly transformed the strategic context within which decisions concern-
ing the use of military power are made. In place of the adversarial conflict between
the US and its NATO allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw
Pact affiliates on the other, a qualitatively different distribution of power has
emerged. Globally, the United States has been left as the only superpower, with a
dynamic economy, global military power projection capabilities and considerable
soft power. The US, however, is not a global hegemon: it enjoys a hegemonic
position in the Western hemisphere, and considerable influence in most other
regions, but does not exercise hegemonic power in other regions of the globe.
In post-Cold War Europe, bipolarity faded following the unravelling of the Soviet
Union and the precipitous decline of the rump Russian state. What replaced
bipolarity was not American regional hegemony, but rather a more multipolar
system. This multipolar system comprises five regional ‘great powers’: the US,
Russia, Britain, France and Germany. The distinguishing feature of this multipolar
system is that power differentials between the major regional actors are relatively
balanced. In this context of balanced multipolarity, security competition between
the great powers is relatively muted. Russia’s weakness following the break-up of
the Soviet Union allowed NATO and the EU to expand eastwards and shape new
political and strategic relationships in much of Central and Eastern Europe. The
process of NATO and EU expansion has been driven by the major powers involved,
largely at the expense of Russia. Nonetheless, the emergence of balanced multi-
polarity has provided the context for the emergence of more cooperative approaches
to common security problems – as the example of the Contact Group illustrates.
One interesting aspect of the transformed post-Cold War strategic environment
is the emergence of a potential new ‘strategic triangle’ involving the US, Russia and
the EU. Despite the current crisis in the European integration process occasioned
by the French and Dutch referenda on the proposed new European constitution,
many commentators continue to suggest that the EU is evolving into a significant
‘strategic actor’. This is certainly the aspiration of some influential EU member
states – most notably, France and Germany, who together see themselves as
providing the ‘motor’ of the European integration process. Indeed, the diplomatic
tussles that preceded the 2003 Iraq War constitute a classic power political struggle,
with Paris and Berlin seeking to project themselves as the leaders of a ‘European’
power bloc capable of challenging America’s strategic pre-eminence. The Franco-
German attempt to cement the EU as a counter-balancing force against the US failed
amidst much rancour, primarily because of the opposition of Britain, Poland and
other ‘Atlanticist’ states in what Donald Rumsfeld (with characteristic undiplomatic
bluntness) termed ‘new Europe’. Despite the fractures opened up between Europe
‘old’ and ‘new’, however, there is evidence that the EU may still serve as a collective
vehicle for European aspirations to shape their ‘near abroad’ and project European
power and values in the wider international system.
Operation Artemis
A prime example of this is the developing role of the EU in crisis management
operations. Although none of the EU’s major powers are willing to leave issues 
of vital national security to the vagaries of a Union of 25, there is broad consensus
that the EU can and should tackle the three ‘Petersberg tasks’: peacekeeping, humani-
tarian missions and military crisis management. One example of this is Operation
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Operation Artemis was an
‘autonomous’ EU-led military operation conducted without recourse to NATO
assets and capabilities. It was launched on 12 June 2003 in Bunia in the Ituri province
in the DRC, in response to a request from the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
French President Jacques Chirac announced the willingness of France to mount an
interventionary operation, and this was subsequently adopted as an EU operation.
On the basis of the EU Framework Nation concept endorsed on 24 July 2002, France
acted as the ‘framework nation’ for Operation Artemis, providing the bulk of the
military assets and the command and control capabilities necessary for the planning,
launch and management of the intervention. The EU Military Committee (EUMC)
monitored the conduct of the operation, whilst the Political and Security Committee
(PSC) was formally responsible for political control and strategic direction 
under the responsibility of the European Council. The Secretary-General/High
Representative of the EU, Javier Solana, was responsible for cooperation with the
UN, assisted by the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region.
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Operation Artemis involved the deployment of a 1,850 strong French-led Interim
Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), consisting of contingents from nine
countries. The objective was to protect civilians from ethnic conflict between militias
based on the majority Lendu tribe and rivals from the Hema minority in the Ituri
province. These conflicts were estimated to have cost some 50,000 lives and
displaced 500,000 others since 1999. The IEMF was charged with a limited mission:
to secure the regional capital, Bunia, and its immediate surroundings. This was
successfully done, and involved securing the airport and establishing a weapons-free
zone inside the town. IEMF demonstrated early on a willingness to use coercive
military power to impose its will on the area, engaging in some fierce fire-fights and
using overflights of Mirage jets based in neighbouring Entebbe airfield in Uganda
to intimidate the combatants and to demonstrate resolve. The coercive powers of the
French-led force were significantly enhanced by the use of special forces – 150 from
France and 70–80 from Sweden – who gave IEMF a highly effective capability to
engage and neutralize armed threats emanating from outside the area of operations.
IEMF was replaced on 1 September 2003 by a 3,800-strong UN force, MONUC (UN
Mission in the Congo), and completed its withdrawal on 7 September.1
Operation Artemis was an important test-case for the EU as a strategic actor, and
illustrates some of the likely features of EU autonomous military crisis-management
operations. First, it took place in an area of low strategic importance to the great
powers. Second, it had a clear ‘humanitarian’ agenda, in keeping with the EU’s
self-image as an ethical actor and a ‘force for good’ in the world. Third, it was led
by France acting as the ‘framework nation’, which ensured unity of command and
the requisite political resolve. Fourth, it was limited in both space and time: IEMF
operated only in Bunia and its immediate environs, and lasted only three months.
Fifth, whilst Operation Artemis was primarily a French-led affair, its formal
endorsement and adoption by the EU provided France with additional diplomatic
leverage which was important in dealing with Rwanda and Uganda. Finally, IEMF
was not afraid of using lethal military force in ensuring the success of its mission
and the safety of its personnel. As such, Operation Artemis is a prime example of
the peace support operations using coercive military power that have come to be
such an important aspect of the military requirements of European armed forces
since the collapse of the Soviet imperium.
Strategic coercion in the new strategic triangle
As Operation Artemis illustrates, the transformed strategic environment in post-
Cold War Europe has significantly impacted upon European attitudes towards the
use of military force. The Cold War emphasis on collective and territorial defence
by mass conscript armies has given way to a growing concern with the calibrated
use of military force as an instrument of statecraft. After four decades in which
strategic thinking was primarily focused on nuclear deterrence and the prevention
of war, Clausewitzean understandings of war as a continuation of politics by other
means are back in vogue. Military coercion has become an integral aspect of milieu-
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shaping, in the form of peace support operations and humanitarian intervention.
Since the end of the Cold War, therefore, military power has been used less as an
instrument of ‘brute force’ to impose one’s will on one’s opponent, and more as 
an instrument of strategic coercion – in other words, as a means of influencing the
behaviour of adversaries and shaping the international milieu.
The use of strategic coercion by major powers to shape their international milieu
derives from the very nature of military force. The use of military force always has
two dimensions, material and psychological. The purpose of using military force
is to break the adversary’s will to resist. This can be achieved either by crushing
their material ability to resist, or by persuading them to concede in order to avoid
significant damage and pain. Military force thus has both a material and a
psychological impact, and one important aspect of military strategy is to maximize
the psychological impact of using force whilst minimizing the material costs.2
In most situations, the ideal outcome would be to achieve one’s political goals
without having to fight at all. When military force is used, the aim is to maximize
its psychological impact on the adversary’s will to resist. Strategic coercion 
thus involves using military force, or the threat of force, to break the enemy’s will
to resist.
The concept of ‘strategic coercion’ derives from the path-breaking work of
Thomas Schelling and Alexander George in the 1960s–1970s. With the end of the
Cold War, the concept has undergone something of a revival. At the same time, its
meaning has become more contested. In his recent edited volume, Lawrence
Freedman has defined strategic coercion as ‘the deliberate and purposive use of
overt threats to influence another’s strategic choices’ (p. 3). This definition is a
broad one that includes deterrence as well as compellence. Mark Sullivan, on the
other hand, uses the term ‘strategic coercion’ in a more limited sense as ‘the act of
inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which he is not predis-
posed’. He sees this as synonymous with Schelling’s term ‘compellence’, which
involves ‘a threat intended to make an adversary do something’.3 Robert Pape also
uses coercion in a similar way to Schelling’s use of compellence, defining it as
‘efforts to change the behaviour of a state by manipulating costs and benefits’.4
Here, strategic coercion is defined as the use of threats of force, or the limited 
use of force with the threat of further escalation, to change the decision-making
calculus of the target actor. This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the
concept of strategic coercion, focusing on its relevance for the EU and the problems
of coalitional coercive diplomacy. It begins with a brief analysis of the changed
strategic environment and the new European security agenda. It then goes on to
examine the nature and meaning of strategic coercion, and to consider some of its
implications and complications. It continues by examining the problems facing the
EU if it is to evolve into a strategic actor capable of wielding coercive military
power. The chapter concludes by suggesting that any effective ‘European’ use of
strategic coercion will probably be led by either France or the UK, the two Western
European powers with a significant power projection capability.
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The European strategic environment
The end of Cold War bipolarity in Europe has been followed by the emergence of
a multipolar structure of power in which five states play a key role: France,
Germany, the UK, Russia and the USA. Regional power relations within Europe
are roughly balanced resulting in a broad equilibrium of power, and there is no
obvious candidate for hegemony against which a balancing coalition might be
formed. Europe’s strategic environment can thus be characterized as ‘balanced
multipolarity’. In the context of this balanced multipolarity, security competition
has been relatively low-key, and a form of ‘concert of Europe’ has emerged which
has developed more cooperative approaches to European security. This was evident
from the role of the Contact Group in the Balkans, a region where none of the great
powers had vital interests at stake.
Within continental Europe itself, there are four major powers: Britain, France,
Germany and Russia. Throughout the Cold War, the US fulfilled Britain’s
traditional role as ‘off-shore balancer’ – a role which it continues to fulfil, albeit not
without declining conviction. In addition to these major powers, there are six
second-order powers: Italy, Spain, Sweden, Poland, Romania and Turkey. One
distinctive feature of international politics in Europe is that patterns of interaction
between states have been conducted within a dense and intricately woven network
of overlapping and interlocking institutions, many of which are functionally
differentiated and distinctive in terms of their membership. The two key institutions
are the EU and NATO, both of which have had to develop new strategies for
responding to the demands of a multipolar context.
One important development during the years of Cold War bipolarity was the
emergence of a close strategic partnership between France and Germany. These
two Western European great powers forged a highly institutionalized bond that was
designed to provide the ‘engine’ or ‘axis’ of the European integration process. With
the end of the Cold War, the EU has assumed the role of a collective hegemon, an
Ordnungsmacht, seeking to shape the strategic environment in Europe’s ‘near
abroad’. In the 1990s, the central focus of the EU as a collective actor was the post-
communist lands of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the EU has
sought to shape developments in the Balkans, Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East
and Maghreb (primarily through the Barcelona process, initiated in 1995).
For the next decade, however, the EU will not be able to deploy sufficient military
force to carry out any but the simplest of the Petersberg tasks. It also continues to
lack effective decision-making mechanisms to deal with crisis diplomacy. In this
context, the task of strategic coercion on behalf of ‘Europe’ is likely to fall to the
EU’s major powers – more specifically, France and the UK. These two countries
alone possess the military wherewithal and the political will to project military
power into crisis situations in Europe’s ‘near abroad’ or further afield. One clear
trend in both is a process of military transformation that is giving them the capability
for power projection and expeditionary warfare. This involves not only the acqui-
sition of lighter and more mobile land forces, but also a switch from anti-submarine
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warfare to aircraft carriers and more multi-purpose surface vessels. The conse-
quence of these changes is that both France and the UK are in a position to play the
role of ‘framework nation’ in coalitional coercive diplomacy, acting ‘in Europe’s
name’.
Europe’s security agenda
Europe’s contemporary international security agenda reflects the overall strategic
context. First and foremost, security competition between the great powers is
relatively low-key and restrained, with no major sources of interstate tension.
Western and Central Europe enjoys a high level of stability, whilst relations with
Russia are cordial and cooperative. Second, after a decade of recurrent crises and
instabilities, the Balkans have been largely pacified, although the underlying sources
of conflict have not been resolved. Third, the main international security concerns
of EU member states are focused on a broad ‘arc of instability’ in its ‘near abroad’,
which runs along the southern rim of the Mediterranean to the Middle East, extends
up through the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans into the Caucasus and Central
Asia, then curves around into Eastern Europe. This ‘arc of instability’ includes the
region now known as the Greater Middle East, as well as the post-Soviet successor
states around the peripheries of the former USSR. Fourth, whilst European security
concerns are largely focused on the EU’s ‘near abroad’, some security threats and
challenges are more global in origin. These include the potential international fall-
out from regional conflicts such as those in South Asia (Indio-Pakistan conflicts)
and East Asia (Taiwan, North Korea); proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile technology; international terrorism; and the spill-over effect
from weak or failing states in the global South.
Many of these security threats, risks and challenges are generated by structural
economic and social problems associated with poverty, economic underdevelop-
ment, social inequalities, injustice, political oppression and weak or failing states.
Dealing with these underlying sources of insecurity and conflict will require 
non-military responses focused on aid, trade, developmental assistance and the
application of ‘soft power’ resources. Defusing and resolving these security
problems will require long-term and sustained engagement by NGOs and a raft of
international organizations including the UN, EU, IMF, World Bank, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Council of Europe and OSCE.
However, when crises of an acute and urgent nature occur, long-term strategies of
conflict prevention and structural change are of limited relevance (in the long term,
as Keynes noted, ‘we are all dead’). The task then is crisis management: this can
involve diplomacy backed up by economic carrots and sticks, but in some situations,
soft power alone is not enough. As the experience of the 1990s underlined, crisis
management can often entail the use of military threats to coerce the adversary into




Central to the contemporary European security agenda, therefore, is the issue of
crisis management. Crisis management is one of the three ‘Petersberg tasks’ that
now delineate the scope of the EU’s security and defence policy, while non-Article
V ‘crisis response operations’ are arguably now the core concern of NATO. Most
European armed forces are being restructured away from mass conscript armies
designed for national territorial defence towards leaner professional militaries
capable of external power projection and expeditionary warfare – capabilities that
are central to effective military crisis management.
Crisis management involves seeking to manage conflicts in order to avoid
escalating to war, either through coercion or accommodation. Snyder and Diesing
define a crisis as ‘an intermediate zone between peace and war’ and argue that it is
‘a sort of hybrid condition, neither peace nor war, but containing elements of both
and comprising the potential for transformation from peace to war’.5 In managing
the sorts of crises that could emerge in Europe’s ‘near abroad’, therefore, EU
member states need to develop their capabilities for operating in the ‘grey zone’
between war and peace. This involves rethinking some of the central pillars of Cold
War strategy and developing new capabilities – political, diplomatic and military
– for exercising strategic coercion and coercive diplomacy. One important
consideration is that crisis management and coercive diplomacy now take place in
a multi-actor environment – comprising governments, international organizations,
NGOs, humanitarian organizations, non-state actors. As British General Sir Mike
Jackson notes, ‘The military have an essential part to play in bringing order out of
chaos . . . But conflict resolution is by no means the preserve of soldiers: the military
is but a single dimension, and not necessarily the dominant one. There has to be a
coordinated approach in all dimensions – political, diplomatic, legal, economic,
humanitarian, reconstruction, as well as military’.6
Strategic coercion and European crisis management
In the context of balanced multipolarity, European strategic thinking has focused
increasingly on coercion and military crisis management rather than on the use of
brute force. In any conflict situation, the strategic aim is to break the enemy’s will
to resist. ‘It may be done in a number of ways’, Colin McInnes notes, ‘but the classic
distinction is that of Thomas Schelling’s between brute force and coercion.’7 Brute
force entails using military power to destroy the target’s military assets in order to
remove his power to resist. Coercion, on the other hand, involves the threat of force
and, if that is insufficient, the actual use of limited force with the threat of more 
to come. It involves using what Schelling termed the ‘diplomacy of violence’ to
influence the cost-benefit calculations of the adversary. The crucial point to note is
that with coercion, the target retains an element of free choice.8
‘The perfection of strategy’, Liddell Hart argued, ‘would be . . . to produce a
decision without any serious fighting.’9 The attraction of coercive strategies for
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Western democracies is that they offer the prospect of achieving foreign policy
goals without serious fighting. For this reason, they are particularly apposite to
crisis diplomacy because they offer a means of addressing the political constraints
facing Western democracies when contemplating the use of military force.
Constraints on the use of force arise both from the structural features of institutional
decision-making within pluralist political systems, and from the norms and values
that infuse mature liberal-democracies. Democracies find it hard to undertake
military operations in the teeth of significant domestic opposition, particularly if the
operations are not concluded quickly and successfully. Second, where vital national
interests are not at stake, public support for military operations becomes fragile
when casualties are sustained or financial costs mount. Finally, public opinion is
likely to grow critical if there are substantial casualties from ‘collateral damage’.
Yet at the same time, although the institutions and norms of Western liberal-
democracy can constrain policy-makers’ options, they can also be a source of
strength. They make it harder for democracies to act rashly or aggressively, and
encourage them to try to exhaust all avenues for peaceful conflict resolution. Some
commentators have made much of the ‘bodybag syndrome’ and the general aversion
to war in Western societies. However, an examination of the available poll evidence
suggests that public opinion can be mobilized behind coercive strategies aimed at
reversing aggression or preventing oppression if the political leadership makes a
strong enough case. Although democracies are sensitive to casualties, ‘their impact
is strongly mitigated by the real or perceived purposefulness of the action’.10
In other words, if European democracies decide to use strategic coercion, either
collectively or unilaterally, an essential political precondition is that the govern-
ments involved must make a credible and convincing case for using coercive threats,
and explain the risks involved.
The institutions and values of European domestic politics have thus helped shape
the way in which Western democracies use military power in pursuit of non-vital
strategic interests. As General Rupert Smith has noted, there is now a general
expectation that when the West uses military force, its destructive effects will 
be minimal and localized and that, wherever possible, political outcomes will be
achieved directly without the prior passage through a major action that has produced
technical military defeat in detail.11 For this reason, coercion has assumed an ever
more important place in the strategy of Western democracies since the end of the
Cold War. Given the values and norms embodied in the political culture of mature
democracies, the strategic culture of Western democracies emphasizes the use of
coercion and discriminate force rather than brute force. Unless national survival is
at stake (as in the Second World War), military power is used selectively and subject
to strict political guidelines. Force is limited and targeted, and aimed not at the
physical destruction of the enemy’s society or even its armed forces, but rather at
the leadership or regime. The aim is usually to influence the adversary’s decision-
making, not to eliminate his ability to resist. Coercive diplomacy is thus a
continuation of politics by other – more limited – means, and embodies an aspiration
to a more ‘humane’ form of warfare. Above all, strategic coercion is not about
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national territorial defence, but about power projection involving expeditionary
forces to preserve or shape international politics.
Coercion and brute force
Coercion is usually counterposed to what Thomas Schelling termed ‘brute force’.
‘Brute force’, he argued, ‘succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most
successful when held in reserve. It is the threat of damage or of more damage to
come, which can make someone yield or comply.’12
Coercive strategies are often associated with the use of air and naval assets
(particularly airpower), whereas land warfare is seen as the realm of ‘brute force’.13
Yet the crucial distinction is not between the instruments employed, but the intent.
Thomas Schelling explicitly argued that ‘The difference between coercion and brute
force is as often in the intent as in the instrument.’14 In this respect, coercive
strategies share much in common with ‘limited war’. Indeed, in their book on
coercion, Byman and Waxman explicitly state their intention ‘to revive a once-
active discussion about limited war’.15 In his discussion of limited war, Henry
Kissinger defines the concept in terms very similar to that of coercion. Brute force,
or what Kissinger terms all-out war, ‘represents an effort, perhaps subconscious,
to transform foreign policy into an aspect of domestic policy, to bring about a
situation abroad in which the will of other nations, or at least that of the enemy, is
no longer a significant factor’:16
A limited war, by contrast, is fought for specific political objectives
which, by their very existence, tend to establish a relationship between
the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to
affect the opponent’s will, not to crush it, to make the conditions to be
imposed seem more attractive than continued resistance, to strive for
specific goals and not for complete annihilation.
(Kissinger 1979: 140)
One point of contestation in the literature on coercion is the degree of military
force involved. Alexander George limited his concept of ‘coercive diplomacy’ 
to the threat of force or, at most, the ‘exemplary’ use of force. Successful coercive
strategies, however, may involve more than simply the threat of force or exemplary
force. The level of force applied to alter the adversary’s cost-benefit calculation
will vary from case to case, and cannot be arbitrarily defined in advance. Wesley
Clark, for example, defined Operation Allied Force – NATO’s operation in Kosovo
in 1999 – as an exercise in ‘coercive diplomacy’, and distinguished between three
levels of force in a coercive strategy: diplomacy backed by threat (threatening to
bomb), diplomacy backed by force (the bombing campaign) and force backed by
diplomacy (a ground invasion). In some cases, therefore, it might be difficult to
distinguish coercion from brute force. As Byman and Waxman note, ‘Distinguishing
brute force from coercion is similar to the debate over what constitutes pornography
or art: coercion is often in the eye of the beholder.’17
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Strategic coercion is therefore not defined by the degree of force used, but by the
intent governing its use. The important point is that coercion is not about
establishing control over the target’s behaviour, but about changing the way the
adversary acts, whilst leaving him with the possibility of choosing other options.
Coercion and brute force are not simple opposites, but end-points on a continuum
of the use of force; both result from political calculations, and both involve military
operations. In strategic coercion, the coercer’s objective ‘is usually not total
destruction but the use of enough force to make the threat of future force credible
to the adversary’.18
Cost-benefit analysis
At the heart of coercive diplomacy is a cost-benefit analysis. Alexander George
noted that the central task of coercive diplomacy was ‘to create in the opponent the
expectation of costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue
what he is doing’.19 For George, coercive diplomacy is a strategy whereby threats
are ‘injected’ into an enemy’s calculations, persuading it to comply rather than
resist. Similarly Robert Pape in his study of strategic bombing as an instrument of
coercion has argued that ‘Success or failure is decided by the target state’s decision
calculus with regard to costs and benefits. . . . When the benefits that would be lost
by concessions and the probability of attaining these benefits by continued resistance
are exceeded by the costs of resistance and the probability of suffering these costs,
the target concedes.’20
The problem that this cost-benefit analysis raises is that it assumes a degree of
rational calculation on the part of both actors.21 Yet ‘rationality’ is not an unprob-
lematic concept. Explaining foreign policy behaviour in terms of actors’ rational
calculation of their interests has been questioned by those who emphasize the
importance of cultural, historical and societal factors. Rationality, it is often argued,
is ‘bounded’. Rather than following a rationalist ‘logic of expected consequences’,
actors pursue a ‘logic of appropriateness’ deriving from political norms and shared
understandings of what is or what is not appropriate.22 In other words, political
decisions are not simply ad hoc calculations of interest maximization, but are shaped
by normative frames of reference that set the ‘parameters of the possible’.
This has important implications for coercive diplomacy and suggests that ‘many
of the critical variables are psychological ones having to do with the perceptions
and judgement of the target’.23 Consequently, a cost-benefit analysis cannot be
utilized with any hope of predictive accuracy without detailed knowledge of a
policy-maker’s goals and priorities. A key factor is the existence of very different
cultural assumptions about conflict, war and acceptable costs. In the Cuban missile
crisis, neither side wanted war and the issue was which side would back down 
first and at what cost. In the Kuwait crisis of 1990–1, on the other hand, neither 
side was willing to compromise. Coercive strategies are often premised on the
assumption that the adversary shares a common rationality, and will recognize
‘defeat’ when they see it. However, Vietnam demonstrated that there is no automatic
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link between military and political victory: Tet was a US military victory but a
strategic and political defeat. On the other hand, the 1973 Yom Kippur war was
military defeat for Egypt but a political victory.24 The important point to note here
is that one cannot always assume that the coercer and the coerced share the same
‘rationality’: Al Qaeda, for example, has a fundamentally different world-view
from Western governments. Hence, in coercive diplomacy and other forms of
compellence and limited war, it is important to note that ‘the rationality of the
adversary is pertinent to the efficacy of a threat, and that madmen, like small
children, can often not be controlled by threats.’25 Richard Nixon consciously sought
to manipulate his enemy’s calculation of his strength of motivation by advocating
what he described to Henry Kissinger as the ‘crazy man approach’ to deterrence:
if the Soviets think I am crazy enough to do X then they’ll believe that I might be
crazy enough to do Y.26
A second problem inherent in any cost-benefit model of coercion is that the
calculation of interests can be affected by the dynamics of institutional decision-
making. Simply assuming that states function as unitary actors will not do. The
institutional dynamics of policy-making within a state or non-state political actor
is essential in order to identify the specific interests and concerns of its constituent
elements. This was one of the principal findings of Graham Allison’s seminal work
on decision-making and the Cuban missile crisis. He proposed that the outputs of
organizational processes and inter-organizational bargaining rather than the
decisions of a monolithic government often explain important state behaviour.27
Schelling recognized this in his path-breaking study, Arms and Influence: ‘Collective
decision depends on the internal politics and bureaucracy of government, on the
chain of command and one the lines of communication, on party structures, on
pressure groups, as well as one individual values and careers.’28 Yet as Byman and
Waxman note, this is an area that remains under-researched. ‘Unfortunately’, they
argue, ‘since Schelling’s writing, analysts have made limited progress on learning
how regime variations shape coercive diplomacy.’29
Carrots and sticks
Effective strategic coercion involves a mix of political, diplomatic, economic and
military instruments, and the judicious combination of threats of military action
with positive inducements for policy change. These ‘carrots’ can include economic
sanctions or aid, preferential trade relations, improved political relations and mem-
bership of international organizations.’Carrots and sticks’, as Byman and Waxman
note, ‘when combined, are often more effective than sticks alone’:
Traditionally, most coercive strategies focus on raising the costs to an
adversary of continued provocations or on denying the benefits of
defiance. Inducements, however, reverse this focus. Instead of raising
the costs of defiance, inducements increase the value of concessions.
In addition, inducements can decrease the political costs of capitulation
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for an adversary, enabling leaders to claim victory even in defeat. When
inducements are combined with more-traditional forms of coercion,
resolution of a dispute is more likely.
(Byman and Waxman 2002: 9–10)
The problem here is of finding the right blend of carrots and sticks. Carrots can
be seen as a sign of weakness or lack of resolve, and hence undermine the coercive
strategy. Finding the right balance between carrots and sticks thus presents strategic
actors with a series of apparently intractable dilemmas.
Strategies of punishment and denial
The distinction George draws between the exemplary use of force in coercive
diplomacy and more traditional military strategies involving brute force is also
problematic in situations in which coercion involves what are termed ‘strategies of
denial’ rather than ‘strategies of punishment’. A strategy of punishment involves
using military instruments such as air power to impose civilian suffering, whereas
a strategy of denial entails the targeting of the enemy’s military capabilities and thus
sense of vulnerability. Lawrence Freedman argues that the latter may be more
effective and ‘potentially more reliable than a strategy of punishment because its
quality can be measured in more physical terms’.30
Robert Pape has argued that most effective coercive strategies will be directed
against the benefit side of a cost-benefit analysis. His approach is very much rooted
in conventional war and battlefield success, and he describes coercion as being ‘to
attain concessions without having to pay the full cost of military victory’.31 He
suggests that societies can cope with punishment, but that denial manipulates the
opponent’s military capability and thus sense of vulnerability, posing a direct
challenge to his strategy. Sullivan in turn argues that a denial strategy resembles a
brute-force strategy in that it targets an opponent’s military capabilities. The
advantage of denial is that if the opponent does not concede, ‘military leaders are
in a position to fully pursue a military victory’. The difference between brute force
and denial, he argues, lies in ‘attempts – which do not contribute directly to a
military victory – to convince an adversary of the futility of his military strategy’.32
Coercive diplomacy as a dynamic process
At its most basic, the strategy of coercive diplomacy involves specifying objectives
and determining the means to achieve them. This involves a series of steps:
identifying the target’s vulnerabilities and ‘pressure points’; determining the
mechanism through which change can be induced; and selecting the instruments 
to be employed. However, as Clausewitz notes, ‘Everything in war is very simple,
but even the simplest thing is very difficult.’ This is certainly true of coercive
diplomacy. The theory is relatively straightforward; its successful execution,
however, is much more difficult.
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A major complicating factor is that coercive diplomacy – like all strategy – is a
highly dynamic process, where one action leads to response and to further actions,
generating a non-linear logic with a high degree of inbuilt reflexivity. Coercive
diplomacy is a form of strategic engagement, and strategy, by its very nature, is an
interactive process involving the clash of two of more wills. As Edward Luttwak
argues, ‘there are of course at least two conscious, opposed wills in any strategic
encounter of war or peace, and the action is only rarely accomplished instanta-
neously, as in a pistol duel; usually there is a sequence of actions on both sides that
evolve reciprocally over time.’33 Thus he argues the realm of strategy is pervaded
by a paradoxical, non-linear logic which tends to ‘reward paradoxical conduct while
defeating straightforwardly logical action, yielding results that are ironical or even
lethally damaging’. Thus he argues, ‘the entire realm of strategy is pervaded by a
paradoxical logic very different from the ordinary “linear” logic by which we live
in all other spheres of life.’34
Escalation dominance
The dynamic nature of the coercion process means that ‘a critical condition of
successful coercion is escalation dominance: the ability to increase the threatened
costs to the adversary while denying the adversary the opportunity to negate those
costs or to counter-escalate’.35 More precisely, it is the parties’ perception of
escalation dominance that is the key, rather than the actual military balance.
Escalation dominance is essential for successful coercive diplomacy because
coercion involves the threat of force, or the limited use of force, with the threat of
more to come. At the same time, the use of military force in a strategy of coercive
diplomacy is always inherently risky. Threats which carry ‘an explicit reference to
possible military action if the target does not comply always risk events spinning
wildly out of control. They are a gamble on big returns and big losses, which is why
cautious democratic decision-makers are usually averse to them, while less
restricted autocrats will at times be unable to resist the temptation.’36
The use of military force is sometimes viewed in terms of what Betts calls the
‘chess model’ – the cool, rational and deliberate use of military force in a strategy
of graduated and finely tuned escalation. However, as Clausewitz reminds us,
military conflict is also the realm of the irrational, of emotions and of chance.
Schelling himself argued that a military threat is often one ‘which leaves something
to chance’, and consequently what Betts terms the ‘Russian roulette model’ may
be more apposite than the chess model.37
Coercive mechanisms
If coercion is to be effective, it is essential that it be applied in such a manner that
it exerts maximum pressure upon the target. Given that coercive diplomacy involves
the threat of force, or at the most the limited use of actual force, and that the target
will continue to have the means to resist rather than being rendered defenceless, it
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is essential to identify what mechanisms can be used to make the target change its
policy. Effective strategic coercion ‘requires an understanding of coercive mech-
anisms – the processes by which the threat or infliction of costs generates adversary
concessions. Mechanisms are the crucial middle link of the means-end chain of a
coercive strategy’.38
The key problem facing coercive diplomacy is thus to determine what strategy
will most effectively and economically alter the cost-benefit analysis of the target
state. This is the key question, and yet the one that remains least understood.
Coercive diplomacy involves a psychological strategy designed to affect the target’s
decision-making. The coercer must assess the threshold at which force will affect
the target. ‘But’, as Colin McInnes notes, ‘assessing this threshold is far from easy,
and the mechanisms for successful coercion remain poorly understood.’ Coercion
is a highly dynamic process, a ‘two-sided, iterative game in which the situation
may change and with it calculations of costs and benefits. This uncertainty in turn
makes it much more difficult to gauge an enemy’s breaking point – the level of
force that, with its implied escalation, will lead the enemy to give way.’39
Identifying the appropriate mechanisms involves opening up the ‘black box’ of
decision-making in order to understand the political character of the target regime
or actor. In particular, it involves identifying the most vulnerable pressure points
of the target. Similarly, the target state will seek to counter-coerce by targeting the
coercer’s vulnerable points. These pressure points will vary from regime to regime.
It is also evident that democracies have different pressure points from non-
democracies. Whereas democracies will be vulnerable to casualties and to charges
of arrogance and bullying, non-democracies may be vulnerable only when key elite
groups underpinning the regime are attached. A coercive strategy thus involves
identifying what the opponent values most and targeting it. ‘To threaten effectively,
a coercer must first understand what the adversary values. Then the coercer must
determine what it can credibly put at risk without too much cost to itself. In other
words, a coercer must seek out an adversary’s pressure points: those points that are
sensitive to the adversary and that the coercer can effectively threaten.’40
Problems with identifying effective coercive mechanisms
The problems inherent in identifying the appropriate coercive mechanisms can be
illustrated from the example of Operation Allied Force. The Kosovo campaign,
Edward Luttwak has argued, ‘exposed the strategic limitations of fighting by remote
bombardment alone’. A war
fought by precision bombardment alone is necessarily a slow and
tortuous process of identifying, selecting, and destroying single
structures one by one. . . . Unless the entire purpose of the bombing is
to deprive the enemy of some specific facilities or weapons, so that it
can be achieved physically and unilaterally, the success of a bombing
campaign must depend on the enemy’s decision to accept defeat. That
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decision can result only from a complex political process in which the
impact of the bombing interacts with all sorts of other factors, including
cultural determinants and historical memories, the inner politics of
decision making, concurrent threats or reassurances from other powers
if any, and more.
In the case of Kosovo, he notes, different coercive mechanisms were tried;
For example, when the 1999 Kosovo war started on March 24, initially
the bombing was mostly symbolic and largely aimed at air defences,
on the theory that the government of Slobodan Milosovic only needed
to be convinced of NATO’s determination to capitulate [before it
became willing]. When that failed to happen, in April the bombing
became distinctly heavier and focused on weapon factories, depots,
bases, and barracks, on the theory that Serbian military leaders would
pressure the government to accept the abandonment of Kosovo in order
to save their remaining institutional assets. By May 1999, however,
civilian infrastructures such as power stations and bridges were being
destroyed to make everyday life as difficult as possible, on the different
theory that the Milosevic government was not undemocratic after all,
that it would respond to pressures for surrender from an increasingly
uncomfortable public.
(Luttwak 2002: 77)
The EU and strategic coercion
Paradoxically perhaps, given the problems NATO faced in devising an effective
coercive strategy in Operation Allied Force, it was the experience of Kosovo that
provided the crucial catalyst for the ESDP. The ESDP is designed to give the EU a
capability for military crisis management, both acting ‘autonomously’ and in
conjunction with NATO (utilizing the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement); its significance
is that it demonstrates that the Union has clearly moved beyond its former ‘civilian
power’ identity. The ESDP is still in its embryonic stages and it will perhaps be a
decade or more before the Union is in a position to undertake the full range of
Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding. Within Europe, the EU has
functioned as an instrument of collective regional hegemony, seeking to shape its
external milieu through a mix of hard and soft power. With the lesson of the Balkans
clearly in their minds, EU member states have recognized that if they are to act as
a ‘civilianizing’ power, they need to add coercive military power to their repertoire
of foreign and security policy instruments. The development of the ESDP is further
analysed by Arita Eriksson in Chapter 3 of this volume.
Before the EU can develop into an effective institutional forum through which
its member states can collectively manage and resolve international crises, four
shortcomings need to be addressed. The first is that the EU needs more streamlined
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procedures and mechanisms to ensure swift decision-making, whilst ensuring
political accountability and control. In crisis diplomacy involving strategic coercion,
it is essential to get inside the decision-making cycle of the adversary, in order to
seize the initiative and set the agenda, rather than to be left responding to events.
Speedy decision-making is thus essential. A complex ‘wiring diagram’ is now in
place for the second pillar, and in the Nice Treaty the PSC was identified as the
crucial body for crisis management. However, it is not clear how effectively this
will work in practice, and there are still too many procedures involved. The Kosovo
conflict demonstrated the problems NATO faced in trying to ‘wage war by
committee’. Formal procedures involving established institutions tend to lack
flexibility, and much effective crisis management has involved the creation of ad
hoc arrangements.
A further complicating factor is that effective EU action in a complex emergency
may require ‘horizontal links’ between the different pillars, for example, the second
and third pillars (CFSP and JHA), or the first and second pillars. It will also need
to coordinate its activities with other international actors, including international
organizations, states and NGOs. The central dilemma facing the EU is how to
combine effective crisis management decision-making with political control and
direction of crisis management operations. The problem here is that the EU consists
of 25 member states, all with somewhat different geopolitical interests, political
cultures and attitudes to the use of force. Differences in interest between large and
small member states need to be taken into account, and all will want to have their
say if the EU is acting in their name.
Second, EU member states need to identify the lacuna in their military capabilities
and develop common approaches to defence procurement. At the same time, they
will need to consider the implications of the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)
for the sort of military forces they acquire. The problem facing EU member states
is exemplified by the fact that only 3 per cent of the substantial numbers of men
under arms were readily available in a crisis.41 Not only has defence expenditure
steadily fallen in the 1990s, Europe’s armed forces have been largely trained and
equipped for territorial defence, not expeditionary warfare or crisis management.
EU member states are aware of this problem.
Given the strategic requirements of the Headline Goals, which have been defined
by the Petersberg tasks, there is no need for member states to develop capabilities
for the full spectrum of military operations. The EU is unlikely to want to conduct
independent high-intensity operations at the tougher end of the Petersberg tasks for
some time, so capabilities for long-range precision bombing or intense mechanized
ground combat are not urgently required. However, EU member states will need to
improve their capability to project military power and sustain operations in the
field. The key to this is not simply increasing defence spending, but rather to adopt
a more rational and synergistic approach to arms procurement.
Third, the finest armed forces in the world and the most effective decision-making
procedures are useless if there is no agreement on how to use them. EU member
states – or at the least, the serious players amongst them – must agree broad
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guidelines on how to use military force once the relevant political decision has been
taken. This means that the EU must develop a common strategic culture and military
doctrine covering the level and circumstance of the use of force, the general rules
of engagement, military discipline (in the context of a variety of different legal
frameworks) and the chain of command. Common rules of engagement are clearly
important, but thought must also be given to shared understandings about how to
work with other international agencies or NGOs who are likely to be present in
complex emergencies; how to relate to the local authorities and population; and
legal-technical questions of extra-territorial status and immunity. The EU strives
to present an image as an ‘ethical power’, and therefore national contingents to EU
military operations must share certain minimum standards regarding their operation
in the field. This will require the elaboration of a common strategic doctrine, and
shared training – neither of which are on the cards at the moment.
Finally, enlargement will have a major impact on the EU as an international actor.
Enlargement has given the EU new geo-strategic interests in Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus and the Balkans, along with the Mediterranean and the Maghreb. Further
enlargement will extend the EU’s ‘near abroad’ deeper into Eastern Europe and
the Middle East. At the same time, enlargement has complicated decision-making
within the second pillar, and brought more diverse interests into the policy-making
process. This will further weaken the cohesion of the EU as an instrument of
collective hegemony, and weaken its ability to shape its regional milieu. On the
importance of enlargement for the actorness of the EU see also Chapter 2 in this
volume.
In short, therefore, given the heterogeneity of political interests and values in an
EU of 25 members, it will be very difficult to get political consensus for any
operation that does not enjoy a clear and unambiguous mandate from the UN
Security Council or the OSCE, or for one that involves a significant element of
military coercion. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the EU is unlikely to be a
viable instrument of coalitional strategic coercion. EU military operations are likely
to focus on the low-risk end of the Petersberg tasks such as police missions, training,
surveillance, blockades or protection of SLOC (sea lines of communication). Such
missions include what has been termed ‘coercive inducement’ or ‘coercive preven-
tion’,42 and may involve taking over peace support operations from NATO. In
Robert Kagan’s terms, the EU will ‘do the dishes’, once NATO (or a coalition of
the willing) has ‘cooked the meal’.43
This has implications for the EU as a strategic actor. The EU as such is too diverse
to act as a coherent actor in international politics where security issues of vital
national importance are involved. In this regard, it remains less than the sum of its
parts. Nonetheless, in some contexts, it can serve to amplify the power and influence
of its largest and most capable member states acting in its name – as the example of
Operation Artemis demonstrates. Such operations, however, are only possible in
regions not caught up in the web of varying strategic interests and geopolitical
concerns of its member states.
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Conclusion: the limits of strategic coercion
Coercion is a very difficult strategy to implement, replete with risks and
uncertainties. There is an ever-present risk of escalation in the context of a changing
and dynamic environment. Once force or the threat of force is introduced into a crisis
situation, the whole dynamics of the conflict change. Once a coercive threat has 
been issued, the coercer faces the prospect of backing down if it is rejected, with
dire consequences for its future credibility as an international actor, or escalating
to a more aggressive strategy based on brute force. The historical record is not
reassuring: coercive strategies have failed more times than they have succeeded.
Strategic coercion is thus a high-risk approach that is difficult to implement
effectively against a determined, crafty and unpredictable opponent.44 It depends
less on the precise balance of military capabilities between coercer and target, and
much more on their relative motivation and political resolve. For this reason,
strategic coercion is more of an art than a science, and depends on the ability to
calibrate military operations to nuanced and effective diplomatic negotiation. As
Freedman notes, therefore, ‘[t]here is no mechanical formula that can ensure
success, even though we might be able to identify conditions that make success
more likely’.45 He thus concludes that
Strategic coercion is not an easy option. Because the target remains a
voluntary agent the objective must be to influence its decision-making
and will therefore only be one of a number of influences. It is dependent
on an appreciation of how the target constructs reality and its likely
responsiveness to alternative forms of pressure. It lacks the legitimacy
provided by consent or the certainty promised by control. Unsuccessful
coercion may therefore necessitate a more aggressive approach based
on control or else a more conciliatory approach geared to generating
consent.
(Freedman 1998: 17)
Despite the problems inherent in strategic coercion, it is likely to remain an
attractive option for European policy-makers because it promises a way to achieve
political and strategic objectives short of full-scale war. Strategies of military
coercion employing the discriminate use of force that minimizes collateral damage
are also attractive to Western democracies because they fit contemporary
understandings of the ‘just war’ theory. In the 1990s, strategic coercion was used
by NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo, with mixed results. As a result of the Kosovo
campaign, the EU has moved to equip itself with the military and institutional
capabilities to conduct military crisis management operations, ‘including the most
demanding’. Yet as we have seen, the EU’s heterogeneous membership and
cumbersome decision-making procedures mean that the Union is unlikely to engage
in collective strategic coercion. Instead, this will be left to ‘coalitions of the willing’
led by one or more of the EU’s major powers. In some contexts, this will be
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conducted with the US and NATO, utilizing the ‘Berlin Plus’ mechanism. At other
times, non-EU OSCE states might be involved, most notably Russia, the Ukraine
and Canada. Russia would make a suitable strategic partner given that it has military
capabilities (for example, strategic airlift) that complement those of EU member
states. Possible areas for joint EU-Russia military intervention include Moldova
(Transdniestra) and Georgia (Abkhazia). Cooperation in addressing the long-
running problem of Chechnya is unlikely given that Russia regards this as an area
where vital national interests are at stake. The example of Chechnya illustrates the
point made at the start of this chapter: collective strategic coercion is only possible
in situations where none of the vital interests of Europe’s great powers are involved.
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THE ALIEN AND THE
TRADITIONAL
The EU facing a transforming Russia
Charlotte Wagnsson
Introduction
A most intriguing issue is why Russia–EU cooperation in the sphere of security has
not evolved further, despite expected mutual gains and official declarations in
support of closer collaboration. The aim of this chapter is to further explore both
driving forces and obstacles to EU–Russia rapprochement in the sphere of security.1
Is cooperation held back by diverging threat-conceptions, the two parties’
differences in actorness, or perhaps by the shadow of the ‘giant’ on the other side
of the Atlantic?
Security issues have been discussed at biannual EU–Russia summit meetings
since 1999 and the cooperation has been described in terms of a ‘strategic
partnership’.2 Representatives from both sides have paid generous tribute to the
cause of rapprochement. The newly appointed High Representative of the EU’s
common foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, assessed relations with Russia
as the Union’s most important task, since a partnership with Russia ‘offers the
greatest opportunity to affect the cause of world affairs for the better and to begin
the new century in a manner which will truly affect the course of history’.3 Russian
leaders interpret a strong EU as largely beneficial to Russia, since it contributes to
spreading the power in the international system.4 President Putin has described
Europe as one of the most important poles in the emerging multi-polar world.5
The basic driving force for closer cooperation between EU and Russia is
economics. Russia depends on the EU as its main trading partner. The Union
accounted for 40 per cent of Russia’s trade in the 1990 and answers for about 6 per
cent of Russia’s imports and export trade after the EU enlargement in 2004.
European companies are the main foreign investors in Russia’s expanding econ-
omy.6 The EU counts on Russia above all as an exporter of energy. Russia provide
20 per cent of the EU’s fuel.7 (Economic relations between the EU and Russia are
analysed in Chapter 9 in this book.) Despite many problems, the volume of trade
will most probably increase in the future. Economic considerations spill over into
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the security area.8 Russian leaders link security to the promotion of development
goals. The overall most important political aim is to regenerate the economy by
focusing on internal reform and establishing favourable external relations for its
trade. The National Security Concept of 2000 states that ‘Russia’s national interests
may be assured only on the basis of sustainable economic development.’9 The
Foreign Policy Concept of June 2000 also places security in relation to economic
development as such and not only to traditional security goals.10 President Putin
displays an awareness of the link between a strong economy and international power
and influence.11 (The ‘economization’ of Russia’s foreign policy is further explored
in Chapter 7.)
Apart from economics, the pursuit of stability in the European sphere of security
is a strong force for further rapprochement. A forceful EU motive for cooperation
is the desire to promote stability along its borders. The EU’s ‘Common Strategy on
Russia’, adopted in Cologne in June 1999, states that lasting peace on the continent
can only be achieved if Russia is democratic, stable and prosperous and firmly
anchored in Europe. Russia’s Middle Term Strategy for the Development of
Relations between the Russian Federation and the EU (2000–10), published in
October 1999, acknowledges the two parties’ mutual interdependence and empha-
sizes the advantages of cooperation for curbing common threats. It suggests that
Russia could contribute to the solution of problems facing the EU, such as organized
crime and local conflicts, and to the strengthening of Europe’s common position in
the world. The two parties already collaborate to reduce the risk of spillover. For
example, a Co-operation Programme for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in
the Russian Federation was launched in 1999 in order to increase nuclear safety 
in Russia.12 The EU also maintains an interest in boosting stability and prosperity
in more distant regions where Russia plays a key role, most notably in the South
Caucasus.13
Moreover, the two parties share some basic interests in global relations, most
obviously a common will to strengthen the UN. At the summit in Rome in November
2003, the joint statement ‘confirmed a high degree of mutual understanding with
regard to a number of acute international issues and the central role of the UN in
world affairs’.14 Indeed, the rationales behind the promotion of the UN differ.
Russia’s seat in the Security Council is one of the few remaining signs of its status
as a great power, which makes it quite focused on sustaining the importance of the
Security Council. The EU, rather, sees in the UN a vehicle for advancing multi-
lateralism and upholding the rule of law. Nevertheless, despite their differences the
two parties share the same goal of retaining the UN’s significance in world affairs.
If resources were pooled, Russia and the EU could indeed gain greater leverage
in the international arena. The two parties already collaborate in the peace process
in the Middle East and the EU has worked hard to convince Russia of the advantages
of ratifying the international agreement that seeks to reduce the emissions of gases
contributing to global warming, the Kyoto Protocol. The Russian ratification in
October 2004 was vital for the implementation of the Protocol.15 Also, Russia and
the EU have taken a rather cohesive stance on North Korea, partially pursuing a
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different strategy from that of the US.16 The two parties also share interests as
regards to the struggle against international terrorism and organized crime and non-
proliferation. In January 2005, Russia chose to join and thereby strengthen a
European diplomatic imitative to persuade Iran to renounce any nuclear technology
that could be used for military purposes.
The two parties could increase practical cooperation in many areas. In the field
of conflict resolution and mediation, the EU can take advantage of Russian efforts;
the latter is neither a member of NATO nor of the Union, and in the Balkans it also
plays a particular role due to historical reasons.17 There is also a considerable poten-
tial in the area of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement within the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS). The Russian leaders could much more easily accept
joint peacekeeping within the borders of the former Soviet Union together with the
EU than they would consider launching such projects together with NATO. Closer
cooperation in these areas would also provide the EU with valuable information 
on conditions within the CIS, e.g. augmenting transparency as regards to Russia’s
conduct in Chechnya.18
One possible way forward is to incorporate Russia into EU security structures,
by seeing to that it plays an enhanced role in, or is integrated into, the ESDP.19
However, so far Russia has only made a limited contribution, by participating 
in the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina which became operational 
on 1 January 2003.20 Russia could also provide assets in support of an EU-led crisis
management operation, such as heavy-lift transport aircraft and satellite recon-
naissance. Military-technical cooperation has, however, not evolved very far.
This overview suggests that there are plenty of possibilities and some attempts
to boost practical cooperation. However, tangible results are relatively poor.21
Indeed, declarations of goodwill and formal agreements constitute achievements 
per se thanks to their strong symbolical value. This holds particularly true with
regard to the Russian leadership, which has aimed at getting Russia accepted as a
respected and prominent actor in the sphere of European security ever since the fall
of the Soviet Union.22 Still, why has so relatively little been achieved in practical
terms? Three potential explanations to the relatively poor outcome are addressed
below; differences in actorness, diverging threat-perceptions and the shadow of 
the US.
The first problem is about the quite different set-up and character of the two
actors. The EU is a new and different kind of actor on the international scene. It is
not primarily based upon the notion of sovereignty and cannot be equated with any
other actor in the current international system.23 (The special character of the EU
as an international actor is also analysed in Chapter 2 of this volume.) Such a ‘post-
Westphalian entity’ ought to encounter both advantages and difficulties when
interacting with a traditional sovereign state like Russia. Most probably, difficulties
are linked more to how the two actors perceive each other, rather than to factual
differences. How do the EU’s and Russia’s interpretations of the ‘existential barrier’
impact on the prospects of further cooperation? This is the main question of the first
section of analysis.
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The second problem is that the framing of threats to security may diverge to 
an extent that causes difficulties for cooperation. There is a risk that Russia and the
EU ‘play different games’ in the sphere of security, due to diverging definitions of
threats and security. Russian leaders traditionally frame security in terms of high
politics, state-to-state relations, power politics, spheres of influence and geopolitical
balancing. This practice meets with a new actor in the international arena, which
bestows the nation-state with a secondary position, and which places economics
before power politics in the traditional military sense. This section of the analysis
starts by capturing similarities and differences in the actors’ subjective descriptions
of reality; in other words, it asks how actors frame problems. A frame demonstrates
how actors conceptualize political issues. The targets of analysis are official
motivations used so as to describe and justify security policy; in Schön and Rhein’s
words, ‘rhetorical frames’.24 Politicians are obliged to communicate an acceptable
basis for their politics to counterparts in both the domestic and international 
arena. Framing is essentially a power game; it affects the very essence of a debate,
determining what issues are included and excluded in a communicative process, i.e.
the boundaries of discourse.25 The battle for control in a political debate is, in turn,
a central battle in political reality. Competing framing is the result of frame conflicts,
and ultimately, of policy controversies that have tangible political consequences.26
The third problem is that great international political transformations induce
actors to adapt their strategies in the sphere of security. During the Cold War, the
enmity between the two superpowers froze regional security dynamics, a phenom-
enon labelled ‘overlay’.27 After the end of the superpower confrontation, regional
dynamics prospered all over the globe, resulting in both enhanced cooperation and
unleashed conflicts. However, actors are still pressured to adjust their perspective
on security to a new agenda and to a new distribution of international political power
labelled unipolarity. This does not signify a renewed overlay on European security
dynamics similar to the overlay of the Cold War, but it is still relevant to ask whether
or not the looming shadow of the US serves as an obstacle to evolving relations
between Russia and the EU.
The existential barrier: the alien and the traditional
Some scholars consider the EU to be more than an ‘actor’. One way to conceptualize
the EU is as being both a structure and an actor in the international arena. Its
particular form of multi-level governance results in structural processes, such as
long-term aid for development, or prevention of crises and the stabilizing of non-
member states and regions. It also performs as a typical actor in international
relations, carrying out tasks that have previously been handled only by states or
alliances. When the EU on 4 July 2003 decided to send a joint peacekeeping force
to the Democratic Republic of Congo to try to contain ethnic violence, it took a new
step towards powerful actorness in the international arena. The 1,400-member force
constituted the EU’s first military operation outside Europe, and it was carried out
without assistance from NATO. (See also the analysis in Chapter 5 in this volume.)
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Moreover, the EU aims to develop a more multi-faceted capacity than traditional
states present. The EU claims to possess exceptional qualities as an actor in the
sphere of security. Larsen demonstrates that, since the St Malo summit, the EU has
promoted a self-image as a power with access to both civilian and military means,
thus constituting itself as a unique actor in international security.28 The EU Security
Strategy paper, which Javier Solana presented in June 2003, calls for more active
policies to counter ‘new, dynamic threats’, stating that the EU has a particular value
to add, particularly in operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.29
In several ways, the EU is thus an ‘alien’ in the international system.
Russia has principally welcomed its new, peculiar, associate in the sphere of
security, refraining from defining the Union’s development towards increased
actorness as a threat to its security.30 Moscow still regards NATO and the US 
as threatening counterparts in the international arena – however only potentially 
– which presents challenges that can be conceptualized in terms of balance-
of-power, polarity and geopolitical interests. Russia’s intense protests against 
the enlargement of NATO testify to a die-hard tendency to view the alliance as 
a tangible danger to Russian interests which should be kept at a distance from 
its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
The EU, by contrast, has most of all been interpreted as a rather weak body,
governed by a wide range of different interests that are unlikely to generate any
serious threat to Russian interests. In 2000, Moscow claimed that it did not feel
threatened at all, but, rather, was positive to the EU’s plans to form a European
rapid reaction force.31
One source of concern, however, is the EU’s relations to states in the perceived
Russian sphere of interests, most notably the Ukraine. Russia’s reluctance to 
cede influence in the Ukraine caused a major disagreement with the EU during 
the autumn of 2004, with the two parties holding starkly different views of the
Ukrainian presidential election in November. The Russian president first received
criticism for openly supporting the Kremlin-backed Viktor Yanukovich on the
campaign trail. He then accepted Yanukovich’s victory, while European observers
considered that the elections had been rigged. Disagreements largely ruined the
Russia–Europe summit on 25 November, since the EU did not accept the official
outcome of the Ukrainian election, while the Russian side rejected what it termed
as being ‘outside interference in the affairs of a central-European sovereign state’.32
(For more on the Ukrainian presidential elections see Chapter 7.)
Russian ambivalence towards the EU as an actor in the sphere of security is most
of all linked to the fear of losing influence in the European security sphere, which
could happen if Russian control of its perceived sphere of interests diminished. The
fear of isolation has been a substantial theme in Russian rhetoric on security, most
notably during the campaign against the NATO enlargement.33 The Middle Term
Strategy views the Union’s enlargement in the light of the national interest,
cautioning that the expansion will produce an ‘ambivalent impact’ on Russian
interests. Recycling a customary catch phrase, the document warns that Europe has
to be constructed ‘without dividing lines’.34
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The Russian sense of alienation vis-à-vis the EU is, however, not primarily linked
to traditional threat perceptions. It is rather, the organization’s quite different
appearance that results in a sense of estrangement. Bureaucratic obstacles to cooper-
ation have been abundant. Russians have had difficulties in learning to understand
how to deal with the intricate structures in Brussels.35 The Russian difficulties 
in dealing with EU bureaucracy and its ambivalence towards a totally new kind 
of international actor is reflected in deputy foreign minister Alexei Meshkov’s
description of Russia’s relationship with Europe:
Russia’s relations with many European countries are several centuries
old while the European institutions are comparatively young. It is
important, therefore, to complement the multi-component and multi-
level system of security and cooperation that is being formed with
bilateral relations. They play the role of a ‘safety net’ when the situation
grows too complicated.
(Meshkov 2002: 21)
The statement bears witness to a Russian view of some key European states –
most notably Germany, France and Italy – as being more reliable and easy to deal
with than the EU itself. Also, the EU’s institutional complexity results in a multi-
faceted, sometimes ill-synchronized, policy. The Commission shares a particular,
long-term interest in Russia’s economic and political reform, if only by virtue of
having invested great sums for the sake of it. Russia received 2.281 billion euros in
assistance between 1991 and 2000, most of which was intended to support institu-
tional, legal and administrative reform, including the development of independent
media and civil society, fiscal and banking sector reform and social reform.36
The durable, heavily organized engagement in the economic sphere contrasts
with the more short-sighted process in the security sphere. Dempsey notes that EU
diplomats blame the Union’s passivity as regards Russia’s conduct in Chechnya,
and as regards its slowness in accepting the Kyoto Protocol, on institutional
weaknesses. Above all, the EU lacks a foreign minister with tangible powers and
the rotating presidency results in difficulties to verge a long-term, coherent foreign
policy.37 The EU officially conceded, in 2004, that its attempts at handling relations
with Russia are ineffective and inconsistent, lacking an overall strategy. The Council
– the representatives of the member states – and the Commission often pursue
different, contradictory, strategies. The Union admitted that Russia is able to use
differences among member states and EU institutions, for example by linking
unrelated issues. The officially recommended remedy was to forge common EU
positions on specific issues in the face of each summit, in order to make the member
states and the Commission speak ‘with one voice’ on Russia.38
There is indeed a tension between the EU’s diverse aims. For example, the
Commission depends upon functional relations to the Russian leadership to be able
to advance reforms in the economic sector, which may restrain EU criticism of
human rights violations in Russia. Policy aims in one field may thus serve to hold
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back aims in another sphere. Also, the Union develops as a result of its complex set-
up of self-interested member states, whose views of the Union’s global role in the
sphere of security differ substantially. The most obvious example is divisions over
the US’s intervention in Iraq in 2003. In such cases, Russia may choose to side with
a few member states.
Then again, internal differences within the Union are not always to the
disadvantage of EU–Russia relations. If Russia feels alienated by the Union’s
bureaucratic structure, or policies, member states can consciously intervene to
comfort Russian leaders. Sometimes the Moscow leadership simply finds it easier
to cooperate with leaders of particular member states, but this can still lead to a
Russian rapprochement to European standards, interests or values that work to the
advantage of the Union as a whole. During the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, France and
Germany pursued such a path, exercising intense shuttle-diplomacy, going to
Moscow on several occasions, to ensure that the Russians stayed ‘on board’ during
the peace process Russia can also exploit such internal EU differences to its
advantage, forming coalitions in a case-by-case pragmatic fashion. In November
2003, Putin remarked that Russia stands closer to individual European states on
many important international issues than the EU states do in relation to one another,
and stated that Russia is willing to pursue a dialogue both with all the individual
states and the Union as a whole.39
While the EU has had some difficulties in ‘explaining itself’ to its eastern
neighbour, Russian bureaucracy has also erected substantial hurdles in the way of
cooperation.40 The unreformed Russian military system is another factor that
impedes practical cooperation.41
In sum, the EU and Russia have clashed to some extent in the ‘borderland regions’
between the two giants, most notably in the Ukraine. However, the two parties have
not officially portrayed one another as ‘threatening’. Still, the EU’s set-up as a
starkly different entity than its traditional neighbour has contributed to a rather slow
development of collaboration. The Union’s complexity, its sometimes contradictory
policies and severe differences between member states have worked against the
pursuit of long-term, strategic aims in its foreign policy towards Russia. However,
individual member states may contribute to upholding good relations between
Russia and the EU at times when the former disagrees with Brussels. Likewise,
Russia can draw advantages from its traditional bilateral relations to key member
states in order to improve relations with the EU. There are severe bureaucratic
obstacles to cooperation on both sides, but the two actors seem to be gradually
learning how to deal with one another. After all, it takes time to develop new ties and
structures of cooperation. Just a little more than a decade has passed since the Cold
War security order collapsed. It was only in the 1990s that the EU began to develop
into a new type of international actor, presenting Russia with a wholly different kind
of neighbourhood in the sphere of security. Simultaneously, Russia tried to find a new
path forward in the field of security, exposing a new face to its European neighbours.
In conclusion, differences in actorness do not generate serious threat perceptions,
but still contribute to explain the slow pace in the development of cooperation.
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However, the existential barrier should not, in the long run, place any serious
obstacles in the way of further rapprochement.
Diverging framing of threats
The second stumbling block to further cooperation is related to diverging stand-
points on what constitute the most serious threats to security. Do the two parties’
positions on ‘the state-of-the-art’ in the sphere of security differ to a substantial
degree and what would be the political implications of such differences? The
ensuing analysis asks to what degree and in what ways the actors’ framing of threats
differ, and discusses political consequences.
First, since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has stubbornly proclaimed that
it remains a great power in the international arena and should be treated accordingly.
The leadership has called attention to the importance of traditional great power
attributes such as a vast space of territory, geopolitical location, balance of power,
large population and nuclear weapons.42 The Russian culture of framing the 
world through the prism of geopolitics and the struggle for power clearly clashes
with the EU’s way of presenting itself as an actor in the sphere of security. The 
EU has emphasized the ‘soft’ edge of the security agenda in accordance with 
the WEU’s Petersberg declaration of 1992 envisaging new, ‘soft’ threats.43 The
EU’s Security Strategy adopted at the Brussels summit in December 2003 also
frames security within a broader societal perspective. The document stresses the
importance of promoting a ring of well-governed countries around the Union,
adding that ‘the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed
democratic states’.44
Notably, the task of ‘pre-emptive action’, included in a previous draft of the
treaty, was removed from the text, replaced by the milder term ‘preventive
engagement’. The latter is described as ‘acting decisively before events get out of
hand’; launching diplomatic initiatives and conducting civilian, police or military
operations, before countries deteriorate, humanitarian emergencies arise, or when
signs of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are detected. The differences
between the ‘traditional’ Russian framing of threats to security and of adequate
methods of dealing with these threats, as well as the EU’s ‘new’ way of framing
these issues, should still not be exaggerated. The EU’s capacity for acting in the
sphere of security has increased. In 2003, the Union launched the European Union
Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and launched its first military operation,
taking over NATO’s responsibility for establishing security in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. Its readiness to intervene beyond its borders was also
manifested by the military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the
summer of 2003. Moreover, even though ‘soft security’ remains the Union’s main
focus, it has taken some tentative steps to ‘sharpen’ its security agenda; the Security
Strategy adds some elements to the original Petersberg logic, describing new threats
of which the major ones are terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime.45
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Moreover, the EU’s emphasis on organized crime, failed states and terrorism
corresponds to what in the 1990s became Russia’s normal practice of framing
security, heavily drawing upon the threat of terrorism, leading the authorities, e.g.
to combat organized crime and struggling to control unstable states such as Georgia
and Afghanistan. Russia has long emphasized the seriousness of terrorist threats.46
At least since the conflict in Kosovo in 1999, the leaders have asked other states for
support in the struggle against separatism and international terrorism, describing 
it as a problem threatening ‘the entire civilized world’.47 The terrorist attacks of 
11 September 2001 created a ‘window of opportunity’ to gain an ear for these claims.
Putin concluded that ‘we talked a lot about the threat of terrorism, but apparently
we didn’t find the words that would have persuaded the world community to create
an effective defence against international terrorism’. He argued that the US had
failed to anticipate the attack because of its unwillingness to recognize that the
world had changed.48
Indeed, 11 September 2001 added a new dimension to Russia–EU relations. The
altered outlook on international security in the US and Europe produced many
practical consequences. Russia and the EU developed their cooperation against
terrorism during the subsequent months. The Russian leaders increased contacts
with the EU and President Putin called for a common security space in Europe.49
According to a joint declaration of the EU–Russia summit of November 2003, ‘the
fight against terrorism and our commitment to prevent proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction are cornerstones of our cooperation in the field of security.’50
Furthermore, the EU’s process of strengthening its actorness in the sphere of
‘not-so-soft security’, albeit slow, evolves in tandem with Russia steadily pursuing
a reverse path, from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ security. Russia has experienced a far-reaching
transformation of its security policy over the past decade, and is now focusing more
on economics. The leaders have not abandoned the focus on ‘high politics’, they
still largely frame the world using a global prism, are eager to maintain what is left
of Russia’s great power status, and fear US hegemony. A large, unreformed army
that does not correspond to the new kind of international reality is still maintained.
Yet, to these traditional standpoints the leadership has added an emphasis on
economic power and ‘new threats’. The 1990s can be characterized as a decade
during which the Russian leadership has faced serious setbacks on the international
arena, experiencing NATO enlargement, the rise of US predominance and the
latter’s attempts at infringing on Russia’s sphere of interest in the former Soviet
Union. Despite these trends, worrying in the eyes of the leaders, and despite the
traditional collective threat perception based on the experience of being surrounded
by potentially aggressive neighbours, the leadership adopted a ‘modern’ security
agenda.51
Russia’s search for a new orientation since the end of the Cold War corresponds
rather well to the EU’s emerging approach to ‘low’ and ‘high’ security politics as
embodied in the ESDP/CFSP. In addition, both Russia and the EU have countered
internal and trans-national threats using means other than military force, for
example, employing the Russian Interior Ministry’s forces and EU special police
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forces.52 The will to collaborate against new threats was manifest at the EU–Russia
summit of November 2003, when the two parties issued a joint declaration that
stated, ‘We are committed to intensified cooperation on new security threats and
challenges.’53 In his address to the Nation of 2003, Putin again stressed the severity
of new threats, particularly mentioning international terrorism, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, regional and territorial conflicts and the narco threat.54
Even though Russia and the EU partly frame threats to security in different ways,
the main differences between them do not primarily pertain to different definitions
of threats, or even to different views of the use of force. The EU does not refrain
from using force. It is, rather, the rationales behind the use of force and the concrete
methods that differ. The main problem is not primarily that the two parties totally
disagree on the list of threats, but that their priorities and their views on the roots
of the problems and the relevant means to address them, diverge. The EU frames
liberal values, stability and absence of threats as densely interlinked. The Union’s
policy of preventive engagement using non-military means stands in stark contrast
to Russia’s readiness to use extraordinary, military means in order to curb instability.
The discord essentially relates to the ‘depth’ of the security agenda – a referent
object that ought to be in focus. Although Russian leaders ensure that security
measures are designed to protect both the state and the individual, the integrity and
security of the state is still the overriding concern. For example, in his Address to
the Nation of 2003 Putin emphasized the necessity of maintaining Russia as a
‘strong power’, in order to preserve existing borders:55
I would like to remind you that throughout our history Russia and its
citizens committed and commit truly historic deeds for the sake of the
country’s integrity, for the sake of peace in it and stable life. Keeping
the country together on vast expanses, preserving the unique community
of peoples, with the strong positions of the country in the world, is not
only a strenuous job but also tremendous sacrifices and deprivations of
our people. Such is the thousand-year old history of Russia, such is the
method of its reproduction as a strong country. And we have no right
to forget this. We must take this into account as we assess present-day
dangers and our main tasks.
(Putin 2003)
The EU does not emphasize sovereignty to the same degree as Russia and the
issue of intervention at the cost of sovereignty clearly divides the Union, which 
the Iraq war testified to. The Union proceeds towards upgrading the individual as
a referent object in the sphere of security at the cost of the sovereign state. The EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights of 1999 was an important step forward in the process
towards providing individuals with increased opportunities to appeal to agencies
with the power to compel national states to ensure human rights.56
Moreover, the altered discourse in Moscow towards emphasizing ‘soft threats’
has been explained partly as the result of a strategy of political correctness. Bobo
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Lo even argues that practically no change has actually taken place, implying that it
all boils down to Russian leaders paying lip service to Western world-views.57 This
is an exaggeration; the Putin regime does care about economic development and
about new threats, at the very least those that are linked to terrorism. The campaign
against terrorism essentially serves three main causes. First, it is waged to secure
the territorial integrity of the Russian state. The Russian leaders equate separatism
with terrorism and perceive this evil as a threat to the state’s integrity. After 
11 September 2001, they have gained better opportunities to legitimize their combat
against separatists with reference to international terrorism. Second, the combat
against terrorism provides the leaders with an internal enemy, a scapegoat to blame
and rally against in order to win the electorate’s support. Third, it is also plausible
that the Russian anti-terror rhetoric partly arose from a will to improve the state’s
international reputation by conveying to the West that the intense combat against
terrorism makes Russia a worthy, just actor that stands up for universal, democratic
values, and by synchronizing threat perceptions. A united front against common
enemies would increase identification and thereby the possibilities for cooperation
with the West. When launching its new rhetoric, the leadership openly declared
that the new threats were of concern for both Europe and Russia, thus uniting them.58
In 2003, the Russian president explicitly placed value on the ‘anti-terrorist commu-
nity’ and ‘the fight against a common threat’.59 In brief, the Russian stance should
be interpreted as stemming from a mixture of political correctness intended to
increase identification and collaboration with the West and to improve Russia’s
reputation, ‘genuine’ worries of new threats, and a die-hard tendency of adhering
to the traditional view on security.60
The analysis suggests that Russia’s and the EU’s ways of framing threats differ
to some degree, and their underlying principles and views on the methods to counter
threats partly deviate. Diverging the framing of threats in some areas largely stems
from different historical experiences; Russia retains the perspective of a traditional
great power eager to remain influential in the international arena, while the EU
depicts itself in other terms than being a traditional power and also sets up partly
different goals.
The differences are partly counterbalanced by the shared emphasis on the need
to combat international terrorism, the awareness of mutual interdependence and, to
a rather large degree, converging global interests. Both parties promote the role of
the UN and argue on behalf of multilateralism. Russia also shares a scepticism 
of US dominance in world affairs with a large number of EU states. Finally, the
collaboration against terrorism bears witness of the fact that Russia is a contributor
to European and global security. It wields experience and knowledge in areas where
European states are relatively weak, such as the war against terrorism, organized
crime and non-proliferation.
Differing underlying rationales for framing issues in certain ways, and diverging
standpoints on humanitarian rights and methods to ensure stability, appear as the
main differences between Russia’s and the EU’s view on security. The conflict in
Chechnya captures this problem area very well. Moscow has tried to gain acceptance
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for its conduct in Chechnya, emphasizing the links between Chechen separatists,
the attacks of 11 September 2001 and terrorists based in Afghanistan.61 However,
the EU is reluctant to accept Russia’s justification of its actions in every instance
with reference to the vital struggle against international terrorism. These differences
were aggravated in the autumn of 2004. Russian authorities received criticism for
their handling of the hostage-taking in the North-Ossetian town of Beslan, where
hostage-takers seized an entire school and killed dozens of children. The Russian
side reacted by linking the hostage-taking to the issue of international terrorism,
arguing that the hostage-taking was supervised from abroad, and claiming that 
al-Qaeda operates on Russian territory.62 The Russians complained of poor inter-
national coordination in the struggle against terrorism, e.g. criticizing the United
Kingdom and the United States for granting political asylum to senior figures in the
government of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. Putin stated that in order to
fight terrorism effectively the international community must learn to find ‘a common
language’.63 Putin’s criticism should be seen against the background that the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had recently rejected Moscow’s
definition of terrorism, considering it as being too broad.64
Hence, although Russia and the EU share a focus on ‘soft’ threats to security,
definitions of threats – and in particular the root causes of threats and the means to
deal with them – partly differ at a deeper level. Apart from the diverging standpoints
on Chechnya, this has not placed any substantial hurdles in the way of further
rapprochement, but the discrepancy contributes to explaining the slowness in
boosting practical cooperation.
The shadow of the giant
The shadow of the US could indeed serve as an obstacle to further rapprochement
between Russia and the EU. Russia’s relations to Europe and the US have often been
termed in an ‘either–or’ manner, according to the logic that a rapprochement to
Europe entails a Russian strategy of rallying with the EU against the US. The
formation of a ‘troika’ between Russia, Germany and France in October 1997 was
commonly interpreted as directed against the US.65 However, Russia’s relations to
the US have improved in the past years, and closer Russia–EU collaboration no
longer unavoidably complicates relations to the US. In cases when Russia has joined
in with European states against the US, as during the war in Iraq in 2003, the
Moscow leadership has been careful to declare a determination to preserve good
long-term relations to the US.66
The new Russian strategy of pursuing a ‘strategic partnership’ with both the EU
and the US essentially began in 2001. Russia’s relations to the US improved after
the terrorist attacks of 11 September. Moscow gained increased acceptance for its
conduct in Chechnya emphasizing the links between Chechen separatists, the
attacks of 11 September 2001 and terrorists based in Afghanistan.67 Fedorov notes
that the upgrading of relations actually started a few months before the terrorist
attacks, at the Ljubljana summit in Slovenia of Presidents Vladimir Putin and
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George W. Bush in June 2001. The summit started a process during which Russia
decided to withdraw its military bases from Cuba and Vietnam and implicitly accept
the US exit from the ABM Treaty and the NATO enlargement.68
Foreign minister Igor Ivanov later described 2001 as the year when Russia
returned to the international arena as a key player, and argued that the relationship
to the US had radically improved.69 Two years later, at the summit in Camp David
of September 2003, Bush re-affirmed the value of a Russia–US cooperation in
Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea and Iran.70 The two parties had declared a new
strategic relationship already at the Moscow summit in May 2002, defining areas
of cooperation including the struggle against terrorism and regional instability, non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cooperation in order to solve the
conflicts in southern Caucasus and between Israel and Palestine.71 President Bush
clarified that he valued the emerging cooperation with Russia within the sphere of
security:
Here in Russia, President Putin and I are putting the old rivalries of our
nations firmly behind us, with a new treaty that reduces our nuclear
arsenals to their lowest levels in decades and, for years, the planning
for war. Russia and the United States are building a friendship based
on shared interests — fighting terrorism and expanding our trade
relationship.72
(Bush 2002)
Remaining US–Russian differences include a negative Russian view of the US’s
tendency to act unilaterally. Moscow is also concerned with US advances in southern
Caucasus and in the Ukraine, which is linked to the latter’s interests in controlling
energy resources and in curbing growing grounds for international terrorism in the
Caucasus.73 Washington’s condemnations of anti-democratic tendencies in Russia
in 2004 and 2005, such as Moscow’s handling of the oil company Yukos and the
continuing concentration of power in the Kremlin, also serve to strain relations.74
Yet, overall, the US has expressed limited criticism of the Russian political system
during the past years, and incentives for cooperation are probably stronger than are
the differences in views. Among the key areas of cooperation, where Russia can
make a contribution in line with the US’s interests while also satisfying its own
national interests, are the struggle against international terrorism and relations with
North Korea. George Bush’s personal judgement of Putin after the Ljubljana
summit in Slovenia in 2001, as a ‘man he can trust’, also serves to ease relations
between the two countries.
Relations with NATO, which infected the Russian perception of the US during
the 1990s, have also improved. The Russian support for the US struggle against
international terrorism has contributed to easing relations. NATO’s Secretary-
General, Lord George Robertson, named Russia ‘NATO’s first partner’ in the
struggle against international terrorism in December 2002.75 The Russian foreign
minister described the year 2001 as the year when Russia had returned to the
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international arena as a key player, and depicted relations to the US and NATO as
radically improved.76 More important than expressions of goodwill, the NATO–
Russia Permanent Joint Council was created at the May summit of 2002. The
Council provides Russia with opportunities of participating in NATO decisions, in
particular with regard to the struggle against terrorism, to regional emergencies and
to arms control. The fact that Tony Blair was a main initiator in creating the Council
in turn indicates that if Russia maintains good relations with the EU, this may also
serve to smooth relations to the US and NATO.77 Closer relations to Europe may
contribute to improving Russia’s position as a reliable partner of the US, and vice
versa.78
In conclusion, Russia’s strategy of preserving good relations both with the US
and the EU signifies that although ‘the shadow of the giant’ may disturb and
sometimes complicate EU–Russia relations – above all since it is not always clear
where the loyalties of Russia and the major EU states lie – it is not a substantial
hindrance to further EU–Russia cooperation in the sphere of security.
Cooperation with impediments
Russia needs to cultivate functional relations to its major counterparts in the strategic
triangle; the EU and the US. Notably, Russia is closer to the US than to the EU 
in the area of security. It traditionally shares with the US a global perspective 
on security politics, a very strong emphasis on the struggle against terrorism, and
on regulating regional conflicts and combating the proliferation of weapons. Above
all, Moscow is highly conscious of the US position as ‘the sole superpower’, and,
as a consequence, of the necessity of pursuing close relations with Washington.
Still, in the long run, Russia will gain a lot in pursing a closer partnership with
the EU, primarily due to the economic gains inherent in further cooperation, but also
because of the need to co-manage ‘soft’ threats, and to preserve an influential partner
in its efforts against unilateralism and in strengthening the powers of the UN. 
A range of motivating forces spur EU–Russia cooperation. The two parties
experience converging global interests and a common stance against terrorism.
They are interdependent both in the economic sphere and as regards ‘soft threats’
in Europe. Still, Russia–EU relations in the sphere of security have developed very
gradually so far. A diverse set of impediments contributes to a rather slow pace of
rapprochement.
One potential stumbling block addressed above is the shadow of the US. The
review suggests that Russia shares with the US not only a firm focus on international
terrorism, but also a generally strategic, global perspective on security politics.
Moreover, Moscow leaders are accustomed to giving primacy to relations with the
US. Russia is, however, also likely to value its relations to the EU, because of a
common focus on ‘low threats’ to security in the broader area of Europe, a shared
will to strengthen the UN, and most importantly, due to economic incentives. The
likely conclusion is that the Russian leadership will continue to pursue its strategy
of preserving functional relations to both the EU and the US.
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A sense of alienation persists, based on differences in actorness. EU–Russian
relations have been strained by the two actors’ quite different, and quite complicated,
bureaucratic set-ups. The EU’s relatively weak foreign policy institutions, its
internal differences and bureaucratic structure have contributed to a Russian sense
of alienation. The latter’s partly unreformed institutions have also hampered
communication. These problems can partly be sidestepped by EU member states
pursuing good relations with Russia when relations between the Union and Moscow
become disconnected. Moreover, the actors ought to be able to improve their ability
to communicate and adjust to one another with the passing of time. However, for
the time being, differences between ‘the alien’ and ‘the traditional’ contribute to a
slow pace of rapprochement.
Threat perceptions differ in some ways. The Russian leadership places consid-
erably more emphasis on threats against territorial integrity, while the EU to a larger
extent focuses on ‘non-traditional’ threats, such as hazards to the environment 
and the suppression of minority groups. Despite processes of changing threat
perceptions on both sides, somewhat of a gap still remains between ‘traditional’
Russian threat conceptions focused on ‘high politics’ and the use of military means,
and the EU’s focus on ‘soft threats’ and the use of preventive diplomacy.
A key discrepancy is the Union’s emphasis on the spreading of liberal values and
protection of human rights, as compared to Russia’s tendency to place territorial
integrity and the struggle against terrorism above the protection of human rights and
the cultivating of civil society. This point of divergence has caused severely strained
relations, the most obvious example being the Union’s criticism of Russia’s conduct
in Chechnya.79
Differing values may complicate further rapprochement in the sphere of security.
To the EU, close cooperation with Russia must hinge on the latter’s adherence 
to ‘European values’. The Amsterdam Treaty declares that the EU is ‘founded on
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States’.80 Russia has been criticized in connection with each of these principles.
The EU Commission’s official homepage states that the EU aims at drawing Russia
‘closer to European values, standards and capacities, including on issues such as
the environment and combating organized crime and illegal immigration’.81
However, the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003 and 2004 bred
worries about the state of Russian democracy. In addition, Russia’s tendency to
stick a ‘security label’ on everything from farming to media politics, restricting
activities of certain actors of civil society, threatens the development of democracy
and civil society, which is clearly prioritized in the EU’s policy. Moreover, two
major sources of disagreement surfaced during the autumn of 2004. The EU and
Russia disagreed on standards of democracy in relation to the Ukrainian presidential
election in November, as recounted above. In addition, European and US leaders
expressed concern about Putin’s reform of the federal system, which according to
his critics, would centralize power at the cost of democracy. Moreover, the sentence
of one of the so-called Russian oligarchs Mikhail Khodorkovsky in May 2005 to
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nine years in prison for charges including tax evasion and fraud attracted wide
attention in the US and Europe, causing some critics to suggest that the sentence
was politically motivated.
Incompatible views on democratic values and civil society are thus a major source
of discontent, impacting on relations between Russia and the US to some extent,
but to a much larger extent on relations between Russia and the EU. A probable
scenario is a sustained long-term EU strategy of pressuring and encouraging Russia
to accommodate to European standards in both the economic and security sphere,
coupled with an ad hoc, short-term foreign policy strategy, the results of which are
difficult to predict. For its part, Russia is likely to remain largely positive towards
the EU’s evolving actorness in the sphere of security, and will attempt to take
maximum advantage of mutual cooperation in the economic and security spheres.
In conclusion, the triangular relationship between Russia, the US and the EU is
evolving to a large extent around the issues of international terrorism and values.
EU–Russia relations depend much upon the continued evolution of Russian security
policy, in particular with regard to what values are linked to perceptions of security,
and to what means are used to counter threats. US–Russia relations on the other hand
depend – not exclusively, but to a rather large degree – upon what alliances and
agreements can be reached in the struggle against international terrorism. EU–
Russia relations in the sphere of security will continue to evolve, but the hindrances
described above make any major step forward in the nearest future unlikely.
Complex bureaucracies restrain relations. However, the most severe obstacles to
further integration are caused by diverging views on security, by differing values
and, not least, on differences relating to what methods ought to be used to ensure
stability. The EU views liberal values, stability and absence of threats as densely
interlinked and largely follows a policy of preventive engagement using non-
military means stands in stark contrast to Russia’s readiness to use exceptional
military means to curb instability. A key issue, maybe a decisive one, is to what
extent the EU will allow intervention in sovereign states with reference to human
rights, and, conversely, to what degree Russia will promote similar interventions
with reference to the struggle against terrorism. If the EU follows the path of
promoting or accepting military interventions for the sake of ensuring human rights,
thus violating territorial integrity, this is likely to cause rifts in the relationship with
Russia. Conversely, if Moscow joins the US in the event of future interventions in
sovereign states under the pretext of curbing the growth of bases for terrorism, this
may serve to distance Russia from the EU.
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UKRAINE AND BELARUS OF
NATO AND EU EXPANSION
Bertil Nygren
Introduction
The New Strategic Triangle that includes the United States, the European Union and
Russia has had a significant impact on other relationships as well, especially
relations among states along the new borders. In recent years, this impact has 
been evident in the Caucasus (especially in Georgia) and in Central Asia (especially
in Uzbekistan), but nowhere as evident as in Ukraine and Belarus. And as indicated
in the introductory chapter of this volume nowhere has the clash of two (the US 
and the EU) with the third (Russia) been as evident as in the Ukrainian presidential
elections in late 2004, where two political cultures and political norm sys-
tems clashed. The ‘orange revolution’ was in my view a showdown between the
‘European’ and the ‘Asian’ and the normative differences between the two, 
the importance of which goes far beyond Ukrainian domestic politics. Chapter 6 in
this volume studies the way in which security issues are handled in the EU 
and Russia: different perceptions of security constitute an obstacle to further
cooperation in the field. The analysis of the US–Russian relationship in Chapter 10
tells us how the NATO enlargement issue has affected – and not affected – the
triangular relationship. In this chapter, we are concerned with the extent to which
President Putin has attempted to surf on the enlargement debate and practice to
regain control of the culturally, socially, politically, militarily and economically
closest Russian neighbours – Ukraine and Belarus – by using geo-economic rather
than geo-political means.
The purpose of this chapter is to give examples of the profound changes in
Russian foreign policy attitudes towards Ukraine and Belarus that have taken place
since the coming to power of President Vladimir Putin in 2000. The general argu-
ment is that Putin very consciously and from the very outset of his first presidential
term distanced himself from the more traditional Russian (or ‘Primakovian’) 
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geo-political thinking (despite the fact that Putin himself had been partly responsible
for its formulation as Head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and subsequently
Prime Minister) and in favour of a more modern geo-economic thinking.
There are two ways of arguing this change. One is to point at instances where
Putin has acted or argued contrary to the tenets of ‘Primakovian’ geo-political
thinking in situations where geo-politically motivated actions or thinking have been
directly applicable. Another is to point at situations where Putin has used geo-
economic rather than geo-political actions or thinking to further Russian policies,
languages and strategies that are more akin to modern European Union thinking than
to ‘Primakovian’ foreign policy thinking. Putin has either dodged the implications
of such ‘Primakovian’ thinking in confrontations with Ukraine – on border issues
or her NATO application, and with Belarus – on the Union issue and on military
cooperation, or he has used geo-economic thinking in promoting Russian energy
and other industry interests – on issues like oil and gas prices, deliveries, transpor-
tation and transits.
My proposal is, then, that Putin argued for employing typical EU long-term
strategies (to use economic interactions in political institution-building) in relations
to the closest CIS neighbours. Putin had anticipated the EU and NATO enlarge-
ments to include former Soviet empire protegés and realized that Russia could do
nothing whatsoever about these enlargements. Instead, Russia should take the
opportunity to strengthen its grip over those countries that were not on the list 
of further enlargement plans. Putin has thus been using predicted consequences of
the two enlargement processes, i.e. that Ukraine and Belarus would be left outside,
in order to tie Ukraine and Belarus much closer to Russia and to do so with classical
‘neo-imperialist’ instruments for creating economic dependencies. Below, I use
some examples to show this evidently ‘modern’ and ‘neo-imperialist’ Putin by
pointing at his personal behaviour and involvement in some critical areas of
contention in Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus.
In using these examples, we are focusing on leadership politics which follows
from the idea that Putin has been the engine in the foreign policy changes that have
taken place since Yeltsin’s days, and often in a hostile (to Putin) decision-making
environment.1 Putin has shown a drastically new way for Russia in re-establishing
herself as a regional great power, a way where both Tsarist-like, Soviet-like and
general Great Power-like behaviour towards Russia’s neighbours has been
exchanged for a much more modern and ‘EU-like’ policy of economic reintegration
for both economic and political purposes.2
Even in the most fundamental dimension of Russian foreign policy, i.e. ‘what 
it is all about’, Putin’s foreign policy has been very different from that of the his
predecessor Boris Yeltsin. Since this fundamental shift in orientation also colours
Putin’s policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Belarus, we need to say a few words about
these fundamental changes by the end of the Yeltsin period, when Russia’s foreign
policy was ‘neither consistent, nor effective’.3 It was heavily dominated by Yevgeny
Primakov, probably the most ‘geo-political’ of all Russian foreign ministers 
ever, and by his balance of power thinking, his multi-polar world idea, and implicitly
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also power politics. Therefore, the most fundamental shift in the early Putin 
period concerns precisely the ‘economization’ of Russian foreign policy, i.e. a shift
to a policy based on ‘geo-economic’ rather than ‘geo-political’ ideas, arguments 
and interests.
While this fundamental policy shift was only vaguely pronounced in the Foreign
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation signed by Putin in June 2000, the
ideological tenor of which was ‘Primakovian’, the Concept nevertheless suggested
that ‘more traditional security goals’ were aimed at the well-being of the Russian
economy.4 By the time of his inauguration, Putin had already abandoned some of
the ideas of the Concept and was instead pronouncing and stressing others. Judging
from his behaviour in the two years that followed, Putin was the most dissatisfied
with the Concept’s presentation of Russian foreign policy towards the United States,
Ukraine and Belarus. Within a short period of time, the United States was to be
elevated to the highest rank in Russia’s foreign relations, Ukraine seen as the most
interesting object for economic ‘re-imperialization’, and a political union with
Belarus (on political and not on economic grounds) as the least attractive foreign
policy goal, all of which was contrary to the goals expressed in the Concept. And
after 11 September, Putin pursued ‘a more single-minded’ strategy of economic
integration.5 This is perhaps best seen in his addresses to the Federation Council in
2003 and 2004.6 It must be realized, however, that although there generally is an
unwillingness or inability among some Russian élites to forget altogether the
Russian (and Soviet) imperialist past, based on political and military might (notably
among some generals), such ideas are not necessarily the first that come to Putin’s
own mind in thinking about Russia’s future.7
We know that, generally speaking, Russia has for almost a decade reacted
positively to EU enlargement and negatively to NATO enlargement.8 The two
European enlargement processes have had different implications for Russia’s Slavic
neighbours, and the approaches of these countries to the processes have been very
different; while the Ukraine under President Leonid Kuchma (and even more so
under his successor Viktor Yushchenko) has been balanced between the EU and
Russia in the economic sphere but has basically chosen NATO rather than Russia
in the military sphere. President Aleksandr Lukashenka rejects both the NATO and
EU options for Belarus, but at the same time resists being swallowed economically
by Russia.
Before we dig deeper into Putin’s handling of his two Slavic neighbours, we
should briefly present the main features of Yeltsin’s policies towards Ukraine and
Belarus and to present the broader picture of Putin’s policies towards the two Slavic
neighbours.9
With respect to Ukraine, Yeltsin’s foreign policy was hampered by several
unresolved post-Soviet issues, which had delayed a normalization of relations. The
signing of the Friendship Treaty and the final resolution of the Black Sea Fleet issue
in the spring of 1999 did not yield the momentum expected for solving other long-
delayed conflict issues, such as the delimitation of common borders, gas, oil,
electricity and customs issues, since the new NATO strategic doctrine and the
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Kosovo war in the spring of 1999 refuelled tension in the Russian–Ukrainian
relationship because of Ukraine’s open drive for NATO.
Putin immediately set out to restore good relations with Ukraine, and by February
2001, the two leaders had in their own words ‘changed the quality of relations’.10
Putin thus chose not to stick to the inherited Foreign Policy Concept in his policies
towards Ukraine, and instead turned policies around 180 degrees. Already by
Putin’s first mid-term, Russia and Ukraine were jointly striving for closer relations
with NATO and the EU and had become the closest of partners. In the political
sphere, the strategic conflict over Ukrainian NATO membership had largely been
defused, and in the military sphere, the former conflict over the Black Sea Fleet and
its naval facilities have generated military and defence cooperation. In the economic
sphere, the crucial gas and oil transportation issues, as well as joint production of
military and civilian technologies, have become a natural element of satisfaction
in the relationship.
Yeltsin’s relations with Belarus were largely based on the notion of a future
Union between the two Slavic countries. The appointment of Primakov as Prime
Minister in the fall of 1998 strengthened the ‘strategic partnership’, and in December
1998, Yeltsin and Lukashenka signed an agreement that pointed towards a new
Union of Russia and Belarus. Russia’s conflict with NATO reinforced Yeltsin’s
drive for a Union, while the Belarusian President Lukashenka saw the Union as a
way of increasing his own possibilities of entering a new power structure once
Yeltsin was gone. Due to domestic élite opposition, Yeltsin could only sign a
watered-down draft treaty on the Russia–Belarus Union in September 1999 and an
even more thin, but new, Union Treaty in December 1999.11
From the start, Putin held an extremely low profile in his relations with
Lukashenka on the Union issue. The 11 September volte-face with respect to
Russia’s US relations probably helped Putin take a definite stand on the Union issue
in 2002, and the Russian–NATO rapprochement of May 2002 was a deadly blow
to ideas of a ‘political’ Union. Putin’s pragmatism has not left any room for
pompous political declarations, and economic integration between the two is the
name of the game for Putin.
Putin thus inherited Soviet-like or empire-like arm’s-length policies with respect
to Ukraine, and very intimate but equally Soviet-like or empire-like relations with
Belarus. Policies towards Ukraine were immediately reversed by Putin in his first
presidential year – 2000 – while he kept a low but chilly profile with respect to his
Belarus policies, before he fundamentally reversed these policies in 2002. Not only
were these policies towards Ukraine and Belarus the very opposite of Yeltsin’s
policies, they were also in total contradiction to the doctrinal formulations of
Russian foreign policy in the Foreign Policy Concept adopted in June 2000. What
happened next is the subject of this essay. The presentation that follows is structured
on the division of geo-political and geo-economic standpoints and arguments, where
Putin, it is argued, has resisted traditional Russian geo-political arguments and
promoted more modern geo-economic arguments in his relations to Ukraine and
Belarus, often in opposition to important Russian élite groups.
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The geo-political dimension in Russian foreign policy 
towards Ukraine and Belarus
The general argument here is that Putin, although at times slipping back into old
tracks of geo-political arguments, either involuntarily or voluntarily has been trying
to change Russian thinking on international relations. Below, we will look at some
of the main conflict issues in Russian–Ukrainian relations under Putin to show his
reluctance to ‘talk’, to ‘do’, or to ‘act’ geo-politically, even in situations when such
thinking would be the most ‘natural’ or easily available to a traditional Russian
politician.
The NATO enlargement issue in Ukraine
The fundamental change caused by 11 September in Russian foreign policy, i.e. 
the band-wagoning with the US in its ‘war against terrorism’ and support of the
Afghanistan operation, reinforced Putin’s determination to continue on the road
towards reintegration with the neighbouring countries. Since both Russia and
Ukraine increasingly found themselves ‘on the same side’ with respect to the United
States after 11 September and after the November 2001 Putin–Bush summit and
then the establishment of the joint NATO–Russia Council in May 2002, the former
cleavage between Russia and Ukraine with respect to the NATO enlargement issue
by implication became less acute and dramatic. There was even an element of
competition between Russia and Ukraine in improving their relations with NATO,
especially in 2002.12
Nevertheless, the fundamental Russian problem with Ukraine’s continued and
outspoken desire to join NATO has remained. At the same time, the ‘Russia first’
policy pursued by the United States, NATO and the EU after 11 September and the
‘NATO at 20’ in November 2001 gave Ukraine an evident back seat in this
competition for friendship with NATO. NATO has required structural military
reforms, but Kuchma himself turned out to be the real problem. The Ukraine–NATO
Action Plan adopted at the Prague summit in November 2002 basically left it to
Ukraine to be ‘worthy’ of NATO membership.13 In January 2003, the Ukraine–
NATO Action Plan entered into force; the plan talked of Ukraine’s ‘full integration
into Euro-Atlantic security structures’ and Kuchma set up a State Council for Issues
of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration ‘ensuring Ukraine’s entry into the
European political, economic, security, and legal area as well as creating precon-
ditions for Ukraine’s admission to the EU and NATO’.14 The Iraq war helped
Kuchma to improve his relations with George W. Bush. Later in 2003, Ukraine
planned to bring its military structure more in line with NATO standards, and when
Ukraine’s military reforms were praised by NATO defence ministers in December
2003, Russia’s listening ears were wide open.
Although Russia had no formal objections to these Ukrainian steps, the events
at Tuzla in the Azovsk Sea in October–December 2003 (see next section) indicate
a conflict in kind, since the Tuzla events were generally seen as intended to hamper
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Ukraine’s integration into NATO and since NATO is unlikely to easily digest an
application where the applicant has unsolved border problems. One related problem
with Ukraine’s NATO membership has been the Russian Black Sea Fleet naval
base in Sevastopol, which contradicts the NATO requirement that member countries
should have no foreign military bases on their territory. Ukraine has so far abided
by the agreement with Russia, and the twenty-year lease signed with Ukraine 
in 1997 remains in effect despite Russia’s plans to build a new naval base in
Novorossiysk. Russian sensitivity on the Ukraine-NATO issue has not disappeared,
however, and the issue is likely to remain contentious under the Yushchenko regime.
This common Russian and Ukrainian interest in improving relations with NATO
became overtly evident by May 2002, when the Russia–NATO accord was reached
and the Russia–NATO Council was set up. When Putin met with Kuchma the same
month, he noticed that ‘the quality of relations . . . has recently improved’ and
assured that ‘one would not like to change anything’ in these relations. Kuchma was
even more poetic in his declarations that ‘there are no clouds over us, the air is clean
and transparent, and the temperature is appropriate – neither too warm nor too cold,
just normal’.15 By the end of 2002, Kuchma hinted that relations were the warmest
possible and on Putin’s initiative, in January 2003, Kuchma was elected – as the first
non-Russian – Head of the CIS. In May 2003, the Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov concluded that relations between Russia and Ukraine ‘have matured to such
an extent that these two countries can set themselves more ambitious and long-term
objectives’.16 In June 2003, Ukraine was named Russia’s ‘strategic partner’, a
euphemism for the closest of friends.
The NATO Membership Action Plan did not foresee a speedy Ukrainian
membership either, and the NATO membership issue had already by the summer
of 2004 become directly tied to democratic values, which had hampered the Kuchma
regime. After the ‘orange revolution’, the situation is altogether changed, and the
Kuchma attempt to turn Ukraine’s defence policy 180 degree around in late 2004
– with a new Ukrainian defence doctrine pointing to defence cooperation with
Russia instead of NATO – may now be history.17
Nevertheless, the actual NATO enlargement and the clarification of Ukraine’s
(low) status did help Putin to tie Ukraine closer to Russia also in the geo-political
dimension. However, the real point in this essay is, rather, that Putin has not 
allowed the NATO membership issue to interfere in other areas of cooperation or
to poison the relationship. This kind of behaviour by Putin stands in sharp contrast
to the behaviour of much of the Russian security establishment, as well as to the
recommendations of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation: Putin
simply has not played the ‘geo-political game’.
The Russia–Ukraine border delimitation issue
Another sour geo-political issue that has been on the Russian–Ukrainian agenda
since 1992 is the question of border delimitation. While the delimitation of the
2,063-kilometre land frontier apparently did not involve severe problems – 
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the delimitation was, reportedly, more or less already finalized by November 2001
– only in January 2003 did Kuchma and Putin finally sign the border delimitation
treaty, but left the division of the Azovsk Sea still to be agreed upon.18
The extent to which borders have remained sensitive in the relationship became
evident in October 2003, when Ukrainian sabre-rattling over the Tuzla islet in the
Kerch Strait developed into a major crisis with Russia. The Kerch Strait is a shallow
channel that connects the Azovsk Sea with the Black Sea and separates the Crimea
(Ukraine) in the west from the Taman Peninsula (Russia) in the east. Russian
regional authorities had issued a plan to build a dam between Russia’s Taman
Peninsula and the Tuzla islet in order to protect the Russian coast from being washed
away by the sea. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry warned, at an early stage, Russia
that such a dam might violate Ukraine’s state border and territorial integrity.
The real crisis took off in mid-October when the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada
warned that all measures would be taken to ‘protect the sovereignty of the
[Ukrainian] state on its territory’ should the dam construction continue. Several
dozen Ukrainian border guards, bulldozers and excavators were sent to the Tuzla
islet as well as a dredger and a sea-borne crane to mark a division line in the Kerch
Strait with buoys. Kuchma called the construction of the dam an ‘unfriendly’ action
and as a result the temperature increased further still. In a Ukrainian diplomatic
note, Russia was warned that she would be held fully accountable for any potential
border conflict.19
As the dam builders approached the Tuzla islet and the Verkhovna Rada held a
hearing in which measures on how to meet the threat were discussed, Putin and
Kuchma were eager not to let the issue get entirely out of hand. They agreed over
the phone that their Prime Ministers should meet immediately. The Russian Foreign
Minister, Igor Ivanov, reassured Ukraine that the dam project was dictated by
economic and ecological considerations and was not at all connected to the border
talks on the Azovsk Sea.20
As is often the case, conflicts tend to lead a life of their own, and crisis-related
events developed rapidly. Kuchma cancelled a planned Latin American tour 
and instead visited the Tuzla islet. A couple of days later, seventeen Ukrainian 
jet fighters held an exercise, involving firing missiles into the water not far from
Tuzla, and the Verkhovna Rada passed a resolution (by 369 to 5) calling for ‘the
removal of the threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity’ and also recommended that
the UN General Assembly discuss the dispute at its current session. The OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly was asked to send international observers to the area. One
leading Ukrainian politician said that we ‘have never discussed so actively the
possibility of an armed conflict even when we were dividing the Black Sea Fleet’.21
When the two premiers, Mikhail Kasyanov and Viktor Yanukovich, met to discuss
the dispute, it was agreed that Russia should suspend the construction of the dam
and that the Ukrainian side should withdraw its border guards from the island. This
watered the fire, but Russian nationalists had by now picked up steam, and Kuchma
pitied Putin’s situation, of being ‘forced to take into account neo-colonial sentiments
in Russian society, in the Russian ruling class, and among the Russian generals’.22
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On 30 October, the Russian and Ukrainian Foreign Ministers, Igor Ivanov and
Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, agreed that the Tuzla issue should be resolved by
working groups together with other issues related to the Azovsk Sea and the Kerch
Strait. In December, the Ukrainian and Russian Presidents finally signed an agree-
ment on the use of waters of the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azovsk. The agreement
provided for the delimitation of the state border on the bottom and the surface of
the sea.23
The border agreement on the Kerch Straits and the Sea of Azovsk marked the end
of the long drawn out border delimitation negotiations. The typical Ukrainian
argument to this day is that the border issue has been used by Russia to slow down
Ukraine’s integration into Europe and NATO.24 Putin, on the other hand, was eager
to solve the issue of delimitation before Kuchma was to be replaced in November.
The Tuzla issue indicates that Putin was not prepared to sacrifice Russia’s successful
‘economization’ of the Russian–Ukrainian relationship, showing that geo-economic
reasons prevailed over geo-political ones in his thinking. Putin’s and Kuchma’s
personal relationship saved the situation from getting entirely out of hand.
The geo-political (and geo-economic) dimension: the Union issue in
Russina–Belarusian relations – re-integration on Russian conditions
The Yeltsin heritage with respect to Russia’s relations with Belarus was quite
different from relations with Ukraine; the Yeltsin–Lukashenka attempt to create a
Russian–Belarusian Union was inherited by Putin. As one of Yeltsin’s very last
deeds, he handed over the new Union Treaty to Putin. It soon became obvious,
however, that Putin was less than eager to continue along the road envisaged by his
predecessor.25 When Putin visited Minsk within a couple of weeks of being elected,
he firmly placed the economic aspects of the Union at the very centre, rather than
the political or military issues. A year later, Lukashenka was already seriously
disappointed and sharply criticized Russia for creating impediments to the develop-
ment of the Union. After 11 September, the Union issue took a new turn when Putin
simply refused to discuss an approval of the Union Constitutional Act.
By the summer of 2002, relations deteriorated further when Putin showed his
open aversion to Lukashenka’s integration scheme, i.e. the very scheme that had
been endorsed by Yeltsin. In June, Putin formally offered Lukashenka to make
Belarus a federation subject within the Russian Federation, i.e. to become part of
Russia. Lukashenka was shocked at the proposal, as were Primakov and Yeltsin,
but Putin insisted that the unification process must proceed ‘unconditionally’ and
on the basis of a single state with a single parliament and a single government.26 At
a joint press conference after a summit between the two in August 2002, Putin
openly insulted Lukashenka, again suggesting that Russia and Belarus should create
a unified federal state, the institutions of which would be in accordance with the
Russian and not the Belarusian constitution, ‘because . . . the new country will . . .
be a federation’ (i.e. not a Union). This time, Putin also offered an alternative, an
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‘EU-like’ proposal, which Lukashenka interpreted as part of a plan by ‘rich people’
in Russia ‘to grab Belarus and criminalize its economy’.27 A chilly period followed.
In the spring of 2003, Lukashenka warned that Belarus had other options than
‘crawling into Russia’ or ‘remaining under Russia’s foot’.28 By September 2003 the
idea of the Russia–Belarus Union was officially proclaimed dead by the Russian
Premier Kasyanov, and the fact that the eight years of discussions had not produced
any signed and ratified bilateral agreement indicated irresolvable differences. To
date, nothing has come out of this attempt and to me it is evident that nothing short
of a Belarusian adoption of market reforms and privatization of the economy will
change Putin’s principal standpoint that economic integration on Russian conditions
is the more important goal.
The real test of Putin’s attempt to make something out of the Russia–Belarus
Union idea concerned the common Union currency. In April 2001, the formal
decision to introduce the Russian rouble as the sole currency (on 1 January 2005)
and a new union currency (on 1 January 2008) was made. The currency issue
remained a major stumbling block and at a summit in January 2003, a formal rift
over currency and monetary controls was obvious: Russia wanted full control while
Belarus wanted to have a joint central bank.
In the summer of 2003, Lukashenka argued that a monetary union could go into
effect only after all other Belarusian–Russian agreements on the union had been
implemented.29 In August 2003, Putin concluded that the time had come to make
the final decisions on the proposed single Russian–Belarusian currency: ‘We have
come to the point at which we must decide to go one way or the other’, he said.30
Lukashenka continued his crusade, telling his home constituencies that ‘we might
be left without money, wages, and pensions’ if Belarus signed the agreement.
Another summit in mid-September brought no solution to the issue.31 It seemed by
now evident, as one source close to Putin put it, that the stalemate was really due
to the fact that Lukashenka was first and foremost ‘concerned with his own political
role within the future union’, and since no such role was foreseen, other activities
on the union issue had been stalled.32 In 2004, the discussions and later principal
agreements on a Single Economic Space and a free-trade agreement (to be treated
below) more or less superseded the discussions on the common currency of the
Russia–Belarus Union.
The geo-political dimension: defence cooperation in 
Russia–Belarusian relations
Despite the failure of the unification efforts from the mid 1990s and the open
Putin–Lukashenka conflict, military and defence cooperation had been fairly
successful. In the field of military co-production, Russia and Belarus already in
early 2000 merged two Belarusian and seventeen Russian weapons production
companies producing air defence equipment. What is more, Lukashenka proposed
a Russia–Belarusian joint defence force of some 300,000 troops, and in the spring
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of 2001, there were indeed some attempts to draft a military doctrine for the
Russia–Belarus union, with a united or separate command.
Putin called the shots, however, and a conflict developed between Putin and the
Russian defence forces on the issue. In April 2002, the Russian Defence Minister,
Sergey Ivanov, complained that ‘political decisions’ were lacking and that ‘we, the
defence ministers pass relevant proposals all the time’. The general showdown
between Putin and Lukashenka in the fall of 2002 killed all initiatives for some
time, but when Sergey Ivanov suggested the creation of a joint Russian–Belarusian
army a year later, Lukashenka backed down, believing that this might be used as a
lever.33 In October 2003, the strategic, long-range radar station Volga was put on
combat-alert duty (a radar station that substituted the Skrunda radar base in Latvia
abandoned by Russia in 1998), and there was also a large-scale military exercise
(code-named Clear Skies 2003) in Belarus. In April and July 2004, however, it was
announced that the establishment of a joint air defence had been delayed.
Obviously, although there have been some cooperation successes in the defence
field, Putin does not want to be ‘kidnapped’ by Lukashenka’s bad reputation in the
West, and Lukashenka knows that Putin has an ‘economized’ agenda that spells
problems for Lukashenka. Putin does not seem to think that the evidently good
relations between the military structures of the two countries should be used at 
all; this, again, could be understood only if we accept that Putin has abandoned
traditional Russian geo-political thinking. Otherwise, this stand is incomprehensible.
The geo-economic dimension in Russian foreign policy 
towards Ukraine and Belarus
To recapitulate the main thesis in this essay, Putin is increasingly changing the
language and practice of Russian élites to think ‘geo-economics’ instead of ‘geo-
politics’, which obviously is most evident on issues that more directly deal with
trade and economic cooperation. But ‘thinking geo-economics’ does not necessarily
mean that the final or end objective is geo-economic per se; very similar to the ideas
on the European Union as a peace project, Putin might regard economics as a means
to appease and to exert political power over his neighbours. In this section, we look
at some examples of Putin’s behaviour in the economic sphere.
Trade and economic cooperation with Ukraine
While national political interests dominated Russian–Ukrainian economic relations
in the 1990s, and often resulted in conflicts, Putin broke this vicious circle in his
first term. On the one hand, Russian–Ukrainian economic relations have probably
saved Ukraine from recession, but on the other the Ukrainian dependency on Russia
has become manifestly high: since 2000, Russian investments in Ukraine have
concentrated on strategic branches like energy, aluminium, defence, telecom and
banking. By 2002, almost 50 per cent of the Ukrainian industry was owned by
Russian capital and the business élites of the two countries are closely connected.
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This situation nourishes Ukrainian arguments about Russian ‘economic imperi-
alism’; during Ukraine’s privatization process, the Ukrainian national security was
supposedly threatened by Russian acquisitions of ‘oil refineries, raw-aluminium
production, communications, and many other strategic enterprises’.34
Economic cooperation boomed in the Russian–Ukrainian relationship. In
November 2001, Putin and Kuchma agreed to sign a treaty on a ‘free economic
zone’, and in December the two leaders took part in a breakthrough gathering 
of Ukrainian and Russian business executives and an agreement in principle was
made on the signing of a ‘free economic zone’ treaty and on jointly striving for
membership in the World Trade Organization (in December 2001).
One of the measuring rods of the Russian–Ukrainian relationship is, in my view,
the issue of a customs union. In the early summer of 2002, Ukraine joined the
Eurasian Economic Community (at the time composed of Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan), although with observer status only. There were even
grander plans in the coming, which soon changed the perspective. By December
2002, no treaty on a bilateral free-trade zone had yet been designed, but instead a
treaty on a CIS free-trade zone appeared as the more general trade issue.35 Once this
issue had been reborn, it developed quickly and the ‘CIS Four’ – Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kazakhstan – formally agreed to create a ‘joint economic space’ with
the purpose of creating a new economic alliance in the autumn of 2003. Such a
treaty would, in the words of the Prime Ministers, ‘open a new phase in the
development of trade relations within the CIS’. In January 2003, the new CIS head,
Kuchma, said that such a zone would ‘help us feel safe in the rough sea of globali-
zation’, and the Belarusian President Lukashenka prophesied that such a zone would
liquidate other economic and semi-economic formations such as the Eurasian
Economic Community or GUUAM.36
The idea acquired a more definite shape in late February 2003 when the Presidents
of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, at an unexpected meeting in a
Moscow suburb, reached an agreement in principle to create a ‘joint economic
space’ (to be formalized in September after a period of co-ordinating economic
policies). The ultimate goal was to create a regional integration organization in
which economics would rule over politics, an idea similar to the EU project idea
that Putin had floated with Lukashenka in August 2002. By April 2003, the main
stumbling blocks had been detected, and by August, some of the stumbling blocks
had already been lifted out of the negotiations: the four states were no longer
considering either a common currency or a common customs union. The CIS
summit in Yalta in September proved a success for the idea of a free-trade zone,
and the CIS foreign ministers agreed on many draft documents on a CIS free-trade
zone; most importantly, the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan
signed an accord on the creation of a single economic space – SES.
Putin reassured those who feared that the single economic space represented a
step towards restoring the Soviet Union that this was pure nonsense. Kuchma
suggested that the SES allowed for a switch to a ‘subsequent, higher stage of mutual
relations’, and he added that ‘when the European markets are closed for us . . . it is
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better to have a real bird in the hand than two in the bush’. President of Kazakhstan
Nursultan Nazarbayev called the SES ‘a very serious step toward real integration
in the 12-year history (of the CIS)’. Lukashenka was much more cautious in his
comments.37
The agreement on the SES was safely ashore, however, and the ratification of the
SES treaty took place in April 2004 in all four countries. In May, Putin said that he
was prepared to create a ‘full-fledged free-trade zone’ despite the likely Russian
short-term losses. However, Putin had a hard time convincing the other leaders of
adopting a single ‘economic constitution’, and, in the end, 61 separate agreements
were adopted instead. There was no longer any desire to try to join the WTO as a
single unit and the creation of a customs union was opposed by Ukraine.38 The new
Ukrainian President Yushchenko’s interest in the SES has been lukewarm,
especially since his prime goal is for Ukraine to join the European Union. The SES
is of interest to Ukraine today only to the extent that it does not dim the prospects
for EU membership.
Obviously, the issue of a SES ties Ukraine and Belarus closer to Russia and is
seen as an alternative to EU association. Ukraine had openly expressed its intentions
of joining the EU as a high priority goal already in 1998 (and Kuchma had paved
the way already in 1995 and 1996). In 1999, Kuchma decreed integration into the
EU by 2007, the first steps of which would be to join the WTO and to be followed
by a free-trade agreement with the EU as an associated member, and subsequently
to conduct talks between 2004 and 2007 on full membership. The EU remained
cool, however. In 2002, the refusal to grant Ukraine the status of a market economy,
which Russia had been granted a couple of months earlier, crushed Ukrainian hopes.
At the EU–Ukraine summit in October 2003, Kuchma already accused the EU of
a lack of interest in Ukraine and of forcing integration within the CIS.39 Kuchma
himself thus argued that the increased Russian influence in the CIS could at least
partly be blamed on the EU. In May 2004, there was another setback when Ukraine
and Belarus were seen to be part of the ‘ring of friends’ for Europe (stretching from
the Baltic Sea through the Middle East to North Africa).
Yushchenko has made it abundantly clear that EU membership is the main
objective under his reign and that Ukraine will not accept anything less than
membership, but it is also evident that Ukraine has a long way to go before it could
become a member. In the meantime, there are no signs of SES being dissolved. 
To Ukraine, the SES means much less than EU membership, but there is an iron
dynamic in economic dependencies, too, that Yushchenko will have to acknowledge.
For Putin, the SES is nothing but a borrowed success idea which, if it succeeds, 
will reintegrate the neighbouring economies into the Russian one, whether the
neighbours like it or not.
Energy issues in Russian–Ukrainian relations
Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia and the Russian transit dependency on
Ukraine have been constant features of Russian–Ukrainian relations. Putin’s policy
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has been consistent with the more general foreign policy parameter of transforming
Soviet-type relations (based on subsidized prices) into normal market economy
relations (based on international market prices). In this effort, there has been an
evident element of ‘economic imperialism’, i.e. an attempt to increase Ukrainian
dependency on Russian energy deliveries, and diminish Russia’s dependency on
transit through Ukraine by buying energy installations and controlling pipelines.
Oil, gas and pipelines were issues that Putin could not avoid and already in the
spring and summer of 2000, the Ukrainian gas debt to Russia had become a major
conflict issue. The debt issue was defused only in late autumn and both Putin and
Kuchma hailed the agreement. The related issue of gas thefts had not in any way
made agreements easier to reach, but this issue was also tuned down immediately
after the Russian presidential elections in the spring of 2000.40
Gas deliveries have also been locked to the issue of transit gas pipelines in
Ukraine. Russia had repeatedly threatened to bypass Ukraine in its gas exports to
Europe despite the high costs involved, and Russia’s Gazprom and Germany’s
Ruhrgas continued to discuss the construction of such additional pipelines. The fact
that Poland had a stake in the alternative pipeline did not make the issue any easier.
In June 2002, the gas pipeline issue took a giant leap forward when Putin and
Kuchma, together with the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, decided to 
create a joint gas transport consortium for the joint development and exploitation
of the existing pipeline infrastructure for both oil and gas through Ukraine to
Western Europe. This was for all practical purposes an end to alternative plans 
to build a bypass pipeline. In August 2002, the tripartite consortium was set up and
in April 2003, the consortium was registered. The prospecting work is in progress.
Another energy issue developed in the summer of 2003 and was related to oil
pipelines and it involved the same type of reciprocal dependency as in the case of
gas; the Odessa–Brody pipeline was built to pump Caspian oil to Europe, but had
been idle since 2002. The pipeline had great symbolic value to Ukraine since it
signified a ‘return to Europe’. The Odessa–Brody pipeline had been connected to
the Druzhba pipeline in 2001 (the pipeline that provided Central Europe with oil
from the former USSR), but since Ukraine was unable to find exporters in the
Caspian region to use the pipeline, it looked more like a failure.
In the summer of 2003, Russian appeals to employ the pipeline in a ‘reverse
mode’, i.e. to pump oil in the opposite direction, immediately touched a ‘national-
istic’ chord in Ukraine; the pipeline was used as a lever in negotiations both with
Russia and the European Union. When Ukraine and Russia signed a draft 15-year
agreement on oil transit through Ukraine, it explicitly excluded the Odessa–Brody
project. In November, Ukraine and Poland signed an agreement, with EU
participation, on the development of the Odessa–Brody–Plock pipeline for Caspian
oil, i.e. an attempt to link the Polish and Ukrainian oil-transport systems by reloading
oil in Brody and transporting it by rail to Plock in northern Poland, awaiting plans
to build a Brody–Plock oil pipeline link.
The issue of integrating the Druzhba and Adria oil pipelines were solved in an
agreement by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, Slovakia and Croatia to transport
PUTIN’S POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE AND BELARUS
137
an additional 15 million tons of oil annually via these pipeline systems to the world
markets, with reloading to tankers at the Croatian port of Omisalj. The general
Ukrainian argument was to diminish Ukrainian dependency on Russian oil by also
tapping Caspian oil on route to Europe. In July 2004, a decision was made to actually
build the link from Ukrainian Brody to Polish Plock.41
This will be a story to be continued in Putin’s second term and under the new
Ukrainian leadership. Once the Ukrainian strategic assets are in Russian (although
semi-private) hands, Russian political influence on Ukraine’s political developments
is bound to increase. More important, however, Putin has learned from the history
of the European Union that economic integration also locks states together politi-
cally, which is a positive side-effect, or prime goal to Putin with respect to his Slavic
neighbour.
Energy issues in Russia–Belarus relations
Belarusian energy dependence on Russia has been even greater than that of Ukraine,
and has also been blatantly used by Russia. After the Putin–Lukashenka showdown
on the Union issue in August 2002, Russian oil and gas deliveries soon became a
major irritant in the relationship. In November 2002, Gazprom had fulfilled its
export contracted for 2002, and, in order to deliver extra gas, Gazprom wanted 
a higher price, which in Belarus was seen as a way of exerting economic pressure.
In the end, Belarus gave in to necessities.
The problem with respect to gas deliveries continued in 2003, with some new
spices being added. One had to do with the transit of Russian gas through Belarus
to Western Europe, another involved the privatization of Belarusian petrochemical
enterprises. By the summer of 2003, Lukashenka backed down on a previous
promise and proclaimed that Belarus would not sell the Belarus gas-pipeline
operator Beltranshaz to Russia’s Gazprom ‘for nothing’, that the stakes in
Beltranshaz would be sold only at ‘the market price set by Belarusian experts’. The
arguments were that if Belarus sold control of Beltranshaz, she ‘would sell control
of the country’.42 Yet a third energy issue was the Russian oil companies in Belarus,
and in September 2003, Belarusian authorities decided to freeze some of Slavneft’s
and Transneftprodukt’s assets in Belarus: Russia was certain to defend its ownership
rights of the Transnefteprodukt company’s pipelines located in Belarus.
Russia’s pricing of gas deliveries to Belarus continued to be a problem, and in
September 2003, Gazprom announced that it intended to stop selling natural gas to
Belarus at the subsidized price. The issue was directly linked to the deadlocked
issue of selling shares in the Belarusian gas transit company Beltranshaz. In Belarus,
the question of raising gas prices was interpreted as part of Putin’s personal strategy
vis-à-vis Belarus and seen as evidence of a ‘hardening of Russia’s foreign-policy
course in relation to Belarus’. Russia’s supply of natural gas to Belarus at subsidized
prices was to end by 1 January 2004.43 The linkage between the issues of the union
common currency, the selling of shares in Beltranshaz, and the pricing of gas
became evident at a Putin–Lukashenka summit later in September, when the two
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leaders agreed in principle on market-based pricing and on creating a joint pipeline
company. In October, Belarus agreed to sell a non-controlling share of Beltranshaz
to Gazprom in exchange for a quota of cheap Russian gas under a 2002 agreement.
The pricing issue soon took on an ugly character in what could be called the ‘gas
war’. On 1 January 2004, Gazprom ceased gas supplies to Belarus because of the
failure to reach an agreement on the creation of a joint company to run Beltranshaz.
Gazprom explained that it did not want to be a milk cow any longer, Gazprom had
‘subsidized the Belarusian economy and budget for several years, supplying gas at
a loss and having nothing in return’. Instead, other Russian gas companies (Itera and
Transnafta) entered the scene, but these companies too halted deliveries after
Belarus had consumed the contractual volume of gas already by mid-January. New
contracts on temporary gas deliveries were signed with Itera and Transnafta to give
Belarus sufficient amounts of natural gas until the end of January. Lukashenka
phoned Putin to discuss the issue, but while Belarusian official comments noted that
‘an understanding was reached that natural gas would be delivered continuously and
in the full amount that our country needs’, Putin’s comments did not confirm this.
New negotiations with Gazprom also failed, and the Gazprom head, Aleksei Miller,
noted that ‘the “romantic” period is over’. Both Lukashenka and the Russian
Foreign Minister Ivanov tried for a while to downgrade the issue, all in vain.44
On 12 February, Itera and Transnafta halted the supply of Russian gas for several
hours. The next day, Lukashenka threatened to demand higher transit fees on natural
gas bound for Europe in exchange for the same price as that Ukraine pays for
Russian gas. Itera and Transnafta gas deliveries were again halted a week later due
to ‘the lack of a contract between economic entities’. On the same day, Gazprom
also halted gas transit completely as a response to the siphoning off of Russian gas
flowing in transit to third countries. The next day, Belarus recalled its Ambassador
to Russia for consultations, and the Belarusian government issued a statement
saying ‘such an unprecedented step as the disconnection of gas from people in
winter with the temperature nearly 20 degrees below zero has not taken place since
the Great Patriotic War 1941–45’. Later the same day, however, Lukashenka
accepted the Russian terms. This was not the end, though, because later in the day,
the very Belarusian company that Russian Gazprom wanted to have a controlling
stake in (i.e. Beltranzhaz) cut off natural gas supplies to the Russian enclave
Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad Governor Vladimir Yegorov appealed the same
evening for immediate assistance from Putin and Kasyanov, after which a gas
pipeline between Latvia and Lithuania that had not been in use for the past 14 years
was reactivated. The next afternoon, the gas supply was normalized again.
Lukashenka severely criticized Gazprom for the halt, calling it ‘an act of terrorism
at the highest level’, taking natural gas away ‘from people half of whom have
Russian blood in their veins, when it’s minus 20 degrees outside’. The same day,
the Belarusian government unilaterally raised its gas transit fee.45
In response to this, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused Lukashenka of ‘trying
to divert criticism from himself and shift responsibility for his own mistakes to
Russia’. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry, in turn, called the Russian statement ‘an
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apparent attempt to reverse the blame and mislead the public’, adding, ‘the price
[of gas] that Gazprom was thrusting on us directly contravened (all Russian–
Belarusian interstate) agreements.’46
Lukashenka yielded to the pressure and warned against politicizing the recent row
which he called ‘solely economic’, and an agreement on a loan that would allow
gas deliveries to Belarus to continue was signed. Ambiguities were not entirely
gone, however, since a Lukashenka spokesman noted that the decision to cut off
natural-gas supplies could only be taken by Putin himself. Putin’s spokesman
commented that Lukashenka was ‘grossly mistaken’, adding that ‘it’s very clear
who is freezing the Belarusian people’. In March through May 2004, the extremely
short-term purchases of Russian gas continued, and only in June, an agreement 
for the rest of 2004 was finally signed.47 There was no ‘repeat war’ in the winter of
2005, even though Lukashenka has kept on grumbling about the high prices: an
agreements was signed with Fradkov in December 2004 to avoid a repetition.48
The ‘gas war’ shows the discrepancies of views on the part of Putin and
Lukashenka, the former arguing along market lines and the latter along ‘Soviet’
lines. The bottom line is a fight over the economic system that is to prevail, and
Russia is not likely to give in on this fundamental issue. Russian capital is to buy
up Belarusian industries of interest, and Lukashenka fears a complete sell-out of the
one lever he has, i.e. gas transit.
Summary and conclusions: Russian imperialism – the highest 
stage of Russian capitalism, and Putinism – the highest stage 
of Russian imperialism?
In conclusion, Putin’s foreign policies towards Ukraine and Belarus have
increasingly been pointing in the same general direction, and actual policies pursued
reinforce the main argument of this essay: Putin has exchanged Yeltsin’s geo-
political focus for a geo-economic focus and from this derived policies vis-à-vis
Ukraine and Belarus, policies that aim at drawing Ukraine and Belarus closer to
Russia and at forcing Ukraine and Belarus into an inescapable and firm economic
embrace, which will also give Russia stronger political leverage. Traditional
Russian geo-political objectives have mutated with these neo-economic objectives.
This specific mutation can be termed ‘Putinism’ – the highest stage of Russian
imperialism. The two EU and NATO enlargements have reinforced this trend
precisely because Putin very early on decided that resisting the two enlargements
would be utterly futile and would continue to alienate Russia from Europe.
In summary, Russia–Belarus relations have seen a downward spin under Putin,
and the grand designs for political integration inherited from the Yeltsin era have
been effectively stopped by Putin’s ‘economization’ of Russian foreign policy. The
Union issue has been drastically transformed and today, the question is whether or
not Belarus should give in to Putin’s demand for economic integration on Russian
conditions. A privatization in Belarus with Russian capital ready to buy the most
interesting Belarusian objects would yield a similar outcome as in Ukraine and a
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political neutralization of Lukashenka and his Soviet-type regime. Despite the
negative relationship between Putin and Lukashenka, however, military and defence
cooperation at the grass-roots level has rather flourished. Only at the highest
strategic level has Putin hesitated, and a two-level game in Russia has been evident.
The post-11 September sentiments might have played some role here, since a closer
relationship with the United States is difficult to reconcile with good relations to
Lukashenka’s Belarus. The international isolation of Lukashenka has increased
with the two European enlargement processes and in the end, Putin might have to
choose between support for US ‘democratization’ goals (with respect to Belarus)
and/or engulfing Belarus economically (at high costs), or simply waiting for the
economic and political collapse of Belarus. The big question mark is Lukashenka
himself: he is rather an obstacle to any positive developments and his present
attempts to hang on to a third presidential period after 2006 will, if successful, only
cement the present stalemate in Belarus’ relations to Russia, the EU and NATO.
The Russian–Ukrainian relationship has up to 2005 been an example of pragmatic
foreign policies based more on immediate geo-economic than geo-political interests.
The economic and infra-structural cooperation on energy issues that has been
initiated under Putin’s first term is far from running smoothly, but it seems to me
that the joint efforts of Putin and Kuchma for integration with the West in tandem
indeed were partly the result of closer economic integration also between the two
Slavic states. To the extent that Putin has been acting like an ‘imperialist’, he is thus
a rather modern one, also involving domestic élites in the interstate relationship.
Putin has also used Kuchma’s bad standing in the West to force Ukraine into the
Russian embrace. While Kuchma accepted this situation, there has also been strong
opposition in Ukraine, and it remains to be seen whether Yushchenko will continue
to walk hand in hand with Putin. Yushchenko’s firm commitment to join the
European Union as soon as possible – and also NATO – cannot but be seen as a
major setback to Putin’s ‘re-imperialization’ strategies.
There is much more to be said on this issue, but the presidential elections in
Ukraine in late 2004 indicate future problems, since the elections posed Russia 
in clear opposition to both the European Union and the United States. In some
respects, the elections looked like a contest between Russia and the West over
Ukraine in the shape of the two main contestants, Viktor Yanukovich and Viktor
Yushchenko. Putin’s flagrant support of the former on the eve of the elections indi-
cated a ‘free but not fair’ election round. Since no candidate received the necessary
50 per cent of the votes, a second round was necessary. Before long, Yushchenko
supporters and youth organizations took to the streets to protest against the
obviously incorrect vote count, and the campaign in the second round took on an
ugly character. Putin again visited Kiev and offered support for Yanukovich, while
the US warned of the consequences of not adhering to the values of the Euro-
Atlantic community.
In the second election round, Yanukovich was first given the victory over
Yushchenko. Putin made the mistake of prematurely congratulating Yanukovich on
his victory. Yushchenko called on his supporters to peaceful demonstrations against
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the vote count, and large-scale and persistent demonstrations followed in Kiev and
elsewhere. Putin severely criticized the European Union, the OSCE and the United
States for their rejection of the election results and the stand-off between Russia and
the West on the issue was open for everyone to see. Attempts at a compromise were
made with EU assistance, but only after the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
and the EU leader Jan Peter Balkenende had had telephone conversations with
Putin, a second run-off election was agreed upon to solve the situation. A new
election round was set to take place on 26 December. By now, permanent mass
protests in front of parliamentary and government buildings in Kiev threatened this
third election round – the ‘orange revolution’ was in full swing. Putin continued to
heavily criticize US and European leaders for their support of Yushchenko.
The third election round gave Yushchenko a clear majority. Yanukovich stepped
down as Prime Minister, and in early January 2005, a new government was 
formed. The new Ukrainian President set off for Moscow in an attempt to remedy
the damage done to the Russian–Ukrainian relationship without compromising 
his main foreign policy goal – to enter the European Union. The future of the 
‘Slavic triangular relationship’ will to a considerable extent now depend on policies
in the EU, NATO and the United States, and not only because the double enlarge-
ments have placed all three Slavic countries on the border to the EU and NATO.
Russia is not likely to give up on ‘re-imperializing’ Ukraine and Belarus by
economic means.
In the final analysis, the two European enlargement processes have not brought
about the closeness of the three Slavic states in any direct way; Putin foresaw the
futility of resistance and tried to adapt to enlargements already in 2000. The two
European enlargements have, however, served as catalysts for substantial changes
in Russian thinking on international relations, changes from a ‘geo-political’ to a
‘geo-economic’ thinking, which (if it is not hampered) might lead Russia into the
post-modern world. Whether or not this new thinking will also be successful with
respect to the economic and political integration of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus is
too early to tell, but as we all know, it takes two to tango, and Yushchenko will not
be as willing a dancing partner as Kuchma has been. The stage for new games in
the New Strategic Triangle is set.
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THE ‘NEW STRATEGIC 
TRIANGLE’ AND THE US GRAND
STRATEGY DEBATE*
Peter Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross
Introduction
During the Cold War, policymakers and strategic thinkers had it relatively easy.
Most strategic choices were defined by a central, apparently enduring cleavage.
Led by the Soviet Union and the United States, two camps – East and West – were
locked into what was thought to be a perpetual confrontation. This bipolar relation-
ship provided the framework that informed analysis and strategy. International
politics and national strategies revolved around this bipolar juxtaposition. What
mattered and what did not was largely defined by it. Regardless of issue area, it was
the United States vs. the Soviet Union; NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact, West vs. East,
liberal democracy vs. communism, free markets vs. central planning. Even the
international economic order, a Western order from which the Soviet Union and its
clients were largely excluded, was largely defined by the Cold War divide.
With the Cold War’s end and the Soviet Union’s demise, what was a given gave
way. The seemingly futile search for a new security construct to replace the bipolar
framework of old continues. Candidates have included unipolarity (or, at the least,
a unipolar moment); a return to multipolarity; the end of history; growing anarchy;
and a clash of civilizations, particularly between the West and Islam. Yet, none of
these ordering devices match bipolarity’s parsimonious power or is accompanied
by a strategic concept with containment’s clarity.
That the concept of a strategic triangle has been resurrected is not surprising.
The analytical attraction of the metaphor is readily apparent. After all, the US–
Soviet–PRC strategic triangle figured prominently during the second half of the
Cold War after the United States under Nixon and Kissinger belatedly exploited a
long-evident Sino–Soviet rift. That Cold War strategic triangle is a near-classic
example of how three powers, in shifting calculations of converging and diverging
interests, each might attempt to play one of its two ‘partners’ off against the other.
The logic underlying the new US–EU–Russia strategic triangle envisioned by this
volume’s editors is not as classically geopolitical. Instead, ideational factors as well
as strictly objective material interests are thought to inform the relationships among
and interactions of the United States, EU, and Russia. Essentially, the parties to the
new strategic triangle are thought to have been brought together less by the tradi-
tional geopolitical calculations that motivated the United States, Soviet Union and
China during the Cold War than by the prospect of a partnership that will yield
common benefits. The endurance of this new strategic triangle is predicated on a
common set of shared societal values and, better yet, domestic and international
institutions that are roughly compatible. In the absence of shared values and
compatible institutions, the triangle is likely to be weak and prone to disintegrate
in times of crisis or extreme stress.
Despite the intuitive significance of the US–EU–Russia strategic triangle,
particularly for committed Atlanticists, a different strategic triangle captured
America’s attention after March 2003. Centred on Baghdad, Ramadi, and Tikrit, 
it was the Sunni triangle, the locus of Sunni opposition to the US occupation of
Iraq that then topped the US list of strategic triangles of concern. Another Iraqi
triangle, that among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds, was high on the list as well. Other
potential strategic triangles also compete for the attention of American strategists.
Among the broadest is the North American, European, East Asian ‘triad’, which
incorporates the world’s greatest concentrations of power and wealth. Another
significant state-centric triangle spans not only Eurasia but the northern hemisphere
of the globe: the US–Russia–China triangle. An alternative conception of a ‘new
strategic triangle’ features the United States and the EU in a relationship not with
Russia but with China.1 Within Europe, there is the EU’s ‘Big Three’ – Britain,
France, and Germany – as well as the French, German, Polish and French, German,
Russian triangles. For those who would have us believe that Asia is the future and
Europe is history, the focus is on Pacific Rim triangles. In East Asia, both the
US–PRC–Japan and the US–PRC–Taiwan triangles command attention. Other
Asia-centric strategic triangles of note include that consisting of Russia, China, and
India and that comprised of China, India, and Pakistan. A triangle focused on South
Asia links the United States, India, and Pakistan.
As this small sampling of potential ‘triangles’ reveals, there is considerable
diversity. First, the complexity of strategic triangles varies; some are essentially
unidimensional, others multidimensional. Second, some consist exclusively of
states; others of an admixture of states and multilateral institutions. Yet others are
domestic manifestations of transnational religious and/or ethnic groupings. Third,
their significance varies across issue areas. Fourth, their relative importance, for the
world as a whole, for particular regions, and for the United States, varies tremen-
dously. Despite all this variation, however, there exists a striking commonality: the
US–centric character of contemporary strategic triangles. Even when the United
States is not a party, it figures prominently. This shared feature of today’s strategic
triangles reflects the reality of contemporary geopolitics. Like it or not, America’s
pre-eminence often defines reality for others. As a senior advisor to President Bush
reportedly observed, ‘We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own
reality . . . . And while you’re studying that reality . . . we’ll act again, creating
other new realities . . . . We’re history’s actors . . . .’2
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The US–EU–Russia strategic triangle: premise(s)
The central premise underlying the US–EU–Russia ‘new strategic triangle’ is that
the poles of this triangle are, in the words of our volume’s editors, ‘the three most
important actors in the greater transatlantic region’.3 In the long term, that may 
well turn out to be the case. At present, however, the premise is open to question,
at least from the perspective of Washington, DC. The events of the Bush
administration’s first four years suggest that the United States is focused less on
further developing its relationships with Europe and Russia than on challenges 
in the Middle East, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Europe and Russia have often
opposed American initiatives in these regions and sometimes collaborated only
reluctantly. Many aspects of the multidimensional relationships among the United
States, the EU, and Russia have been neglected. Miscommunication, confrontation,
and sometimes outright hostility have plagued relations among the poles of this
strategic triangle.
As the project editors have acknowledged, this strategic triangle is not an
equilateral triangle. Its members include a United States that is the world’s sole
full-service superpower with global political, economic, and military reach. Both
America’s hard power and soft power are unrivalled. Across the entire spectrum of
power, the United States is without peer in this or any other strategic triangle to
which it is party. That said, one dimension of American power outstrips the others:
its large, globally capable military. In both political and economic terms the
relationship, especially with Europe, is less unequal.4 Russia lags along all three
dimensions, although the vestiges of Soviet nuclear systems give it weight
disproportionate to its conventional military, political, and economic capacities. It
is tempting to conclude that from America’s perspective, the triangular relationship
among the United States, the EU, and Russia is a relationship among actors in
possession of, respectively, hard power, soft power, and no power.5
In Washington, the EU is rarely viewed as a worthy geopolitical partner on
security and diplomatic issues. The European Union’s combined economies may
be more than the equal of America’s, but its political-military potential remains
unrealized. While the EU is often able to speak and act as a unitary actor on
economic issues, it cannot yet do so in the political-military realm, despite the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Washington’s Eurosceptics doubt
that the ESDP will amount to much; they believe that EU is quite unlikely to emerge
as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States.6
Washington’s preferred multilateral instrumentality in Europe remains NATO.
The United States did not create NATO, but it became a US creature. While
Washington does not have a seat at the EU table; it is primus inter pares in NATO.
Even as NATO’s strategic significance continues to diminish with the demise of the
Soviet threat and the rise of the EU, the United States continues to invest in NATO
by attempting to modify its roles and missions. Schemes ranging from the creation
of a Rapid Reaction Force to the Defense Capabilities Initiative share the common
goal of making NATO a useful partner for ‘out-of-area’ military actions.
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On a tactical level, Washington generally prefers bilateral dealings with the EU’s
member states to a bilateral relationship with the EU in Brussels. Dealing with
individual states enables the United States to take advantage of its geopolitical
weight. Salami-slicing tactics can be more effectively employed against weaker
members than against the combined strength of the whole. Further, historically, the
United States and Britain have long enjoyed a ‘special relationship’. During 
the Cold War, Britain and (West) Germany were Washington’s favourites. That
continued to be the case through the immediate post-Cold War period. More
recently, Washington has returned to a focus on a Britain that has proved to be more
pliable than continental powers. A preference has also emerged for what Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has termed the ‘new Europe’: former subjects of the
Soviet empire so eager to be in the good graces of the United States that they have
proved even more cooperative than Tony Blair’s Britain.
Russia is in an inferior position in this triangle. Its presence is due largely to 
both the inertia of history and the weight accorded a country possessing nuclear
weapons, a pivotal position on the Eurasian landmass, and vast reserves of natural
resources. Politically, militarily, and economically Russia is outclassed by the 
other parties to the triangle. Russia’s influence today is only a fraction of that once
wielded by the Soviet Union. It inherited the Soviet Union’s formidable nuclear
arsenal, but its conventional forces are a now a hollow shell. Its economy is barely
on a par with those of the EU’s middle powers. In many respects, Russia is of
interest to the United States and the EU today more because of its weakness than
its strength, its oil than any residual military might, its fragile political and economic
institutions than its ideological appeal, and its apparent latent interest in rebuilding
the Soviet empire than its current reach. As a political partner on the world stage 
it has proven unreliable for both the American and European poles of the strategic
triangle.
Although it has become commonplace to assert that 11 September changed
everything, its implications for the US–EU–Russia strategic triangle should not 
be overstated. 11 September did not fundamentally alter the foundations of the
relationships among the United States, EU, and Russia. It did have an impact on 
the security issues atop the agenda. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (re)emerged front and centre; insofar as Russia and the European
states have been willing to share Washington’s obsession, the strategic relationship
has taken a turn for the better. Russia in particular, has tried to use this to its advantage
by equating its war against Chechen terrorists with America’s war against al Qaeda.
In the long term, however, America’s handling of the Iraq war may well have a
greater impact than 11 September on relationships within the new strategic triangle.
The close strategic relationship that 9/11 appeared, however briefly, to revive has
faltered. Aside from Great Britain, Spain, Italy and several central European states,
few bought into the Bush administration’s assertion that Iraq is a central front in the
war on terror. With the possible exception of Great Britain, even the states that
supported the American decision to invade Iraq did so in the hopes of other political,
economic, and military benefits. The insurgency that followed the overthrow of
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Saddam Hussein did not bring European states around to America’s view of Iraq’s
centrality in the global war on terror or make them any more eager to share with
America the burden of rebuilding Iraq.
The US grand strategy debate and the new strategic triangle
Despite a September 2002 White House document with the grand title of The
National Security Strategy of the United States, a post-Cold War US grand strategy
vision that can command widespread support has yet to emerge. Instead we have
contending visions of America’s role in the world. As a result, the relative signifi-
cance of any one geopolitical construct, particularly one as multifaceted and complex
as the US–EU–Russia strategic triangle, is open to interpretation and debate.
Our assessment of the import of the triangular relationships among the United
States, the European Union, and Russia revisits and builds upon the earlier analysis
of US grand strategy by Posen and Ross.7 They identified four contending grand
strategy visions: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security
(which we re-label ‘liberal internationalism’8), and primacy. We add ‘empire’ to the
original menu of choices. For each alternative we summarize the political-military
(or security) and economic components of the strategic vision and assess, in notional
terms, the significance of the US–EU–Russia strategic triangle. The importance of
this triangle varies considerably across the alternative visions of America’s role in
the world.
We employ this approach because the post-Cold War US grand strategy debate
is far from settled. In 2004, for the first time since the end of Cold War – indeed for
the first time since the Vietnam era – national security and foreign policy emerged
as a defining, and extremely divisive, issue in a US presidential election. An
emphasis on American primacy that verges on the imperial will no doubt continue
to be evident in a second Bush administration. Despite, or perhaps because of, the
‘re-election’ of George W. Bush, the US grand strategy debate will continue. That
debate has concrete implications for the US–EU–Russia strategic triangle.
Neo-isolationism
America’s new isolationists have little interest in a US–EU–Russia strategic triangle
or any other sustained strategic relationship. They would have the United States take
advantage of the predominance it has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War by
pulling back from the world. In the absence of a major power threat akin to that
posed by the former Soviet Union, there is no justification for continued US
internationalism. This neo-isolationist alternative is built upon a distinctly narrow
interpretation of US national interests. The central vital US interest is defence of
the homeland. Fortunately, according to this school of thought, there are few if any
conventional threats to the homeland; the United States is remarkably secure.
The maintenance of a balance of power in Eurasia no longer requires active US
involvement. The United States can safely assume the more passive posture of an
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offshore balancer.9 Its military presence around the world is no longer necessary.
Indeed, as 11 September demonstrated, that presence can be counterproductive and
‘a magnet for trouble’.10 As one long-time advocate of US disengagement observed
in the aftermath of 11 September, ‘terrorism must be understood as an inevitable
consequence of global [US] intervention’.11 Islamist terrorists strike the United
States because it mucks around in their backyard. Homeland security would be best
served if the United States were to withdraw from foreign entanglements and
jealously guard its strategic independence – and its values.
In the economic, as in the political-military, realm, the United States needs
Europe, Russia, and the rest of the world far less than the world might need or desire
relations with the United States. The unmatched size, strength, and resilience of its
economy sets the United States apart from the rest of the world. It is significantly
less dependent on imports and exports of goods and services than other countries.
Economically, the United States, to a greater extent than others, can go it alone.
Whatever international economic engagement is necessary is best left to the
private sector. It is up to the challenge of ensuring American prosperity. Markets,
whether domestic or international, function best in the absence of intrusive
government involvement according to the libertarians and paleoconservatives who
are among the most prominent proponents of the new isolationism. Globalization
would be left to its own devices.
Multilateralism and economic institutions alike are suspect. Both are thought to
constrict US freedom of action. Neo-isolationists do not necessarily advocate the
abandonment of international economic institutions, but their support for them is
tepid. The cost of supporting institutions such as the WTO, World Bank, and IMF
and exercising leadership in them is perceived as greater than the benefits they
provide.
Neo-isolationism and the new strategic triangle
America’s new isolationists do not privilege a US–EU–Russia strategic triangle.
Even the intimate, prized relationship with the Western European Cold War allies
responsible for founding and leading the EU is not exempt from their pronounced
emphasis on strategic independence. The recent escape from strategic nuclear
interdependence with the Soviet Union is simply to be welcomed, not replaced with
an unnecessarily close strategic relationship with its successor state. For the neo-
isolationists, there is no new strategic triangle and no need to construct, or imagine,
one. The United States is now able to distance itself from the EU and its members
as well as NATO. There is little reason to either support or oppose the ESDP.
Whether collectively under the auspices of the EU or a Europeanized NATO or
individually, the states of Europe have the resources to provide for their own
security. Precisely how that is done is their business. The burden of European
security should not be shared; it should be shed. American forces would be
redeployed, but homeward rather than eastward. Only the Soviet threat necessitated
an American military presence in Europe after World War II. In the absence of a
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comparable threat, there is no reason for the United States to remain entangled in
the affairs of Europe.
Russia’s future and its relationship with the EU should be left to the Russians 
and EU members. A politically, economically, and militarily weak Russia is of 
little concern to the United States. The United States is under no obligation to
provide material support for Russian political and economic reforms. Neither is it
obliged to ensure the security of the Russian nuclear stockpile; that is Russia’s
responsibility. If the EU feels the need to invest in Russia’s future, so be it.
Selective engagement
The members of the European Union (at least its leading members) and Russia are
accorded a significantly higher priority by the realist proponents of selective
engagement. National interests are more broadly framed than by neo-isolationism
but not as broadly as by either liberal internationalism, primacy, or empire. For
selective engagement, the greatest threat to US security and international order is
conflict among the world’s major powers. The purpose of US engagement abroad
is to (1) ensure peace among the major powers and (2) prevent the emergence of a
great power capable of challenging US predominance. It should focus on those
parts of the world in which the major powers reside – the two ends of Eurasia – or
compete – essentially, today, the Greater Middle East/Southwest Asia. Under this
construct, the leading powers of the EU and Russia matter. Always mindful that
resources are scarce, the advocates of selective engagement reject what they portray
as the indiscriminate engagement of liberal internationalism and the demands of
preserving, indefinitely, US primacy. America cannot afford to be either the world’s
policeman or the ‘indispensable nation’.
Selective engagement’s discretionary approach carries over into the economic
realm, where it exhibits a realist fix on ‘large concentrations of power’.12 Outside
of North America, large concentrations of economic power are located only at the
two ends of Eurasia. Managing relationships, whether cooperative or uncooperative,
with the principal economic powers such as Japan, the leading members of 
the European Union (rather than the EU as such), and China would be assigned the
highest priority. Next on the list of priorities are economic relationships with other
members of the core, or peak, economic associations. On both counts, the leading
members of the EU require attention.
Selective engagement would have the United States remain both economically
engaged with the rest of the world and committed to, as Robert Art put it, ‘inter-
national economic openness’.13 There are distinct limits to international economic
engagement and the commitment to an open international economic order, however.
For Art, international economic openness is a ‘desirable’ rather than a ‘vital’
interest. In his view, the demise of an open global economic order would not pose
‘severe’ or ‘catastrophic’ costs for the United States.14
Economic globalization, multilateralism, and institutions should be subjected to
a scrutiny of benefits and costs informed by the dictates of great power politics.
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Realist sceptics demand that the alleged virtues of this liberal triad be balanced
against their costs. To the extent that globalization, multilateralism, and institution-
alism erode state, particularly US, power and influence, they should be resisted; to
the extent they help set the global agenda in ways favourable to the United States
and allow for more efficient systems management they should be encouraged. The
outcome of such a calculation is likely to be a distinctly measured commitment to
globalization, multilateralism, and institutions.
Selective engagement and the new strategic triangle
This major power, state-centric approach suggests that selective engagers would 
be inclined to prize individual relationships with the EU’s leading members more
than any relationship with the EU itself. But an increasingly effective EU would
come to command the attention of even the advocates of selective engagement.
They would have little choice but to engage with a collective that represents the
concentration of power evident in the EU, especially if the EU increases its ability
to control outcomes, whether economic or political-military. Among its members,
however, Britain, Germany, and France would count as major political-military
and economic powers. Russia too, despite the loss of the Soviet Union’s superpower
status, counts, if more because of its potential than anything else. Moreover, given
uncertainties in global energy markets Russia’s growing role as a producer state and
the possibility that still greater oil reserves remain to be tapped ensure this Soviet
successor state a place among those regarded as major powers.
Since the United States remains the leading member of NATO and is not a
member of the EU, NATO would continue to be America’s preferred multilateral
instrumentality in Europe; as such the United States might seek to ‘securitize’
economic and political issues in order to influence outcomes it might otherwise not
have a say in. For example, dual-use export and technology controls would remain
a province of security specialists rather than those primarily interesting in expanding
trade, saving on defence procurement, or preserving industrial sectors or individual
firms. The proponents of selective engagement would have been loath, however,
to rush into what they see as the ill-advised and unnecessary post-Cold War
expansion of NATO, a project that needlessly alarmed and, even worse, antagonized
nationalist elements in a still smarting Russia. In the absence of the threat it was
established to deter and if necessary fight and defeat, NATO’s significance is
expected to decline. The decline of NATO need not imply an automatic, corre-
sponding rise in the EU’s political-military significance, however.
In the security realm, selective engagement’s stance on the EU might be best
characterized as ‘studied ambiguity’. Ever mindful of the need to husband scarce
resources, the proponents of selective engagement are inclined to share with
European partners the burdens of ensuring order and stability, even if that means
sharing leadership on occasion. Therefore they are receptive to the EU’s ESDP
even while remaining unconvinced of its ultimate success. But the acceptance of
the ESDP would be contingent. Those interested in selective engagement have an
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interest in promoting a favourable division of labour in the military and defence
realms. If the EU and the European contributions to NATO could be focused on
military tasks that the United States is either unable or unwilling to take on, so much
the better. As former Secretary of State Madeline Albright put it, the ESPD and
similar efforts are fine if there is no decoupling, duplication, or discrimination.15
On the economic front, even the realist advocates of selective engagement
recognize that the European Union is a force to be reckoned with. Despite the
preference for bilateral dealings, a US–EU economic relationship is a necessary
inconvenience that even can benefit the United States if managed correctly.
Consensus between the United States and the EU on international economic issues
such as trade, finance, and development could make it more difficult for others to
resist continued liberalization.
Whatever the issue area – Russian political and economic reforms, loose nukes,
access to Russia’s energy resources, Chechnya, or latent Russian revanchism 
– selective engagement’s proponents are inclined to prefer a direct, bilateral
US–Russia strategic relationship to a triangular US–EU–Russia relationship. That
preference would likely be modified if a de facto division of labour is developed in
US and EU dealings with a struggling Russia. There is little reason that selective
engagers, always acutely aware of the need to safeguard scarce resources, would
object to a more active EU role in, for instance, Russian political and economic
liberalization. The new strategic triangle need not be a merely nominal relationship
under selective engagement.
Liberal internationalism16
It is the liberal internationalist alternative that most prominently features an
emerging US–EU–Russia strategic triangle. Informed by contemporary liberalism
rather than realism, its starting point is strategic interdependence: ‘peace is
effectively indivisible.’17 Conflict of any kind is thought to threaten world order.
National security requires security for all. Consequently, US interests must be
broadly conceived. Neither traditional nor, especially, non-traditional, transnational
threats to peace can be countered unilaterally. Security requires an approach that 
is collective, preventive, and comprehensive. ‘Multilateralism,’ it is asserted,
‘matters.’18 Dramatic evidence of the potential of multilateral, institutionally based
cooperation is provided by the history of the European Union and the other
institutions that comprise Europe’s highly developed security architecture.
Security communities and the democratic peace are central to liberal interna-
tionalism’s cooperative security project. Democratic security communities are,
essentially, security regimes, complete with sets of principles, norms, rules,
conventions, and procedures that constrain, even govern, the behaviour of members.
Advocates call for the development and broadening and deepening of webs 
of ‘overlapping, mutually reinforcing arrangements’.19 The model, admittedly
imperfect and incomplete, is the transatlantic security community encompassing
North America and much of Europe. The European Union, along with NATO 
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and the OSCE, is a central component of that democratic security community.
Significantly, the web of overlapping arrangements evident in this model has long
featured not only security but also economic arrangements, particularly those
involving the EU.
The US pursuit of a liberal world order is not, of course, a post-Cold War
phenomenon. As Ikenberry has pointed out, it dates to the 1940s. It was then that
the foundation of a ‘liberal democratic order’, featuring ‘economic openness,
political reciprocity, and multilateral management of an American-led liberal
political system’, was put in place.20 The task for liberal internationalism is not to
create a new order but to ‘reclaim and renew’21 the existing order that was
collaboratively constructed by the United States and key European allies such as
Britain and France.
The economic counterpart of, and historical predecessor to, Carter, Perry, and
Steinbruner’s webs of ‘overlapping, mutually reinforcing arrangements’ in the
security arena is Ikenberry’s ‘dense web of multilateral institutions, intergov-
ernmental relations, and joint management of the Western and world political
economies’22 constructed in the aftermath of the Great Depression and World War
II. For liberal internationalism, prosperity, and peace, require the broadening and
deepening of today’s open economic order. Open markets, transparency, free trade,
non-discrimination, shared economic and social welfare – collaboratively arrived
at – ensure prosperity in this order. At the heart of the liberal internationalist
economic program is the multilateral and institutional management and continued
broadening of globalization so that prosperity, and peace, can be extended to all. 
If prosperity is to be preserved for the haves, it must be shared with the have-nots.
Liberal internationalism and the new strategic triangle
Liberal internationalists are much more inclined than the realist advocates of
selective engagement and primacy to embrace enthusiastically the new, emerging
strategic triangle. America’s relationship with Europe’s leading institutions, the
EU and NATO, would be more evenly balanced. The liberal internationalist
enterprise has long highlighted the continued broadening and deepening of the
binding security and economic relationships between the North American and
European components of the transatlantic democratic security community, a
community that is envisioned as a model for the rest of the world. The EU’s ESDP,
no less than NATO initiatives such as Partnership for Peace (PfP), is a welcome
addition to the increasingly thick web of overlapping and reinforcing institutional
relationships. There is little reason for the United States to object to the development
of military capabilities that will enable the EU to be a genuine strategic partner.
The continued success of the transatlantic security community may require the
capabilities and leadership of a pre-eminent America. But the preservation of that
pre-eminence is not the objective. Nor is ensuring that the United States will always
sit at the head of every table the objective. The goal, rather, is the construction of a
liberal order, a project, clearly, that is most advanced in the democratic security
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community that spans the North Atlantic. This showcase community and its myriad
benefits must be tended, not taken for granted.
Successfully integrating the components of the former Soviet empire, particularly
Russia, into this community is critical. That cannot be accomplished by the United
States alone. The continued political and economic liberalization of Russia and
other successor states and their integration into an enlarging security community
necessitates extensive political, economic, and security collaboration between the
United States and the European Union. EU, and NATO, expansion serve the cause
of political and economic liberalization. From this perspective the new strategic
triangle is still under construction; it is likely, however, to be a prominent feature
of Europe’s security architecture.
Primacy
The advocates of US primacy have little interest in constructing strategic triangles
or any other multilateral arrangements that empower others and constrain the United
States. Informed by the maximal realism of hegemonic stability theory, primacy’s
proponents emphasize the virtues of a unipolar world. While liberal internationalists
would have the United States squander the ‘unipolar moment’ in a misguided,
resource-depleting attempt to construct a liberal world order that risks dethroning
the United States from its lofty perch, the proponents of primacy seek to perpetuate
indefinitely the unipolar moment. In their view, the interests of both security and
world order require that the United States maintain its primacy. America’s national
interests must be broadly conceived – though not quite so broadly and all-
encompassing as by liberal internationalists. The central objective of the United
States must be to preserve its sole-superpower status by preventing the emergence
of peer, or even near-peer, competitors. An across-the-board predominance must
be maintained. Even a one-dimensional challenge, such as may be posed by a
regional power or grouping such as the EU, must be met. Assurances about the
limits of US hegemonic designs, appropriately leavened with an at least minimal
commitment to multilateralism and institutions, should serve to persuade others
that US hegemony is relatively harmless.
Primacy’s advocates emphasize maintaining US economic hegemony and pre-
venting the emergence of an economic rival. American economic hegemony means
American leadership. It is that leadership that is responsible for the relatively open,
even liberal, global economic order that exists today. Leadership can be exercised,
as it has been, in a multilateral and institutional context. But the advocates of this
realist primacy are suspicious of institutions, such as the EU, in which the United
States does not have a seat, much less a seat at the head of the table. It is not genuine
collaboration with the EU and others that is critical, but rather the maintenance 
of US economic hegemony. The US attitude towards multilateralism should be
instrumental; it should seek solutions that favour its own interests even at the
expensive of the collective. In the economic as in the political-military realm, 
the resort to unilateralism cannot be ruled out.
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The advocates of primacy would have the United States remain on top by
‘outdistancing any global challenger’.23 Most likely to emerge in the near-to mid-
term is not a political-military rival on the order of the former Soviet Union but an
economic rival. Concerns about the early emergence of such an economic challenger
have even led some to a near-mercantilist fixation on the ‘large concentrations 
of power’ from which an economic challenger may emerge. In the early 1990s, the
concern was Japan. Today China and/or the EU worry advocates of primacy.
Economic relationships with China and the EU that disproportionately benefit them
are to be regarded with suspicion. Russia, with the possible exception of its natural
resource endowments, is largely irrelevant as a global economic actor.
Primacy and the new strategic triangle
Primacy’s advocates have little interest in a new strategic triangle that would only
foster the illusion that the European Union and Russia are America’s equals. 
In their view there is little reason to encourage European or Russian delusions of
grandeur.
Under primacy, European security and economic institutions such as NATO and
the EU are of interest only to the extent they can be used by the United States to
maintain its hegemony or by Europe to challenge US hegemony. NATO, as opposed
to an eternally ‘becoming’ EU, remains the preferred instrumentality of the United
States. Its role is no longer to keep the United States in Europe, Germany down, and
Russia out; instead, NATO’s role is to provide institutional cover for the exercise
of US hegemony in Europe. NATO expansion is a means of incorporating elements
of the former Soviet Union and its empire into the American sphere. Russia’s
protestations are to no avail; it has little choice but to resign itself to NATO’s (i.e.
America’s) continuing encroachments, just as it resigned itself to America’s
unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty. To the extent that the EU, and particularly
the EU’s ESDP, is intended to provide a potential counterweight to US hegemony
and a European alternative to a US-led NATO, it will be opposed by the United
States. However, an ESDP that leads to a beneficial military division of labour
between the United States and Europe will be looked upon more favourably.
In the military realm, if not in the economic realm, the Soviet Union was a
superpower during the Cold War. Russia, the proponents of primacy need hardly
remind us, is not. It is a mere rump of the former Soviet Union. It has displayed little
potential since the break up of the Soviet empire. It has far less weight in Eurasian
and international affairs than its vast expanse might imply. In return, however, for
Russia’s cooperation in the global war on terror and in stemming proliferation, and
perhaps for greater access to its energy resources, primacy’s advocates are prepared
to sacrifice liberal internationalists’ emphasis on Russia’s political and economic
liberalization. These continuing interests in dealings with Russia do not require the
cumbersome workings of a trilateral relationship. The imagined US–EU–Russia
strategic triangle will little affect the calculations of a hegemonic America. There
is no compelling strategic logic for investing resources in its construction.
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Empire
The supposed new strategic triangle would affect the calculations of an imperial
America no more than those of a hegemonic America. Once employed in critiques
of America’s Cold War foreign policy by revisionist historians and their fellow
travellers, ‘empire’ has been resurrected, and rehabilitated, by assertive nationalists
and neo-conservatives out to remake the world in America’s image. For its
advocates, ‘American empire’ is no longer a term of opprobrium or censure but a
term, and a reality, to be embraced, even celebrated. After all, America’s is an
exceptional, liberal, and benevolent empire.
Whether intentionally or not, the United States emerged from the twentieth
century atop an empire. In the view of one prominent neo-conservative, ‘The
Unipolar moment has become the unipolar era’; history has bequeathed America
an empire that cannot but be kept.24 A coalition of neo-conservatives and often
strident nationalists, the new imperialists intend for America to save the world. Of
course, saving the world requires ruling it. That imperial responsibility can be
escaped only at great peril to the world and the United States. America’s is the
indispensable empire.
For the proponents of empire, mere primacy is insufficient. They offer, instead,
primacy on steroids. While primacy emphasizes the simplicity of a unipolar world,
empire emphasizes the great virtue of an even simpler world. The new world order
is an American order. No distinction between US interests and the interests of others
need be admitted. What is good for America is good for the world (including the
EU and Russia).
For America’s liberal imperialists, making the world safe for democracy and
free markets requires that the United State act forcefully. If necessary, it can and
will act alone. Pre-emptive, even preventive, war is its prerogative. Europe, Russia
and others are welcome to join the cause, but America will forge ahead with or
without their support. The United States will not be prevented by others from doing
what is right and necessary. The array of principles, norms, rules, conventions, and
procedures beloved by liberal internationalists do not apply to the United States.
Empires make the rules; they follow them only when it is convenient. International
institutions provide little more than a convenient rallying ground for others to
bandwagon behind the United States. The United States does not require multilateral
approval to act. ‘Old Europe’ and ‘rogues’ alike must recognize that if they are not
with the United States, they are against it.
While the advocates of empire often tout the virtues of an open, liberal
international economic system, the international economic order is viewed as an
American order. American leadership means American rules. While others will be
accorded the privilege of sitting at the US economic table, they will be there in 
a distinctly subordinate position. Despite the institutional, multilateral veneer
provided by organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, for empire’s
advocates it is to be the US that makes the rules and deals the cards. Globalization
is Americanization. The institutional and organizational accoutrements of globali-
zation are merely tools, however unwieldy at times, for maintaining imperial order.
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International economic liberalism need not be considered sacrosanct. Economic
organizations such as the EU to which the United States is not party are by definition
peripheral. For American imperialists, international economic cooperation entails
the rest of the world following America’s lead.
Empire and the new strategic triangle
Empire does not bode well for a new US–EU–Russia strategic triangle. The notion
of a strategic triangle that amounts to anything more than another way to ensure 
that EU members and Russia do America’s bidding with a minimal amount of
obstruction is not acceptable to proponents of empire. If pursuing empire represents
the strategy of choice for America’s leaders, neither the EU nor Russia should
labour under the illusion that they are even the nominal equals of the United States.
Trilateral discussion and consultation will mean listening to the United States.
Trilateral negotiation will mean agreeing with the United States. Trilateral collab-
oration will mean doing it America’s way. Trilateral action will mean following
America’s lead. Burden-sharing will mean bearing the costs of American adventures
(empires, of course, need not shed or share burdens; they impose them on others).
Costs can and will be imposed; tribute will be exacted. The EU’s members should
remember that the Iraq war demonstrated that the EU is not monolithic. Its divisions
can and will be exploited. In the view of America’s new imperialists, in time the
EU’s members and Russia will recognize, if not accept, their place in the American
geopolitical universe. America is the hub; they are the spokes. There is no strategic
triangle.
The new strategic triangle under the Bush administration
Behind a veil of liberal internationalist rhetoric, the Bush administration has pursued
a primacy that borders on the imperial. The administration’s imperious, if not
explicitly imperial, stance has not privileged the new strategic triangle. Neither the
trilateral relationship nor bilateral relations with either the European Union or
Russia have been accorded any status of note. Indeed, US relations with both Europe
and Russia began on a negative tack with the ascendance of George W. Bush to the
presidency. His administration acted quickly to reject a number of multilateral
agreements, including the Kyoto Protocol and later the International Criminal Court.
In some ways, the rejection of the specific agreements was less important than the
implicit denigration of the multilateral process by which they had been concluded.
Even if the Kyoto Protocol was deeply flawed and the Bush administration had
good reasons to be unhappy with it, the cavalier manner in which it was rejected
demonstrated a lack of appreciation for the complexity of the negotiations, the
preferences of America’s international partners, and the difficulty of restarting
discussions from ground zero.
If the unilateralist bent of the new Bush administration set an early tone for its
international relationships, the aftermath of the 11 September attacks defined and
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dominated relations among the United States, Europe, and Russia during the
administration’s first term. Initially both Russia and Europe (both institutionally
through NATO and the EU and individually as states) expressed tremendous
solidarity with the United States. The Bush administration fielded numerous offers
of help including intelligence-sharing, policing, and offers of troops and equipment
in the event of military action. Although the administration expressed its gratitude,
it soon became clear that, with some exceptions, it preferred to undertake the Afghan
campaign nearly alone save for a few trusted allies. The United States did ask Russia
for a free hand to negotiate deals with Central Asian states that had been a part of
the Soviet Union, potentially station troops in the region, and conduct over-flights
in airspace near Russian borders.
With the collapse of the Taliban regime and the rout (it was believed) of al Qaeda
the United States turned its attention to Iraq.25 At least initially, the main selling
point for the focus on Iraq was the supposed connection between Saddam Hussein
and al Qaeda and the assumption that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) that he might be willing to share. Although most European
intelligence agencies and their governments believed at that point that Iraq
possessed WMD capabilities, few were convinced that a direct connection existed
between the perpetrators of 11 September and the Baathist regime. At the same
time it pressed the case for war, the United States showcased in its new national
security strategy26 and other documents a new approach to the use of military force
– the so-called Bush Doctrine which with breathtaking imprecision reserved the
right for the US to undertake pre-emptive strikes and even preventive war. The
American position directly contradicted an emerging European consensus on 
the use of force that had arisen in the aftermath of the Cold War.27 What followed
was a long and acrimonious debate carried out publicly within the UN and other
international venues that served largely to poison relations between the US and its
long-standing European allies.28
In the weeks, months, and years following the quick collapse of Saddam
Hussein’s regime, the United States once again found it necessary to turn to Europe
and Russia for help. Given the high costs of Iraqi stabilization and reconstruction,
the United States sought to persuade Europe, Russia, and other members of the
international community to contribute more. Former Secretary of State and Bush
family factotum James Baker was sent across the globe to ask friends and allies to
forgive Iraqi debts. Nearly simultaneously, the United States attempted to punish,
in a rather heavy-handed fashion, those countries that had not supported it within
the UN or joined the so-called coalition of the willing in a meaningful way.
Uncooperative countries were excluded from bidding for lucrative contracts for
post-war reconstruction. Later it would turn again and again to Europe and others
to contribute more troops as it became clear that the number of available US and
British troops would be insufficient to re-establish order and defeat the growing
insurgency in Iraq.
From the beginning, Iraq was a major irritant between the governments of those
countries opposed to America’s actions and a United States stuck in a quagmire of
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its own making. The rift widened further as it became clear that the European publics
were vehemently anti-war, even in those countries like Great Britain, Italy, and
Spain that had followed the US lead.29
The US and Europe
It is important to remember that many of the disagreements between the United
States and the European Union, the United States and European members of NATO,
and the United States and various individual states are simply part of the give and
take of partners operating within a close and long-standing relationship under stress.
In and of themselves they should not lead anyone on either side of the Atlantic to
ponder the ultimate fate of the Western alliance. Yet the accumulation of petty
grievances and the breach that developed over Iraq resulted in the most significant
crisis in transatlantic affairs since the end of the Cold War. The chronic unwilling-
ness of senior leaders in the Bush administration to acknowledge their mistakes 
and treat allies with respect and dignity drove a wedge between the United States and
Europe. That then-national security advisor, and now Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice could in April 2003 remark that the way to deal with three prominent
recalcitrants was to ‘Forgive Russia. Ignore Germany. Punish France’ reveals the
depths to which US relations with its European and Russian partners had sunk.30
Efforts to repair the relationship have not been especially successful. Even as
French, German, and American leaders pay ritual homage to the importance of
transatlantic relations, there has been little give on outstanding issues. Although
European states assumed a leading role in the Balkans, a much greater role in
Afghanistan, and had begun during 2005 to contemplate a larger role in Iraq, their
contributions were much less than members of the Bush administration foreign
policy team had hoped for. Part of this is an artefact of lesser European capabilities,
but part also stems from the reluctance to join what is perceived to be a losing battle.
Relations were less contentious on the economic front, although outstanding trade
and financial issues remained to be dealt with.
The US and Russia
Since unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, the Bush
administration has treated Russia with benign neglect. It refused to be drawn into
moral and ethical arguments over the Russian approach to the Chechnya insurgency.
Nor did it comment at great length and with any relish on President Putin’s various
campaigns to centralize power in Moscow. The campaign against the remain-
ing media ‘independents’, administrative machinations to weaken provincial
governments, and the progressive emasculation of opposition parties all passed
largely unremarked until early in the administration’s second term. Even Russia’s
refusal to acquiesce to American efforts to force action on Iraq within the UN
Security Council did not invoke the Bush administration’s anger as much as did the
refusal of France and Germany to follow America’s lead into Iraq.
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The Bush administration regards Russia as a key partner in the war on terror and,
no less importantly, as an alternative source of oil. Increased Russian production,
in some cases with the active participation of American firms, could take some
pressure off global energy markets and thus help contain energy prices and sustain
economic growth (however modest) in the United States. More significant, however,
is the Bush administration’s conscious effort to downgrade Russia’s international
status and its place in US foreign and security policies. In the view of some experts
within (and outside) the administration, Russia is no longer worthy of peer status.
It does not have the conventional military strength, political and diplomatic
credibility, and economic base to be a global player. By this thinking, if Russia is
to be part of a new strategic triangle it will be because of its vast territory, dominant
geographic position on the Eurasian landmass, and economic potential. It will not
be because Russia brings much that is of strategic consequence for the United States.
In our introductory observations, we noted that the new strategic triangle is
thought to be built on material interests, shared values and common institutions. As
indicated here, the prospects for a new strategic triangle have been endangered by
divergence on at least two of the three prerequisites. Although it seems straight-
forward to note that all three parties share material interests in both the security and
economic realms, we must recognize that values have and are shifting in the three
regions. The United States has embraced wholeheartedly a willingness to use force
pre-emptively, and even preventively if necessary, to combat terrorists and rogue
states. Europe has been much less willing to do so, either in theory or in practice.
In principle it does not view military force as the all-purpose solution that
Washington sometimes does; in practice it does not have the capability to contribute
on a global scale.
Triangular relations in the future
Prospects for a cooperative and productive triangular relationship have been
undermined by the actions and attitudes of the Bush administration. Despite the
enormous good will toward the United States generated by 9/11, the push to war
with Iraq quickly and, some fear, perhaps permanently altered American relations
with Europe.31 Although Russia joined France and Germany in outright opposition
to the war, the US–Russia relationship did not suffer as much as that between Europe
and the United States. For America, this is largely a function of need. To prosecute
the Afghan campaign the US needed Russian support for constructing relationships
and ultimately bases in Uzbekistan and elsewhere in the ‘near abroad’. It also needed
Russian support to continue preventing Russian nuclear materials and expertise
from falling into the hands of terrorists or states that might pass them along to
terrorists. In return for Russia’s support, President Putin desired American
acquiescence if not silence in the case of his own brutal war in Chechnya and his
aggressive campaign to centralize power in Moscow. The customer–supplier
relationship in global oil markets also helped both countries overcome political and
diplomatic tensions.
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Not unexpectedly, the Bush administration’s high-handed treatment (both real
and perceived) of Europe and, to a lesser extent, Russia in the aftermath of 9/11 have
provoked soul-searching in Europe and Russia alike. The results have been the most
dramatic in the case of the European Union. At the request of EU member states,
Javier Solana, High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP), developed a strategic vision for the European Union. Solana’s efforts
resulted in the emergence of the first ever European Security Strategy, which was
approved by the European Council in December 2003.32 The five key threats
identified in the document – terrorism; the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; regional conflict; state failure; and organized crime – closely track
those featured in American strategic and planning documents. Any convergence in
European and US strategic thinking may be more apparent than real, however. The
ESS features a strong focus on multilateralism and conflict prevention rather than
the pre-emptive or even preventive military action favoured by the United States.33
For a time after 9/11 it appeared that Russia hoped to ally itself more closely
with the United States, despite its objections to the Iraq war. President Putin
appeared to share the Bush administration’s interest in fighting terrorism; some
Russian strategists hoped cooperation in the global war on terror would help win
US support or at least acquiescence in Russian policies in Chechnya. The limits of
the alliance of convenience are suggested by the Bush administration’s early
second-term expressions of impatience with President Putin’s version of democratic
governance and Russian concerns about the US and European roles in Ukraine’s
‘Orange Revolution’ and the continued expansion of both the EU and NATO into
the realms of the former Soviet Union.
Both European Union members and Russia have expanded their options for
responding to American primacy and potential American challenges in the future.
The EU has strengthened the institutional framework for cooperating on foreign
policy and defence policies outside NATO.34 Much depends on how the policies
and organizations outlined in the new European Security Strategy are implemented.
Much also depends on the nature and timing of future crises. A crisis in central
Europe or renewed hostilities in the Balkans might expose once again rifts in the
transatlantic relationship and push Europe toward greater autonomy.
For Russia, the options are less clear, especially given its resource constraints and
the numerous security challenges it faces internally and in the ‘near abroad’. It
confronts more immediate threats than does Western Europe, and even perhaps the
United States, with far fewer economic, political and military assets at its disposal.
Russia may choose, or be forced to seek, alternative partners and security frame-
works if neither the United States nor NATO nor the emerging EU defence apparatus
appears sufficiently compatible with Russian interests. Some have proposed that
Russia might seek to tighten security ties with China, for example.
For both Russia and the EU, though, the wild card is the US position. A
unilateralist America bent on maintaining its primacy and not expending political
and military capital on crises and concerns lying outside its narrowly construed
self-interest might push the other two poles of the strategic triangle away from the
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United States. Early returns since the 2004 presidential election are more promising
but still not entirely comforting for those interested in closer triangular relations.
Presidential candidate John Kerry pledged to restore multilateralism to the
vocabulary of American diplomacy; there is little reason to doubt that he would have
done so. The US–European relationship could have been the biggest beneficiary of
a renewed and revitalized US commitment to multilateralism and institutionalism.
Even though the post-presidential election effort to enlist Europe in America’s Iraqi
(mis)adventure may have been no more successful under a President Kerry than it
has been under President Bush, the prospects for a transatlantic reconciliation would
have been greater.
In a high-minded, idealistic second inaugural address, President Bush declared
that advancing freedom and liberty around the world is to be America’s mission.
Unmentioned was the role of partnerships – with members of the European Union
(whether collectively or otherwise) or anyone else – in the pursuit of this mission.
That strategic partnerships might actually be useful again went unremarked when
the president returned to this theme in his February 2005 state of the union address.
Shortly thereafter, during the course of his remarks with EU leaders in Brussels,
President Bush did acknowledge that it was in US interests for the European Union
to become a ‘viable, strong partner’ and that the United States and the EU share
common values and an interest in spreading those values; he also expressed a desire
for a ‘constructive relationship’ with Russia.35 A meaningful trilateral partnership,
however, requires that the United States more consistently recognize and give voice
to its value and that US behaviour be aligned with its high-minded rhetoric.
The extent to which the United States might more fully embrace a new strategic
triangle during the Bush administration’s second four years remains to be seen. The
experience of the administration’s first four years provides grounds for concern.
There is some evidence that the president and his advisors recognize, if somewhat
belatedly, that the United States is not strong enough to stand alone as an empire
and is barely capable of maintaining its primacy in the face of multiple and multi-
faceted security challenges arising as a result of the ongoing military campaigns,
North Korean and Iranian nuclear ambitions, and China’s emergence as a regional
power and a potential near-peer competitor. Yet the Bush administration puts great
stock in ‘staying the course’ even in the face of unremittingly negative develop-
ments. The ability to acknowledge mistakes and shift course does not seem to be
in its repertoire. Staying the course may well serve both to embolden those who
would have the EU emerge as a counterweight to the United States and to drive 
the EU and Russia into a genuine strategic partnership. The resulting trilateral
relationship between the United States, the EU, and Russia will then resemble the
geopolitical strategic triangles of old rather than the envisioned new trilateral
partnership.
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THE TIES THAT BIND?
Economic relations among the United States,
the EU, and Russia
Jan Hallenberg
Introduction
This chapter focuses on economic relations among the United States, the EU and
Russia, present and future, as well as on the question of the actorness of the EU.
Washington has clearly been the most influential actor – the initiator – of the three
under study here in this policy arena.1
The overriding question here is what influence does economic relations have on
the strategic triangle as a whole? Do they contribute to stronger relations among the
three actors, or do they tend to be counter-productive for the strategic triangle? In
addition, the chapter covers the strength of each of the three dyads – US–EU,
EU–Russia and Russia–US – which, together, make up the strategic triangle. How
strong are the economic linkages in each of the dyads, and do these economic ties
have any influence on security relations, traditionally defined? Finally, the chapter
takes up the strains put on relations among the transatlantic three as a result of the
Iraq War. What influence, if any, did these sometimes profound political disagree-
ments have on the economic ties among the three parties?
Before analysing the crucial dimensions of current economic relations among the
three actors, the chapter covers three essential starting points. First, it briefly
characterizes how the United States after the Second World War constructed an
international economic system in which ties between itself and Western Europe
were crucial. To quote Lars S. Skålnes: ‘The interdependence existing between the
United States and Western Europe was in part the result of an American strategy
consciously designed to make the American and European economies more
interdependent, to reflect and to bolster a strategy determined not by domestic
interests but by policymakers’ strategic assessment.’2 The analysis here is generally
in line with that of Skålnes in starting out from the assumption that ‘foreign
economic policies are used to promote international political objectives and as such
are instruments of high politics’.3
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Second, while the strategies pursued by the United States laid the foundation for
the institutionalized global economic-political system in general, as well as the
more specific ties between the US and Western Europe in the economic arena, 
the position taken here is that the economic strategies pursued by the European
Union, particularly since the Community became the Union in 1993, are in many
respects similar to those pursued by the United States in creating the system for
global economic cooperation after 1945. The geographical reach of the Union is
much more limited than has been that of the US. From the perspective of an eagle
soaring high above the petty details of everyday politics, there are, however,
important similarities in the overarching economic strategy pursued by the two
economic giants in their respective times and geographical arenas. Consequently,
a brief analysis of the broad lines of the economic strategies pursued by the Union
towards the United States and Russia during the period from 1993 up to the time of
writing (2005) is necessary as a background to the analysis of the current state 
of economic relations among the three actors.
Third, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian government
has also pursued economic strategies towards the other two actors in our presump-
tive triangle. A short analysis of the main aspects of these strategies is also necessary
as a backdrop to the assessment of current relations among the three actors.
Setting the stage: the economic grand strategies of 
the three actors
The United States was the driving force behind the construction of the international
economic system whose inception was the conference at Bretton Woods in 1944.
In addition, US support for the continuation of this system of cooperation – which
originally encompassed a fairly small group of Western and westernized countries
but which has gradually spread around the globe – has been almost as crucial as its
role for the inception of the system.
US leaders . . . were determined to avoid the ‘mistakes’ of post-World
War I political and economic isolationism . . . For them, a recon-
structed, integrated Europe was central to US security and future
economic growth. They mobilized to pump US money into Western
Europe to finance its reconstruction, counter the spread of communism
and anchor West Germany into a larger European framework.
(Pollack and Shaffer 2001b: 8)
It is a matter of some contention in the literature to what an extent this strategy
was mainly self-serving or altruistic. The position taken here is that in this strategy,
as in many other cases in US foreign and security policy during the last 100 years,
policymakers in Washington fashioned and pursued strategies that ingeniously
served both what has traditionally been called the national interest of the home
country, and the interests of the governments in the countries of Western Europe
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after the Second World War. Washington thus supported the creation of political
cooperation in Europe, a cooperation that had some supranational traits. While
doing so, the leaders in the Superpower were always clear that this new cooperative
venture would continue to be linked to the United States in a fashion that meant that
the two parties would continue to cooperate. There was never any doubt in the
minds of the highest leadership in Washington that this cooperation would continue
to be led by the United States.4 In other words, the system would be in the interest
of the Western Europeans, but it would also certainly be in the continued interest of
the United States.
Another building-block in this chapter’s analysis of the economic ties among the
transatlantic three concerns the beliefs held by first decision-makers in Washington,
and subsequently by those in Brussels, concerning the links between economic
strategies, primarily those serving free trade on the one hand and peaceful relations
among nations on the other. The assumption guiding this study of the economic
linkages among the three actors is that such linkages serve to tie countries together.
In a paper written for the Heritage Foundation, Ariel Cohen expresses well this line
of thinking:
Economists and political thinkers have long recognized that free trade
and the spirit of commerce promote international understanding and
reduce hostility and mistrust among nations. The reality of the global
economy today reinforces that priority . . . . Free trade is a U.S. foreign
policy priority: an effective way to promote and protect America’s
economic interests. Given Russia’s new role as a strategic partner in the
U.S.–led campaign to end terrorism, expanding trade with Russia and
helping it to become a full member of the community of developed
democratic states is in America’s best interests.
(Cohen 2002)
To some extent, the strategies pursued by Washington towards Russia after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have resembled those pursued towards Western
Europe after the start of the Cold War. As pointed out by Michael Mastanduno,
however, ‘US statecraft became less integrated as foreign economic policy and
national security policy proceeded on separate diplomatic and institutional tracks’5
from around 1980. This certainly does not mean that there is no relationship between
US foreign economic policy and national security policy after1980, but it does mean
that the two policies are, after that point in time, to some extent pursued along
separate tracks and not always with one of these broad strands controlling the other,
as was the case with the security strategy controlling the economic one during the
Cold War.
If the economic strategies of the United States towards Russia thus to some extent
resemble those pursued toward Western Europe more than fifty years ago, there
have, in Western Europe itself, been crucial changes. As analysed further in other
chapters of this book assessing the actorness of the European Union is a complex
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matter (see in particular Chapter 2, as well as Chapters 3 and 4). It cannot be denied,
however, that the economic strategies pursued by the modern Union in several ways
resemble those practiced by the United States as the Second World War ended and
as the global economic system of cooperation was being constructed.
The EU has, from the beginning, been an economic-political construct in which
the ties between first six member states, and, gradually, ever more candidates, many
of whom have successively been converted into members, have become increas-
ingly tighter. If there ever was a case in modern international relations where an
actor used economic-political strategies to reach political goals, that actor is the
European Union. The quote above from Ariel Cohen about the positive effects of
increasing trade relations for the creation of peace between trading nations is thus
very applicable to the strategies of the Union as well.
In terms of the relationship with the United States, the Union has since 1990 
had an institutional framework in which to pursue its strategies. The first step in 
this development was the issuance of the Transatlantic Declaration between the
George H. W. Bush Administration and the European Commission in November
1990. Five years later, the Clinton Administration signed a new declaration on the
importance of US–EU relations called the New Transatlantic Agenda, which had
even more far-reaching goals than the earlier declaration. Together, these documents
initiated a period in which US decision-makers regularly meet EU decision-makers
for broad-ranging discussions.6
In its relations with Russia, it is a sign of the importance the Union attached to
relations with that country that the first example of a new policy instrument that the
Union decided upon in the late 1990s – common strategies – was one regarding
Russia, decided upon in 1999.7 Informed Western European observers have had
conflicting assessments about the success of this first EU common strategy during
its first five years in operation, while Russian specialists have issued assessments
that include both positive evaluations and clear statements of the limitations that,
in their view, still characterize EU–Russian relations.8 At a summit in Moscow in
May 2005, the two parties signed a new agreement on a ‘Road Map for the Common
Economic Space’ and a ‘Building Block for Sustained Economic Growth’9
(relations between Russia and the EU are also analysed in Chapter 6 of this volume).
It seems clear that both have made an effort to create an institutional framework
within which better economic relations may be constructed.
Russian economic strategies after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can
broadly be characterized as going through the same stages as most other transition
economies. The former Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, one of the most
important actors in the creation of the new Russian economy, characterized in a
book the three first stages of economic development as ‘post-socialist recession’,
‘post-socialist reconstruction’, and ‘investment growth’.10 A part of this economic
strategy, a part that seems to have received increased attention after President
Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin in 2000, has been to increase Russia’s 
role as an international economic actor, particularly in global trade. Russia applied
for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as early as in 1993, but
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only during the last few years has the pace of negotiations for Russian membership
increased.11
The other side of the Russian application for membership in the WTO, as seen
from the perspective of the strategic triangle, is of course what strategies the United
States and the EU, respectively, have conducted in response to the Russian appli-
cation for accession. For Washington and Brussels, Russian membership may serve
their political strategies of getting Moscow more integrated in this economic system,
which Brussels as well as Washington also believe would, if anything, serve as a
positive influence for the strengthening of democracy in Russia.12 A brief analysis
of the development of Russian negotiations for membership in the WTO is thus
included in this chapter.
Economic ties among international actors
In the modern era, states and other international actors operate in a global economic
arena that contains several distinct issue-areas. This assessment of the economic ties
among Washington and the two other actors in the transatlantic strategic triangle
focuses on three such issue-areas.13 The first is trade relations, where international
cooperation is supported by beliefs among statesmen as well as among economists
that countries that trade with each other do not go to war with each other. In addition,
cooperation in international trade is supported by a general belief among both
categories that liberal trade rules aid economic growth in all states that participate
in the trading system.14
The second economic issue-area covered here is monetary relations. The role of
currencies has a potential influence that is so great that it can hardly be overlooked
in any deeper assessment of the economic ties among the United States, the EU and
Russia. This is despite the fact that the effects of various arrangements regarding
currencies are ambiguous, in contrast to trade relations where the starting-point
here is that strong such relations, at least in principle, have positive effects for
relations between actors.
Third, this analysis covers direct investment. We believe that a large amount of
mutual private investments between two actors in the international system serves
to tie these actors closer together, in a way that induces their governments to pursue
security policies that are more considerate to the policies of the other party than they
would have been without the existence of such ties.15
One problem in studying political economy has to do with the concept of actor.
Who are the actors in international political economy? To what extent do states, as
well as the EU in this case, regulate and control political and economic processes
in the three issue-areas presented here? The conception in this chapter is that the
problem is relatively small when it comes to trade and monetary issues. In both
these fields the US government, the EU and Russia regulate economic activities to
such an extent that it is legitimate to assume that they are actors in both issues.
The problem is larger when it comes to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In
principle, decisions in this third field are taken by private actors. There are different
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views among scholars as to which roles are played by Multinational Companies
(MNCs) and the role these play in the world economy more generally, and in FDI
more precisely. The position taken here is, first, that ‘the nation-state is still the
principal actor in international economic affairs . . . and that multinational corpo-
rations are simply national firms with foreign operations and that, with few
exceptions, these firms remain deeply embedded in their national societies’.16
Second, I agree with Hamilton and Quinlan that ‘While trade is the benchmark
typically used to gauge global economic engagement, international production by
Multinational Enterprises through FDI has superceded international trade as the
most important mechanism for international integration.’17
Assessing the importance of economic ties
One starting-point in attempting to analyse economic relations among the United
States, Russia and the European Union is that these are three very different beasts
in the economic field. The United States is a traditional nation-state, a state in which
the immense domestic market still means that this country is less dependent on the
outside world than is either of the other two actors. To use one common measure
in this respect, the ratio of US total trade to GDP was 11.7 per cent in 2002. For the
EU the equivalent figure was 48.1 per cent.18 It is difficult to compare Russia to 
the other two actors in this respect, as the country is neither a member of the OECD,
the club for the most developed market economies, nor of the WTO. Russia has,
however, been a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) since 1992. Data from Eurostat, the EU statistical office, indicate that Russia
is much closer to the EU than to the US when it comes to trade dependence.19 This
means that the United States is much less dependent on international trade for the
health of its domestic economy than is either of the two other actors.
This book is concerned with the power of three important international actors,
and with various dimensions of their relationships. Taking the step from considering
their respective dependence on international trade for the health of their economy
to the assessment of the economic ties among the three actors is very difficult indeed,
as so many aspects enter into the picture. There is, however, one pair of analytic
concepts which may aid us in the assessment of the strength of the ties between each
of the three pairs in the relationship. These concepts are sensitivity and vulnerability
from Power and Interdependence by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.20
Keohane’s and Nye’s reasoning starts from the assertion that modern global
politics are not only concerned with power politics but also with interdependence.
They define the latter term in this way: ‘Interdependence, most simply defined,
means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different
countries.’21 The analysis is this chapter is based on the premise of the simultaneous
existence of power and interdependence. States, and other important actors such as
the European Union, possess power, but they are also interdependent. The question
then arises what the role is of power in a situation where there is interdependence.
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Sensitivity and vulnerability are introduced in this next step of Keohane’s and
Nye’s analysis.22 Sensitivity measures how quickly outside events influence
processes within a polity, as well as how large that influence is, before the influenced
state has been able to undertake any policy response. Vulnerability measures the
costs for an actor of outside events even after that actor has undertaken policy
changes to alleviate the effects of the external event in question.
Sensitivity and vulnerability are not applicable in assessing whether or not an
economic triangle exists among between the three actors. The two concepts are,
however, applied in this chapter to an overall assessment of the importance of the
dyadic economic ties between: the United States and the EU, the EU and Russia,
and Russia and the United States. It is of course possible, even likely, that the
interdependence is asymmetric, that is that one party is more dependent on the
second than the second is on the first. The overriding question is the role of economic
relations for the strategic triangle broadly seen, and the secondary question concerns
the strength of the economic ties in the three dyads that are formed by bilateral
relations among the three actors.
These economic ties are important in themselves. They are also, particularly if
they are very strong, potentially of such importance that they matter for other issue-
areas. The conception here is that very strong economic ties serve to stabilize
relations in other issue-areas, such as security policy more strictly seen. In other
words, if two parties disagree on an issue of security policy and they simultaneously
have very strong economic ties, there is a strong tendency for the economic ties to
influence the two parties’ courses of action in security policy so as not to threaten
the commercial ties. This chapter assesses to what extent the three dyads mentioned
above contain such strong economic links that either one, or perhaps both parties,
feel that these links serve as a strong influence to manage disagreements in other
policy fields.
Trade relations among the United States, the EU and Russia
The economic relations between the United States and the EU are arguably the
strongest between any two economies in the current global system. The only
conceivable exception, when seen from the vantage-point of the United States, 
is the trade relationship between Washington and Canada.23 In gross figures –
including trade in goods as well as in services – the two-way trade between the
United States and EU-25 was over €590 billion in 2003.24 The equivalent figure for
Canadian trade with the United States was €390 during the same year.25 The
comparable trade between Washington and Russia for 2004 was somewhat more
than €12 billion for merchandise trade.26 While precise comparisons are impossible,
the trade relationship between the EU of 25 and the United States was thus many
times larger than the similar figure for United States trade with Russia. There is thus
a strong trade link between the United States and the EU, with both parties having
the other as the most important, or second most important, trade partner concerning
both exports and imports in 2003 as well as 2004.
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The equivalent figure for EU trade with Russia was for the same year €145
billion.27 For Russia, the EU was by far the most important trading partner, both in
terms of its exports and for its imports, with the EU accounting for roughly 50 per
cent of total Russian external trade.28 For Brussels, Russia was much less important,
representing somewhat more than 6 per cent of total external trade.29 It is thus
obvious that the trade link between Russia and the EU is very asymmetrical – when
seen in overall terms – with the Russians being much more dependent on trade links
with the EU than the reverse. The fact that an important part of EU imports from
Russia – nearly 60 per cent according to Eurostat data – are ‘mineral fuels etc.’ to
some extent makes the trade relationship less asymmetrical. It is difficult to estimate
whether likely Russian efforts to increase the exports of these products to the EU
may over the medium-term make the trade relationship between the parties less
asymmetrical. Indications are that Russian oil will not be available for export for a
very long time in the future, whereas Russian exports of natural gas may gradually
take over some of the role of oil in Russian trade relations with the EU.
Monetary relations among the United States, the EU 
and Russia
In the monetary area the US dollar has reigned nearly supreme since the end of the
Second World War, at least until the gradual entry of the euro as an international
currency, beginning in 1999.30 In the first years of the twenty-first century the US
dollar was still the world’s most important currency. To take one example, in 2001
the dollar was one of two currencies in 90 per cent of all currency transactions. The
equivalent figure for the euro was 38 per cent.31 However, the very fact that the
euro became a currency in all respects in 2002 meant that the United States and 
the EU became more equal powers in the monetary arena than they had been
previously.32 One illustration of this fact is that a tool that Washington used to
attempt to influence France and the United Kingdom in 1956 in their disagreement
over the Suez invasion, i.e. putting pressure on the currencies of the two countries,
was unavailable to the United States in the disagreement leading up to the Iraq
War.33 With the introduction of the euro, the US dollar was no longer the unique
reserve currency for it to be used as a tool to put pressure downwards on the euro.34
In the monetary arena, the United States is still the world’s most important actor.
However, with the entry into force of the euro, the EU – in this case in the form 
of the Euro-zone – represents a challenger that is not the equal of the United 
States, but that, nevertheless, possesses much more monetary power than it did
prior to the existence of the euro.35 The fact that the Russian currency, the rouble,
is still not fully convertible, means that Russia can be neglected as an actor in this




Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) among the parties
Partly due to the fact that Russia is a fairly new member of the global market
economy, there are comparatively few direct investments either going into the
Russian market, or emanating from Russia. In the case of the relationship between
Russia and the EU, estimates by the latter indicate that the book value of EU
investments in Russia increased from about €9 billion in 2002 to about €17 billion
in 2003. The book value of Russian FDI in the EU was somewhat more than 
€4 billion in both years. When it comes to the flow of new FDI funds, EU invest-
ments into the Russian market increased markedly from only slightly more than 
€1 billion in 2002, to about €8 billion in 2003.36 The flow from Russia into the EU
decreased from €1 billion to €500 million between 2002 and 2003. While the
increased flows of funds from the EU into Russia may indicate a growing interest
on the part of EU-based companies in the Russian market, still the volumes are 
so small that they have so far not created any strong interdependence between the
two parties.37
The FDI figures for the EU–Russian dyad are dwarfed by those of the US–EU
dyad. In the latter case, companies based in the EU-15-owned assets in US companies
worth more than €700 billion in 2002, a value that increased to more than €750
billion in 2003. This represented more than 62 per cent of the book value of foreign
FDI-owned stock in the US in 2003. The corresponding figures for US FDI in the
EU-15 were €590 billion in 2002, and €640 billion in 2003, which represented
slightly less than 50 per cent of total US holdings outside that country in 2003.
While such immense investments, in terms of stock as well as flow, as those between
the US and the EU fluctuate from year to year, still the enormous values they
represent are vastly greater than for any other dyad in the global economy.38
Russian efforts to become a member of the WTO
In 1993, the Russian Government applied for membership in the WTO.39 Formal
negotiations started in 1995. The Working Party on Russia’s accession to the WTO
held its twenty-fifth official meeting in November 2004. Both the United States and
the EU are in principle positive towards Russian membership in the global trade
organization. The EU and Russia concluded a bilateral agreement on Russian
accession to the WTO at the Moscow Summit in May 2004.40 The United States
and Russia issued a Joint Statement on Russia’s accession to WTO in connection
with the meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin in February 2005.41 In the
statement, the two parties stated that they were committed to working together to
complete their bilateral negotiations for Russian membership of the WTO in 2005.
In a statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in April 2005, the Secretary
indicates worries about Russian progress up to that time in terms of intellectual
property rights issues, as well as on some alleged protectionism in agriculture. In
addition, the Secretary mentions ‘some inconsistency about how foreign investments
will or will not play’ concerning Russian energy resources.42 The obvious reference
here is to the treatment of the Russian ‘oligarch’ Mikhail Khodorkovsky and to the
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uncertainty that the treatment of him and his company Yukos has created among
current and potential foreign investors in Russia, particularly in the energy sector.
While all three parties in the strategic triangle have thus in principle expressed
their positive view of Russian membership in the WTO, it appears that as of this
writing in mid-2005 there are still some hurdles for Russia to clear before it becomes
a member of the global trade organization. The United States has still not come to
any full agreement with Russia on this matter, while the EU has done so. It is
probably not an exaggeration to state that there is a difference in strategies between
the United States and the EU regarding an issue that is crucial to Russia. For the
US, Russia is one of several large powers that has to be handled, a power that to
some extent creates problems on important issues. For the EU, Russia is a constantly
important actor, with which it is easier to attempt to conduct positive relations, for
the alternative is difficult to contemplate.
The state of economic relations among the three actors
There are several reasons why an economic triangle is only just developing among
the three actors under study in this book. Most of those have to do with Russia.
First, Russia is not sufficiently integrated into the global economic network to create
conditions for it to have strong ties to the other two actors simultaneously. Second,
linked to the first point, Russia is a very small economic actor compared to the other
two, with a GDP representing roughly €380 billion in 2003, compared to around
€9,700 billion for both EU-25 and the US.43
If the conclusion is now that there is a nascent economic triangle under
construction among the three parties, it seems that if this triangle is to be developed
into something more solid, much depends on Russia. An economically stronger
Russia would generally be a more attractive partner with which to deepen relations
for the United States and the EU. A Russia that treats its large companies in a fashion
that is less arbitrary than has been the case during the last few years would work
towards enticing more companies to invest in Russia, thus creating stronger
economic ties in the triangle.44
At the same time, the United States still has political restrictions that may make
it more difficult to create stronger economic ties with Russia. The most important
problem here is the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which
‘effectively denies unconditional normal trade relations to certain countries, includ-
ing Russia, that had non-market economies and that restricted emigration rights’.45
Even if the US President can waive the restrictions on trade with Russia on 
a temporary basis each year, and has been doing so starting in 1992 and more
completely from 1994, still the fact that Congress has not repealed the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment is an irritant in US–Russian trade relations that at the very least
does not serve as an encouragement for the further increase of trade between the
two parties.46
The three dyads that collectively form the nascent economic triangle among the
United States, Russia and the EU thus differ a lot in the strengths of their economic
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ties. The least important economic dyad, in these terms, is that between the United
States and Russia. There is some trade, a trade which has been fluctuating somewhat
since the early 1990s, but with an upward trend.47 As seen from the perspective of
total United States international trade, the exchange of goods and services with
Russia is still insignificant. For the United States – if the EU is excluded as a trade
partner in favour of the member states – Russia was in 2003 in 30th place among
its trade partners, counting total imports and exports.48 For a country that is com-
paratively little trade-dependent to begin with, total trade with Russia represented
less than 1 per cent of total trade in 2003–4. Russia is more dependent on trade 
with Washington than the other way round, with exports plus imports representing
nearly 5 per cent of total Russian trade in 2003.49 In the terms utilized by Keohane
and Nye, it is probably most correct to say that Russia is gradually becoming
sensitive to the maintenance of a healthy trade relationship with the United States,
whereas the latter has not yet developed any such dependence on trade relations with
Moscow.
The second dyad in terms of importance when it comes to the economic links
between the two actors is that between the EU and Russia. For the EU, Russia was
in 2004 the fourth of the major trading partners, while for Russia the EU was by far
the most important in total trade in merchandise, representing nearly 50 per cent of
Russian trade in such items.50 For the EU, trade with Russia represented more than
6 per cent of its two-way trade in merchandise. In the other two dimensions of
economic affairs – monetary issues and the flow and stock of FDI – relations
between the two parties are much less important. Still, it is probably fair to state that
both actors have already developed some sensitivity in terms of the continuation of
trade in merchandise. A severe downfall in the trade exchange with the EU would
potentially be disastrous for the Russian economy, while it would be more of a
nuisance for the EU. Perhaps it can be stated that while there is at least some
sensitivity on the part of both parties facing the prospect of a strong fall in trade
exchanges, it is only on the Russian side where such a prospect will raise the
possibility that the situation could also be characterized as vulnerability in the 
terms used by Keohane and Nye. In other words, if for some reason there was an
important break-off in trade relations between the EU and Russia, the latter would
find it very difficult indeed, even after taking counteraction, to mitigate the negative
consequences that such an event would have on the Russian economy.
If there are thus moderately strong economic ties between the EU and Russia,
these ties are infinitely stronger between the United States and the EU. In terms of
total trade – merchandise as well as service trade – the two are each other’s major
trading partner, representing about 20 per cent of the total trade of each.51 When 
it comes to FDI, the overwhelming importance to each of the other party is 
even clearer. Of the total book value of FDI in the United States 62 per cent was
held by companies from EU-15, while the equivalent figure for US Foreign Direct
Investment abroad was that 47 per cent of the book value of all companies owned
by US interests abroad was located in the EU-15 countries.52 While one may debate
particularly the extent to which either the nation-states, or even the EU as an
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organization, can really control the activities of private companies, the linkages
between the United States and the EU in trade and FDI are still so very strong that
it must be obvious that these two actors are very sensitive to the effects of strong
disturbances in the economic relations between them. Indeed, so strong and deep
are the economic relations between the two that both would be very vulnerable to
serious disturbances in their economic relations, even after taking counter-measures.
Or, to put it the other way around, disagreements in other policy areas are over time
bound to be positively influenced by the immense strength of the economic ties
between the two parties.
The Iraq War as a strain on the transatlantic relationship
It is well known that the run-up to the war in Iraq in March and April of 2003, as
well as the war itself and its aftermath, created important strains among the three
transatlantic actors.53 These strains did not have the character of falling exactly
between the three actors as they are conceived in this volume. Instead, the United
States was strongly supported by several members of the EU, most prominently by
the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy, while France and Germany, in particular,
opposed US policies. Indeed, the opposition of the latter two to what was widely
perceived as a US-led political strategy was so strong that it created strains 
among some of the transatlantic partners that were as severe as perhaps any such
transatlantic strains after the start of the Cold War. Russia also opposed the United
States and to a very great extent allied itself with France and Germany in opposition
to the strategy followed by US President George W. Bush.
This is not the place to analyse the details of this complicated political process,
nor to state precisely which actors supported which during these tumultuous events.
What is crucial for this chapter is, instead, to uncover to what extent, if any, the
disagreements over the Iraq War had negative consequences for the economic
relations among the three parties.
The fundamental one-word response to this question has to be ‘no’. It is true that
some US citizens and pundits advocated a boycott of French products, such as wine,
after the outbreak of the Iraq War. From a larger perspective, however, these actions
were but superficial movements on a vast river of economic linkage that continued
to flow strongly and majestically in the relationship between the United States and
the EU. Economic data show that in several respects the flow of trade and FDI funds
between the parties broke records in several ways in 2003. The total transatlantic
trade in goods was higher than ever at $395 billion (€296 billion). US imports from
several of the largest EU countries were also higher than ever, as were profits for
US companies in Europe. In addition, Europeans bought United States corporate
bonds to a greater value than ever before.54 In other words, there appears to be no
indication whatsoever that economic ties between the United States and the EU
suffered because of the diplomatic spats between Washington and France and
Germany in particular. Indeed, there is also hardly any evidence that bilateral
economic relations among the latter three countries were negatively influenced.
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The economic relationship between the United States and Russia, as stated above,
is the weakest link among the three legs of the economic triangle. It is thus hard to
believe that these ties were important enough to be really consequential for relations
in traditional security policy between the two parties. Still, from what can be seen
from the data, there was no real impact on the relationship between Moscow and
Washington as a result of the Iraq War. According to information from the US
Census Bureau, trade with Russia increased every year from 2002 through 2004
without any slowdown whatever that can be attributed to disagreements over Iraq.55
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that in the economic field there exists a very weak, but
slowly strengthening, triangle among the United States, Russia and the EU in the
first decade of the twenty-first century. The respective strengths of the ties within
the three dyads that are formed by the three pairs of actors differ importantly. The
economic links between the United States and the EU are here seen as the strongest
and most multi-faceted among any two actors in the world. The strength of this
economic link means that whatever strains may exist between the US and the EU
in other policy areas, the very strength of the economic ties are apt to be a positive
influence for the proper handling, if not resolution, of such strains. In this view the
improvements in ties in early 2005 between the United States and some important
members of the EU, as well as between Washington and Brussels more broadly
after the enormous strains caused by the Iraq conflict particularly in 2003–4, depend
at least partly on the enormous strength of economic ties between the parties.
Economic relations between the EU and Russia are not nearly so strong. They
are, however, becoming increasingly stronger in the trade field. When seen from
the Russian side, they are now so developed that the Russian economy would be
very sensitive to any severe disturbances in this economic relationship. The
importance for the EU of economic links with Russia is harder to determine. 
They are less crucial, when seen in terms of overall trade. In addition, the fact that
these linkages are comparatively small in the stock and flow of FDI do not serve to
increase EU economic dependence on Russia. The fact that some 60 per cent of
Russian exports to the EU are made up of energy products may, however, if they
continue and increase, perhaps mean that the EU also develops sensitivity to any
disturbances in its economic ties with Russia.
The third leg of the triangle – the relationship between Russia and the United
States – contains by far the weakest economic links among the three. For the United
States, Russia is still a negligible actor, when judged on the basis of the three
dimensions of economic relations considered here. For Russia, however, economic
ties with Washington are gradually becoming more important.
To conclude, if we attempt to depict this most quantifiable of relationships in
international politics in terms of a triangle, we must draw three lines of very different
character between the three actors. Between the United States and the EU, the line
will be very thick indeed, so strong that it appears almost impossible to break for
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any reason. Between the Union and Moscow, the line is considerably thinner, but
it still indicates a relationship that benefits both parties, and where Russia, first, 
and the EU, second, will be sensitive to any important strains in this relationship.
It is the line between Moscow and Washington that is the weakest and the most
problematic to characterize in these terms. The most apt way of depicting this
relationship in terms of a line would be in terms of a dotted line. The line is not non-
existent, but is as yet fairly weak.
As this chapter is being completed in mid-2005, there are strong indications that
Russia will become a member of the WTO either in late 2005 or in early 2006. 
If indeed this turns out to be true, there will be greater opportunities for Russia to
increase its trade with both the United States and the EU. If this happens, there are
clear chances that the dyadic economic links between Moscow and Washington, and
Moscow and Brussels will gradually strengthen over the coming years. As this
chapter has shown, the EU–Russia relationship has already become so strong that
both parties have some dependence on continued trade, even if that dependence is
asymmetrical to the detriment of Russia. The United States–Russia economic
relationship is much less developed, and there will have to be a substantial increase
in bilateral trade for the United States to develop any real dependence upon Russia.
For Russia, such dependence will occur earlier.
An analysis of the consequences of the Iraq War indicated that this did not have
much influence on economic relations among the parties. In particular, the economic
relationship between Washington and Brussels now seems so strong that it supports
the thesis made here, i.e. that very strong economic relations between two parties
in international relations would work to mend strains in other parts of the mutual
relationship. What we know about the relationship between Brussels, and to some
extent Paris and Berlin on the one hand, and Washington on the other, seems to lend
some credence to such a view. Even if many disagreements remain, the visit by the
US President to Europe and Brussels in February of 2005 indicates to us at the very
least that many of the tensions that flared up in 2003 have been if not completely
mended, then at least substantially ameliorated.
A final aspect of economic relations in the strategic triangle has to do with 
the balance of power between the two economic giants that form two corners of the
triangle, the United States and EU. In the trade arena, the EU is a strong actor, in
some respects as strong as the United States. Still, the problems of the actorness of
the Union (see the analysis in Chapter 2 in this book) means that Brussels is less
able to take initiatives and lead global negotiations in the WTO than is the traditional
actor, the United States. As stated in this chapter, the birth of the euro means that
the two parties are now more equal in monetary affairs as well. For more than fifty
years after the Second World War the US dollar reigned supreme. It is still the
world’s most important currency, but the euro represents the first serious alternative
for decades. None of this indicates that the US–EU economic dyad is negatively
affected by the fact that the EU, in some respects, is becoming more of an equal to
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THE UNITED STATES AND
RUSSIA
A clash of strategic visions
Håkan Karlsson
Introduction
During the Cold War, the power structure of the international system was basically
bipolar. Two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, represented the
poles in the system. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the bipolar structure
vanished and the United States emerged as the sole remaining superpower. Many
analysts have therefore characterized the current system structure as unipolar.1
More than a decade ago, they recognized that America’s ‘unipolar moment’ had
arrived.2 The economic and military might of the United States is preponderant 
and unprecedented. Thus, the claim that the post-Cold War world has only one
predominant pole seems reasonable. ‘If today’s American primacy does not
constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will’, William C. Wohlforth and Stephen
G. Brooks conclude.3
The United States clearly has an interest in preserving its dominant position in
the international system. US efforts to prolong the unipolar moment, the period 
in which the United States is substantially more powerful than other states, are to
be expected. Logically, the United States should strive to prevent new great powers
from emerging and balancing against it.4 It is the contention of this author that US
grand strategy after the end of the Cold War has indeed been aimed at perpetuating
unipolarity. The pursuit of this objective is evident in the specific policies of the
United States with respect to four national security issues: enlargement of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), strategic nuclear force planning, strategic
arms control, and missile defence. The present study examines these US policies
and explains how they can serve the strategic purpose of preserving America’s
dominant global position.
Analysts who grant that the structure of the international system has become
unipolar differ over the stability and durability of unipolarity. Some adherents of
the theory of international politics called structural realism believe that unipolarity
is an inherently unstable structure that will not endure. For these theorists, America’s
unipolar moment is just that, a relatively short interlude in world history. According
to their view, a structural shift from unipolarity to multipolarity is inevitable. New
great powers will inevitably emerge and balance against the United States. When
this happens, the present unipolar system will give way to a structure comprising
several powerful poles.5
The experience with unipolarity after the Cold War calls into question the
theoretical claim that this structure is unstable and cannot last. Predictions of a rapid
collapse of unipolarity have failed to come true. The structure has already lasted for
more than a decade. This fact has prompted some analysts to suggest that unipolarity
is stable and durable. In their view, it is no longer appropriate to talk about a unipolar
moment.6 ‘The unipolar moment has become the unipolar era’, as Charles
Krauthammer puts it.7 The principal basis for the argument that unipolarity can be
sustained is the observation that great power balancing against the United States has
not occurred since the disappearance of the Soviet Union.8
In explaining the perceived absence of counterbalancing, scholars have pointed
out that the power of the United States grew more overwhelming in the 1990s. The
result is increased American dominance. In other words, the world has become
even more unipolar than it was a decade ago. It has been argued that the enormous
concentration of American power should dissuade all other states from balancing
against the United States. According to William Wohlforth, the United States is
simply too powerful to be balanced. Wohlforth and others also point out that it will
be decades before any single state can match the United States in terms of either
military or economic power.9
Does this mean that counterbalancing is avoidable? Kenneth N. Waltz, a leading
structural realist, insists that it cannot be prevented. In fact, he disputes the
observation that balancing against the United States has not taken place during 
the last decade. Actually, counterbalancing has already begun, but haltingly so, he
claims. Full-scale counterbalancing is not yet manifest, but Waltz argues that one
does observe ‘balancing tendencies’.10
If Waltz is right, what states have sought to balance against the United States 
and what counterbalancing steps have they taken? Arguably, the most important
counterbalancers include Russia and China. This study focuses on Russia as prime
challenger in the greater transatlantic region. Russian grand strategy has developed
in accordance with a counterbalancing imperative. Russia is determined to regain
true great power status and promotes the emergence of multipolarity. From Russia’s
perspective, unipolarity is not a desirable state of affairs. Russian leaders resent
America’s dominance in international politics. They feel threatened by what they
see as American attempts to achieve global hegemony. Specifically, they view
NATO’s expansion and the US acquisition of a ballistic missile defence system as
threats to Russian security.
This study explores ways in which Russia is attempting to counterbalance the
United States. Russian balancing against America can be pursued both internally
and externally.11 Internal counterbalancing is what Russia does when it tries to
increase its own capabilities. Unfortunately for Russia, this form of counterbalancing
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is both costly and time-consuming. It depends on sustaining rapid economic growth
over many years. A potentially cheaper and quicker route to multipolarity is external
counterbalancing. The most obvious way to counterbalance externally is to aggre-
gate capabilities by forming alliances with other states. It is, however, difficult to
organize and coordinate effective alliances. Moreover, alliance commitments mean
sacrificing national autonomy, and Russia has shown little inclination to make that
kind of sacrifice.
Another, less conspicuous, way for Russia to counterbalance by external means
is to restrain the United States within international regimes.12 In Russian grand
strategy, international regimes have become balancing mechanisms. Russia supports
the United Nations (UN) as an overarching instrument for providing a system of
norms and rules of behaviour in international affairs. It has also defended the
US–Russian strategic arms control regime created during the Cold War, a complex
system of treaties on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive
strategic weapons. The purpose of such efforts, perfectly logical from a counter-
balancing perspective, is to constrain American power. This chapter investigates
the results so far of Russia’s attempts to tie down the United States with institutional
restraints. Finally, the study deals with Washington’s reaction to Russia’s pursuit
of a multipolar world and the implications of this reaction for what in this book 
is called a new strategic triangle consisting of the United States, Russia, and the
European Union (EU).
The US post-Cold War grand strategy
First evidence of an ambition to preserve the dominant global position of the United
States after the Cold War came in March 1992, when a government document was
leaked to the press. This was a draft of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for
fiscal years 1994–9, a classified planning document prepared by the US Department
of Defense under the supervision of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul D.
Wolfowitz. In the draft, the Pentagon’s strategic planners maintained that America’s
post-Cold War grand strategy should seek to perpetuate unipolarity by preventing
new global competitors from emerging: ‘Our strategy must now refocus on
precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.’ To implement
the strategy, the United States, according to the draft, ‘must maintain the mech-
anisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional
or global role.’ Russia was identified in the document as a possible candidate for
becoming a competitor, although the authors recognized that a global Russian
challenge to US security was unlikely to emerge in the near future.13
In the final version of the planning document, the controversial language 
referring to the goal of preventing the emergence of a global rival was eliminated.
Nevertheless, the earlier version had a lasting impact. Its logic and guiding principles
have in fact decisively shaped US security policy for the post-Cold War era.
Despite some ambiguities, the public rhetoric and the actions of the Clinton
administration suggest that its grand strategy had at least strong tendencies 
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towards maintaining the US-dominated unipolar international system. In Michael
Mastanduno’s opinion, the United States under President William J. Clinton
actually pursued a consistent grand strategy of preserving primacy.14 Similarly,
Christopher Layne argues that the country followed a grand strategy of prepon-
derance.15 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross characterize the grand strategy of
the Clinton administration as an uneasy amalgam consisting of several strategic
visions. They conclude that the strategy was basically cooperative in line with a
liberal internationalist tradition and constrained by principles of selective engage-
ment but evolved to a point where it had many of the trappings of primacy.16
To be sure, the Clinton administration in its foreign policy pronouncements
eschewed the blunt language of the 1992 Pentagon planning document, but it readily
acknowledged that the United States occupied a position of pre-eminence in the
international system. The 1995 version of the administration’s National Security
Strategy report stated it explicitly: ‘We stand as the world’s preeminent power.’17
Central to the Clinton strategy was US leadership and engagement in world affairs.
The United States was seen as indispensable to the forging of stable international
relations. ‘America truly is the world’s indispensable nation’, Clinton declared.18
Administration officials did not advertise as a strategic objective the preservation
of American geopolitical dominance, speaking instead of perpetuating America’s
role as world leader. Clinton himself announced this goal in a speech: ‘We must
continue to bear the responsibility of the world’s leadership.’19
The insistence by the Clinton administration on the continued need for American
leadership abroad indirectly betrayed an intention to secure the geopolitical status
quo. Implicit in the official statements was the belief that the United States must
remain in a position of primacy in order to lead the world.20
While the Clinton administration was careful not to depict Russia as an adversary,
its rhetorical record and actual practice of policy revealed that it viewed Russia as
a potential threat. The administration maintained a substantial nuclear arsenal
directed primarily against Russia. US nuclear war planning continued to target the
Russian nuclear forces because they remained capable of destroying the United
States. A principal result of the Clinton administration’s 1993–4 Nuclear Posture
Review was the adoption of a ‘hedge’ policy for the configuration of the US nuclear
force structure. The review concluded that the United States would retain strategic
nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to hedge against the possibility that
Russia could become a strategic rival at some time in the future.21
NATO enlargement became a cornerstone of Clinton’s foreign policy. His firm
commitment to the enlargement process was consistent with a US grand strategy
of primacy. By expanding eastward, NATO established a renewed containment 
of Russia in Europe.22 The Clinton administration never spoke of a new policy of
containment, but its case for extending NATO to Eastern Europe did incorporate
containment considerations. In laying out the various rationales for NATO’s
eastward expansion, US officials made clear that the expansion would function as
a hedge against a potential Russian threat.23
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The Russian reaction
Russia’s quest for multipolarity is largely a response to the US grand strategy of
primacy laid out in the early 1990s, but the Russian reaction emerged through a
gradual process. Only by the mid-1990s did Russian leaders begin to speak seriously
of building a multipolar world in which the United States would not be the only
major centre of power. Initially, the leadership pursued a radically Western-oriented
foreign policy seeking extensive economic and political integration with the West.
The period of Russian deference to the West proved short-lived, however. Since
1993, Russia gradually abandoned its accommodating orientation and moved
towards a more assertive and realist stance.24
The shift away from a pro-Western foreign policy solidified following the
appointment of Evgenii Primakov as foreign minister in 1996. Primakov perceived
Russia’s national interests in terms that conflicted with the grand strategy of the
United States. Securing for Russia the appearance of great power status constituted
a fundamental part of his definition of its state interests. At the very centre of
Primakov’s long-term foreign policy vision was his view that ‘Russia was and
remains a great power.’25 Primakov also maintained that Russia had an interest in
counterbalancing the United States and in fostering a multipolar international
system. He firmly established the idea of multipolarity, grounded in realist theory’s
conception of power balancing, as an official doctrine, arguing persistently that
Russia should play the role of a counterweight to US hegemonic aspirations.26
The multipolarity doctrine was formally proclaimed in a Russian–Chinese joint
declaration of April 1997, which stated that the two countries as partners would
make efforts to further the development of a multipolar world.27 It was also
enshrined in the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. The concept,
approved by President Boris Yeltsin in December 1997, indicated that the Russian
national interests in the international sphere boiled down to ‘the consolidation of
Russia’s position as a great power, one of the influential centres of the emergent
multipolar world’.28
Missile defence in focus
In 1999, national missile defence (NMD) broke cover as a contentious issue in
US–Russian relations. It was apparent that the United States would develop and
deploy a limited NMD system designed to defend its territory against small numbers
of attacking long-range ballistic missiles. Conceding to pressure from the US
Congress, the Clinton administration in January 1999 decided to move ahead more
vigorously in developing NMD technology. In announcing its decision to press on
with a focused NMD programme, the administration acknowledged that the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia prohibited the deployment of any
ballistic missile defence covering the entire United States. Since the administration
believed in the value of international arms control regimes and therefore wanted to
preserve the ABM Treaty, it stated that it would seek Russian agreement on
amending the treaty to permit deployment of its modest NMD system.29
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Russian leaders flatly rejected the idea of changing the severe restrictions of the
ABM Treaty. They looked askance at the US missile defence programme and saw
the treaty as a means of preventing the United States from proceeding with NMD
deployment. Despite US assurances that the NMD system under development was
intended to meet a potential threat from ‘rogue states’, the Russians feared that the
United States was in fact attempting to secure a strategic advantage over Russia.
There were concerns in Moscow that even a limited American NMD system,
especially in combination with the US strategic offensive forces, might threaten
Russia by neutralizing its strategic nuclear arsenal.30
Russian grand strategy under President Putin
Russia’s foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin has rightly been described
as a continuation of the main line followed by Primakov.31 One of Putin’s first
moves in coming to power was to espouse the Russian great power ambitions. He
echoed Primakov’s motto in a programmatic statement released just before he was
appointed Acting President: ‘Russia was and will remain a great power.’32 At a
meeting of the Russian Security Council held on the day of his appointment, Putin
said: ‘I want to emphasize at once that the Russian Federation’s foreign policy line
will not be changed.’ Promoting multipolarity was a central theme of Putin’s foreign
policy agenda, as part of the continuity he promised. ‘Russia will strive for the
construction of a multipolar world’, he told the Security Council.33
Early in his presidency, Putin approved two grand strategy documents. The
primary document, approved in January 2000, was a revised version of the National
Security Concept. In June 2000, Putin approved a secondary strategic document,
the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Both documents endorsed
the political strategy set by Primakov. The new National Security Concept repeated
that Russia’s national interests in the international sphere lay in strengthening its
position as a great power and as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world.34
According to the 1997 version of the National Security Concept, the international
situation was characterized first of all by the strengthening of a trend towards
multipolarity. The 2000 version was more pessimistic but by no means defeatist. 
It stated that ‘two mutually exclusive tendencies’ predominated, one towards
multipolarity and the other towards US–led unipolarity.35
In describing two opposed tendencies in the world, decrying one of them and
supporting the other, the National Security Concept presented a strategic vision
that implied US–Russian rivalry, but it avoided confrontational language. Russian
officials, however, did not hesitate to discuss the striving for multipolarity in terms
of an ideological struggle. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated: ‘Two fundamentally
different attitudes to the creation of a new world order have clashed.’36
The Foreign Policy Concept mirrored the strategic perspective outlined in the
National Security Concept. It noted that ‘negative tendencies’ posing new challenges
and threats to the national interests of Russia had arisen in the international sphere.
In particular, the threat of unipolarity was emphasized. As a counter, the concept
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advocated multipolarity. ‘Russia will seek to achieve the formation of a multipolar
system of international relations’, the document pledged.37
In what has been termed Soviet-like threat assessments, the grand strategy
documents portrayed the United States and NATO as the sources of Russia’s
greatest external security problems.38 The National Security Concept asserted 
that NATO’s eastward expansion produced one of the main threats to Russian
security in the international sphere.39 According to the Foreign Policy Concept,
implementation of the plans of the United States to build an NMD system could
compel Russia to take countermeasures. However, the Russian leadership was
determined to block the US missile defence plans. The Foreign Policy Concept
proclaimed that Russia would seek to preserve the ABM Treaty.40
Russian leaders were explicit in subsuming NATO’s enlargement and the US
NMD effort under the perceived unipolarity menace. They considered both
phenomena as reflections of a desire to create a unipolar world based on US global
dominance. Foreign Minister Ivanov maintained that the expansion of NATO
revealed the tendency towards unipolarity in Europe in that it promoted ‘NATO-
centrism’, a scheme for building the future system of European security around the
US-dominated alliance. Furthermore, he alleged that a unipolar logic manifested
itself in policies undermining strategic stability. In the first place, this referred to
the plans for an American NMD system.41 When asked about the connection
between Russia’s opposition against US NMD deployment and the Russian position
in favour of multipolarity, Ivanov replied: ‘It is quite obvious that the deployment
by the USA of a national ABM system is a road to the creation of a unipolar world.’42
A recurring theme in the Russian military’s approach to the US NMD programme
was the assumption that the real purpose of the programme was to ensure America’s
strategic supremacy over the rest of the world. Just as significant, Russian military
officers repeatedly insisted that a US NMD system would be primarily directed
against Russia.43
Putin’s anti-NMD campaign
In the first years of the new millennium, NATO enlargement and US missile defence
were both major contentious issues between the United States and Russia. Russian
leaders spoke out strongly against further NATO expansion to the east.44
In addition to opposing NATO’s second round of enlargement, Putin staged a
campaign to keep the United States from deploying an NMD system. This campaign
involved a vigorous drive on behalf of the existing treaty-regulated US–Russian
strategic arms control regime. Putin’s opening move was to obtain leverage over
the NMD issue by linking implementation of the 1993 strategic arms reduction
treaty (START II) to preservation of the ABM Treaty. He used the START II
ratification process to establish a direct linkage. In April 2000, the Federal Assembly
of the Russian Federation at long last approved START II, making Russia’s future
adherence to the treaty contingent on strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. Putin
had been pushing vigorously for this decision as a vehicle for strengthening Russia’s
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hand when it came to maintaining the ABM Treaty intact and thereby preventing
US NMD deployment. Addressing the Russian State Duma before its vote, he
stressed that if the United States proceeded to ‘destroy’ the ABM Treaty, Russia
would actually withdraw from the START II Treaty.45 Putin’s gambit relied on the
understanding that the Clinton administration wanted START II ratified. As a matter
of fact, START II ratification was one of the administration’s priorities.
Putin also took advantage of the Clinton administration’s commitment to the
ABM Treaty itself. He steadfastly refused to accept any modifications of the treaty
that would allow the United States to deploy a limited NMD system, confident that
the Clinton administration would not violate or abandon the treaty even if Russia
stonewalled on amending it. The administration’s statements clearly signalled its
unwillingness to act unilaterally without Russian consent to treaty amendments.
As early as March 1999, Clinton said that he had no intention of abrogating the
ABM Treaty.46
Russia successfully mobilized other nations in the campaign against a US 
NMD system. As Russia’s principal ‘strategic partner’ in opposition to US-centred
unipolarity, China supported the Russian anti-NMD position, and so did the member
states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Putin was less successful in his attempts at persuading the European allies of the
United States to share in Russia’s struggle to constrain US freedom of action on
missile defence. Although several European states were apprehensive about NMD,
with France standing out in voicing concern and criticism, most US allies in Europe
would not fall out with the United States over the issue.47 Russian leaders were
interested in forming a strategic partnership with the EU, particularly against
American unipolar designs.48 They regarded a strong, independent Europe as a
natural pole in the emerging multipolar world.49 Support from the EU for the
Russian stance would have given a distinctly triangular aspect to the transatlantic
dispute over amending the ABM Treaty. There was no single European position on
the treaty issue, however. Russia’s appeal for strict compliance with the ABM
Treaty was inserted in a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the May 2000
EU–Russia summit meeting but was not endorsed by the EU leaders.50 Following
the next EU–Russia summit in October 2000, French President Jacques Chirac,
also EU President at the time, claimed that the EU had made common cause with
Russia. ‘The European Union and Russia have an identical viewpoint because, as
you know, we have condemned any questioning of the ABM Treaty’, he said.51
Chirac’s assertion had a hollow ring in view of the fact that the official declarations
issued after the meeting contained no such denunciation. Because of the differences
among the attitudes of the member states, Putin could not count on the EU to support
his policy. Accordingly, he campaigned against the US NMD plans at meetings
with individual European governments, urging them to come out in favour of
preserving the ABM Treaty.52 The Europeans proved receptive to such calls, but
Putin’s efforts to win European support for Russia’s policy of stonewalling on US
amendment proposals essentially failed.
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Invigorating the US grand strategy
By 2001, the United States and Russia were poised for confrontation. The grand
strategies of the two countries were antithetical. Russian leaders reaffirmed their
pursuit of multipolarity. ‘We come out for the creation of a multipolar world’, Putin
declared.53
The election of George W. Bush as President of the United States brought into
US foreign policy a renewed emphasis on America’s superior military strength and
great political influence. The Bush administration came into office enunciating a
grand strategy vision that was fundamentally opposed to Russia’s multipolar vision.
Words like ‘hegemony’, ‘dominance’, ‘primacy’, and ‘empire’ have been used by
analysts to describe the administration’s grand strategy. Ivo H. Daalder and James
M. Lindsay see Bush’s foreign policy as springing from a strain of realist political
thinking best labelled hegemonist.54 Peter Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross (in
Chapter 8 of this volume) argue that the Bush administration has pursued a primacy
that verges on the imperial.
The unipolarist philosophy of the new leadership in Washington was expressed
in Bush’s statements in 1999–2000 and in the pre-election writings and remarks of
the people he chose to serve in his administration. While denying that his aims were
imperial, candidate Bush argued for using America’s preponderant military
capabilities ‘to extend our peaceful influence, not just across the world, but across
the years’.55 The Bush team clearly aimed at preserving US global dominance for
the foreseeable future through discouraging the emergence of rival great powers.
Paul Wolfowitz, later appointed Deputy Secretary of Defense, wrote an article
implying that the conceptual thrust of the draft DPG paper prepared by his Pentagon
office in 1992 was right and ‘crucially relevant to our immediate future’.56
Before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 refocused America’s attention,
Bush and his aides showed relatively little interest in international terrorism. Instead,
they concentrated on the threat of great power competition. This is the typical
behaviour of advocates of unipolarity. Condoleezza Rice, Bush’s closest campaign
adviser on foreign policy and then assistant to the president for national security
affairs, insisted that the crucial and most daunting task for the United States was to
focus on relations with other powerful states, notably Russia and China. ‘These
states’, she argued, ‘are capable of disruption on a grand scale.’57 Bush and Rice
had a sharply negative view of Russia. According to Rice, there was a Russian
threat. ‘I sincerely believe that Russia constitutes a threat to the West in general and
to our European allies in particular’, she told a French journal.58
Bush proposed maintaining a policy of ‘tough realism’ in dealing with Russia.59
His initial hard line is termed ‘neocontainment’ by James Goldgeier and Michael
McFaul.60 Their characterization seems appropriate, since the incoming Bush
administration was disposed to keep Russia in check and hedge against its rise to
great power status. The neocontainment policy could be seen clearly in the new
administration’s approach to the issue of NATO expansion. Even before the
election, the Bush team made clear that it would push for further enlargement of
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NATO without consideration for Russia’s objections against it. The Republican
Party platform said: ‘Russia must never be given a veto over enlargement.’61
Unlike his predecessor, Bush was deeply committed to the deployment of a
missile defence system. Moreover, Bush rejected the limited system envisaged by
the Clinton administration. He favoured building a more extensive system to protect
the entire American homeland.62 To make this possible, he planned to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty if Russia refused to accept the necessary major changes to
the treaty.63
Partnership and strife
In 2001, Russian officials continued their campaigns against US NMD deployment
and further NATO enlargement.64 There was, however, no real prospect that Russian
efforts would be successful in either case. Bush’s determination was unshakable.
In early May, Bush outlined ambitious plans to build a robust, layered NMD system
that could eventually include sea-, air-, and even space-based components, all
prohibited by the ABM Treaty. On the treaty, Bush’s position had actually hardened
since the election campaign. He proposed that the United States and Russia ‘move
beyond’ the ABM Treaty rather than seek to amend it.65
Meanwhile, Bush energetically pressed forward with the plans for NATO
expansion. In June 2001, he announced US backing for a continued enlargement
process. ‘We strongly stand on the side of expansion of NATO’, he said.66 In
advancing the enlargement, Bush opted for a ‘big bang’ approach. He called for
NATO to admit all applicant countries ‘from the Baltic to the Black Sea’, clearly
including the three Baltic states.67
The Russian campaign against further NATO enlargement tapered off after the
first meeting between Bush and Putin in June 2001, when Bush, according to Rice,
bluntly told Putin that Russia would have no veto over the admission of new
members to NATO.68 Russia’s anti-NMD campaign, in contrast, continued unabated.
Putin led the way, asserting that if the United States were to abrogate the ABM
Treaty, then Russia would ‘automatically’ renounce the START II Treaty.69
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the Bush
administration was compelled to reorient its foreign policy. The administration’s
focus on potential great power rivals shifted abruptly to the pressing danger posed
by terrorist groups and their governmental patrons, and the global struggle against
terrorism became its highest priority. In Russia, too, the September terrorist strikes
produced a foreign policy reorientation.70 Putin aligned Russia with the United
States in combating terrorism, which the Russians perceived as a serious threat to
their own security. This alignment, confirmed by a series of US–Russian statements
issued at Bush–Putin meetings in 2001–2, represented a major shift in Russia’s
strategic priorities, since it came at the expense of the attention paid to the task of
combating unipolarity.
Cooperation on the issue of terrorism did not fundamentally change the strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia. The security issues that divided
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the two countries were still on the bilateral agenda essentially unaffected by the new
spirit of partnership. With respect to the controversy over NMD, no compromise
could be reached. The Bush administration did not offer any proposals for amend-
ments to the ABM Treaty because it wanted to get rid of all constraints on its NMD
programme. What the administration offered was a joint withdrawal from the treaty.
Putin rejected that proposal but presented no counteroffer to break the impasse.71
After months of negotiations, the Bush administration gave up on convincing Russia
to join the United States in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. In December 2001,
Bush announced that he had given Russia formal notice that the United States would
unilaterally withdraw from the treaty in six months.72
Bush’s withdrawal announcement reflected the central reality of US unipolar
dominance in contemporary world politics. The Russians had to recognize that their
attempt to use the ABM Treaty to prevent the US NMD system had failed dismally.
Putin said that Russia did everything it could to preserve the treaty.73 Indeed,
Russian officials fought for the treaty to the bitter end, working hard to galvanize
international support. Together with China and Belarus, Russia introduced a
resolution in support of the treaty at the UN General Assembly. Of course, the
assembly’s adoption of the resolution in late November 2001 was disregarded by
Washington.74 The elaborate Russian manoeuvre of political extortion conditioning
the START II Treaty’s entry into force on the preservation of the ABM Treaty also
backfired as it turned out that Bush did not care about START II. In short, the
outcome of the NMD controversy ultimately proved the futility of attempts at
constraining America’s freedom of action through international regimes.
Russia in June 2002 renounced START II, but Putin did not follow through on
his implicit threat, issued in November 2000, to abandon strategic offensive arms
control if the United States abrogated the ABM Treaty. On the contrary, he was
eager to negotiate an agreement with the United States on substantial mutual force
reductions to levels that Russia could sustain economically. Moreover, he wanted
to constrain the US NMD programme within a new conditional treaty regime linking
offensive and defensive capabilities.75
The Bush administration’s preferred approach to the issue of strategic arms
reductions was for the United States to go it alone, without entering any legally
binding agreement with Russia. Putin, however, insisted on a formal treaty, and
Bush eventually agreed to sign one. In the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT), signed in Moscow on 24 May 2002, the United States gave up nothing.
The treaty committed the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic offensive
forces so that by the end of 2012 the number of deployed nuclear warheads on each
side would not exceed 1,700–2,200, precisely the level that the Bush administration
had decided unilaterally to reach within ten years, but did not require either country
to destroy any warheads. Nor did it contain any language on defensive capabilities.76
Thus, the Russians once again failed to restrain America. SORT provided the Bush
administration with the flexibility it desired.
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Formalizing the US grand strategy
Although the Bush administration remained preoccupied with the war on terrorism,
its strategic documents indicated that the inclination of the members during their
first months in office was not a passing attitude. A review of the US nuclear force
posture, completed in December 2001, gave clear evidence that the administration,
while seeking a new US–Russian relationship based on mutual interests and cooper-
ation, considered Russia as a potential threat. The Defense Department’s classified
report on the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review acknowledged that the United States
would continue to include a Russian threat among the contingencies for which 
it had to be prepared. According to the Bush administration’s public comments, 
US nuclear force sizing was not driven by an ‘immediate contingency’ involving
Russia.77 In other words, Russia was not seen as a current danger. However, the
Nuclear Posture Review report assumed that Russia could be involved in a ‘potential
contingency’, meaning that a threat from Russia, while neither immediate nor
expected, was still considered plausible.78
The need to be on guard against possible great power rivals was also a theme of
the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. It was recognized in the study that a ‘hostile peer
competitor’ could emerge in the future. The Bush administration viewed the rise of
such a powerful challenger as a potential contingency the United States might have
to address when developing its nuclear force posture.79
The Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review continued the policy of
hedging established by Clinton. In the case of the Bush plans for the US strategic
offensive forces, the hedge aspect was the decision to maintain a large reserve force
of nuclear warheads called the ‘responsive force’. This force was intended to
provide a capability to augment the deployed strategic forces to meet emerging
threats.80 In addition, the responsive force was justified in terms of the adminis-
tration’s strategic goal of dissuading potential competitors from initiating a military
competition. The force was described as an important dissuasion factor in the field
of nuclear weapons.81
Perhaps the most striking element of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review was its
acknowledgement of the possible contribution of the NMD programme to the
maintenance of America’s military superiority over potential competitors such 
as Russia and China. In the words of the Defense Department report: ‘The
demonstration of a range of technologies and systems for missile defense can have
a dissuasive effect on potential adversaries.’ Defensive systems, the report pointed
out, would make it more arduous and costly for rival powers to compete militarily
with the United States.82
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review anticipated the thrust of the Bush admin-
istration’s National Security Strategy report, issued in September 2002. In the latter
document, a grand strategy that centred on the assumption of American primacy was
laid out openly by the administration. ‘The United States possesses unprecedented
– and unequaled – strength and influence in the world’, the report asserted.83 At its
core, the Bush strategy called for the United States to keep the world unipolar. 
Its fundamental tenet, expressed in appealing language, was that America should
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preserve the international disparity in overall power: ‘The great strength of this
nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.’84
The National Security Strategy report confirmed that the US grand strategy
mainly consisted of maintaining military dominance. The United States, the report
promised, would build and maintain military forces ‘beyond challenge’. Dissuading
military competition was a priority: ‘Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or
equaling, the power of the United States.’85 All of this echoed the Pentagon draft
plan drawn up under Wolfowitz in 1992.
Although terrorism tended to distract attention from the threat of great power
competition, the Bush administration was aware of the danger. ‘We are attentive to
the possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition’, the strategy report
stated, referring directly to the potential great powers Russia and China. ‘Tough
realism’ towards Russia persisted despite the recent rapprochement. According to
the report, the administration was ‘realistic about the differences that still divide us
from Russia’.86
The Iraq War and the US–Russian polarity debate
Putin’s initial fervour espousing multipolarity cooled after 11 September 2001. For
more than a year, he hardly even mentioned the concept in public. The preoc-
cupation with terrorism and the new US–Russian partnership evidently distracted
him from the vision of a multipolar world.
Some Western analysts concluded, rashly as it turned out, that Putin had
abandoned the multipolarity doctrine.87 However, these premature hopes were
dashed by the statements of Putin’s minister of foreign affairs. Whereas Putin
largely eschewed the rhetoric of multipolarity, Ivanov showed no such discretion.
Multipolarity was a major theme in Ivanov’s book The New Russian Diplomacy.
In the book, Ivanov saw the world as an ideological battleground where ‘two
fundamentally opposed approaches to a new international system have come into
competition in recent years’.88 He stated that the struggle between the trend towards
a unipolar world dominated by the United States and the opposite trend towards a
multipolar world order had intensified. The fundamental question for the world
community, according to Ivanov, was which of the rivalling trends would finally
triumph.89 Ivanov explained that the multipolar world system proposed by Russia
relied on multilateral mechanisms for maintaining international peace and security.
The UN was regarded as an indispensable means of establishing this system.90
Critical to the role of the UN in the process was the principle of unanimity of the
permanent members of the Security Council. ‘It is this principle that has the potential
to form a multipolar world’, Ivanov asserted.91 It was, of course, no accident that
Ivanov insisted on the centrality of the UN as the ‘linchpin of a multipolar world
system’. Russia’s staunch support for the global organization was determined above




In the run-up to the US–led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Russian foreign
policy was decisively reframed within the context of the quest for a multipolar
world. Charlotte Wagnsson relates why this happened: ‘The Iraq crisis presented
Vladimir Putin with an opportunity to put the idea of multipolarity into practice.’93
Russia’s main strategic objective during the crisis was to constrain the United States
through the multilateral UN mechanism. The Russians realized that the United
States could bypass the UN, as it did during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, but this time
it seemed to be more difficult for Washington to do so.94 One of the important
circumstances that distinguished the crisis over Iraq from the Kosovo crisis was the
open breach in the Western camp. Vigorous French and German opposition to US
military action against Iraq created an exceptional opportunity for Russia to join
with two major West European powers in seeking to use the UN mechanism as a
constraint on the United States. Putin, who had virtually stopped using the term
multipolarity, now once again publicly promoted the multipolar vision. During a
visit to France in February 2003, he said that ‘the future edifice of global security
must be based on a multipolar world’.95
The determined Russian–French–German diplomatic effort to forestall the Iraq
War culminated in a joint statement of 5 March announcing that Russia and France
in the UN Security Council would veto a US-sponsored draft resolution authorizing
the use of force against Iraq. Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov on 10 March
reaffirmed that Russia would definitely vote against the resolution. Ultimately, of
course, Russia and France failed to constrain the United States. Operation Iraqi
Freedom began on 19 March after the Bush administration had decided not to call
for a vote on its war-authorizing resolution.
The Iraq crisis served as a wake-up call for the Bush administration. The fact that
Russia not only refused to support one of the administration’s most significant
foreign policy initiatives but actively opposed it brought to light the fundamental
difference between US and Russian grand strategies that was concealed by the
partnership in the war against terrorism. Administration officials, especially
Condoleezza Rice, grasped the conceptual essence of Russia’s strategy and started
attacking it.
Responding to Putin’s clamour for multipolarity, Rice recognized the term and
rejected its logic. ‘Multipolarity’, she said, ‘is a theory of rivalry, of competing
interests – and at its worst – competing values.’ Washington’s criticism of the
multipolarity concept was based on the belief that because American power was
linked to the values of freedom and democracy there was no reasonable need to
constrain or counterbalance the United States. In an implicit advocacy of continued
US global dominance, Rice asked: ‘Why would anyone who shares the values of
freedom seek to put a check on those values?’96
The US rejection of multipolarity was answered by Russian Foreign Minister
Ivanov. He defended the Russian vision of a multipolar world, stressing that multi-
polarity, as understood in Russia, had nothing to do with confrontation or rivalry.
To Russia, he protested, multipolarity meant in the first place close cooperation
among the world’s major power centres ‘on the basis of equality’.97 The US
THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
197
leadership, however, remained suspicious of Russia’s multipolar strategy. In
Washington’s understanding, multipolarity inevitably involved conflict and compe-
tition. ‘Poles mean opposite positions’, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell noted.98
Undaunted by the US criticism, Putin indulged in the rhetoric of multipolarity.
He did not hide the fact that Russia’s grand strategy was designed to contain US
power. On the contrary, he discussed multipolarity in balance of power terms. ‘The
world’, he said, ‘must be balanced and multipolar.’99 Putin was at pains to point out
that by multipolarity Russia did not mean confrontation. The Russian conception
of the term encompassed no thesis of rivalry or hostility, he claimed. At the same
time, however, he called for containment of US global power. Although Putin did
not refer specifically to the American power position, his remark ‘we will be able
to build a system of checks and balances and create a balanced world’ obviously
implied balancing against the United States.100
While the Iraq crisis did not rupture the relationship between the United States
and Russia, it was clear that the relationship had changed. Both Bush and Putin at
their meetings in 2003 expressed a determination to continue the partnership in the
war on international terrorism, but the serious discord in US–Russian relations had
become apparent. Distrust and dispute crept back into the bilateral dialogue. By
the end of the year, the war of words over multipolarity escalated. ‘I think we need
to work against multi-polarity’, Bush said in a November interview.101
After a year-long hiatus, Putin in October 2004 resumed his rhetorical push for
multipolarity. Interviewed for Chinese newspapers, he repeated that the world must
be multipolar.102 As Bush and Putin at a time of renewed US–Russian tension103
prepared for their meeting in Bratislava in February 2005, multipolarity re-emerged
as a controversial topic. Bush spoke again about his displeasure with the idea that
America should be counterbalanced.104 Putin, for his part, restated what had become
an ideological mantra. ‘This world must be balanced’, he declared. ‘It must be
multipolar, as we say.’105
Conclusion
Primakov, in a book published in 2002, makes the concluding statement that Russia
can be a true partner of the United States if the United States adjusts to the ‘real
prospects’ of a multipolar world.106 For a Russian to suggest that the United States
should accept multipolarity is quixotic to say the least. The Bush administration is
totally against it and works instead towards maintaining a unipolar world structure
in which the United States remains the paramount power. There is little that the
United States can do to prevent changes in the distribution of economic strength in
the world, but the Bush administration, in its exposition of US grand strategy, has
strongly committed itself to preserving the US dominant global position in the
military realm. As shown in this study, policies to uphold American military
dominance are pursued in the areas of NATO enlargement, strategic nuclear force
planning, strategic arms control, and missile defence. This emphasis on America’s
military might will no doubt continue.
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Because of the conscious US efforts to perpetuate unipolarity, a structural shift
to a multipolar world is not likely to come about in the near term. Instead, unipolarity
has the potential to last for many decades. Militarily, the United States has estab-
lished firmly its overwhelming superiority over other powers, and this superiority
will probably endure well into the century.
America’s preponderance makes attempting to counterbalance US power 
and achieve multipolarity a daunting affair. While deliberately refraining from
counterbalancing alliances with other powers, Russia has tried to use international
regimes and institutions as balancing mechanisms. The Russian attempts to
constrain the United States, described in some detail here, have not been successful,
however. Russia has invariably failed to check US policy through arms control
regimes and the UN system. Thus, the external routes to multipolarity are essentially
blocked. In the absence of real allies and strong international regimes and
institutions, Russia’s only effective means to build the preferred multipolar world
is to balance against the United States via increased internal mobilization of power.
However, Russia still has a long way to go before it can become a great power and
global challenger. It is unlikely to regain its great power status over the next several
decades and will do so only if it prospers economically.
Washington is apt to view negatively anything that smacks of multipolarity. This
basically negative attitude has profound implications for the development of the new
strategic triangle, which is supposed to include the United States, Russia, and the
EU. In so far as this triangle is conceived as a subsection of a future multipolar
world structure, the proponents of US primacy will resist it.
Russian politicians who support the official line about the need for a multipolar
world order have broached the idea of an equal triangular relationship between the
United States, Russia, and Europe.107 According to the deputy chairman of the State
Duma’s foreign affairs committee, an ‘equilateral triangle’ comprising these three
‘centers of force’ is an ‘indispensable element’ of a new geopolitical arrangement.108
Such propositions are probably intriguing to Russian leaders. For them, Europe is
still an important potential partner in the struggle for multipolarity. Ivanov’s
successor as Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, has argued that the existence
of the EU confirms that the world can only be multipolar.109 Within the EU itself,
the French have long pleaded for a common pursuit of a multipolar world.110
The British, however, reject the multipolarity concept. It would be going too far 
to say that the common European Security Strategy adopted by the EU leaders 
in December 2003 is even close to the long-term Russian strategy aimed at
eliminating unipolarity and establishing a multipolar world order, but Russia and
the EU evidently share a joint interest in promoting a world order based on
multilateralism.111
A United States pursuing a grand strategy of primacy quite naturally will not
encourage the establishment of an equilateral transatlantic triangle. It would mean
a step away from unipolarity. As Dombrowski and Ross point out (in Chapter 8 of
this volume), primacy’s advocates have little interest in fostering a triangular
relationship based on equality that would constrain the United States. In fact, the
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strategy of primacy leaves little ground for any relationships with the United States
on an equal basis. Its proponents clearly prefer arrangements in which the United
States plays the leading role and other states play only supporting roles.
America’s enormous economic and military strength, Russia’s continuing
weakness, and the active US opposition to multipolarity are not likely to steer
Russian leaders away from their vision of a multipolar world. It is the very fact of
American unchecked power that sustains Russia’s enduring quest for multipolarity.
Russia’s dissatisfaction with America’s high-handed attempts to lead the world
also explains in large measure why Russian leaders continue to promote multi-
polarity. Russia does not want to be a junior partner of the United States. Hence,
the Russian grand strategy directed at forming a multipolar world order will
probably persist for many years ahead.
The inescapable finding of this study is that the United States and Russia have
diametrically opposite approaches to the shaping of the future world order. Behind
the US–Russian partnership in combating terrorism lies a fundamental divergence
and clash between two strategic visions. The US vision of a durable unipolar order
is straightforward and understandable, given the obvious power asymmetries in
America’s favour, while Russia’s multipolar vision has a complex and even contra-
dictory character. On the one hand, Russia is willing to cooperate with the United
States on many security issues and seeks to integrate with the US-dominated world
economy. On the other hand, Russia attempts to balance against the United States,
primarily by pursuing policies to strengthen multilateral mechanisms that might
limit America’s freedom of action. In combining the dual elements of cooperation
and balancing in their foreign policy, Russian leaders are playing a delicate double
game. They appear to be determined to continue to play it for years to come.
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Jan Hallenberg and Håkan Karlsson
Introduction
In this concluding chapter, we take stock of factors that further and inhibit the
formation of what we have termed a new strategic triangle in the greater transatlantic
region. Recent developments make it appropriate to start with circumstances
pertaining to the European Union. As this book project is being concluded, the EU
is undergoing what is conventionally termed a crisis because the proposed Treaty
on a European Constitution, designed – among other things – to enhance the ability
of the Union to act coherently in international affairs, has been rejected in referenda
in France and the Netherlands. It is the assumption in this chapter that even though
the constitutional treaty has been at least temporarily rejected, this does not prevent
the EU from continuing to be an important actor in the greater transatlantic region.
We regard the extent to which the rejection of the constitutional treaty will stop or
slow the building of what we in this book call the actorness of the EU as an empirical
question.
The actorness of the European Union
It is a premise in this book that if the conditions for the existence of the strategic
triangle are to be met, then there has to exist an EU that has both external and internal
legitimacy. There can be no triangle if the other two parties – Russian and the United
States – do not accept the Union as an actor. Nor can there be any triangle if the
Union itself is unable to act. This section deals with the issue of internal legitimacy,
covering the efforts within the EU to achieve actorness.
In Chapter 2 of this book Magnus Ekengren and Kjell Engelbrekt analyse the
internal aspects of EU actorness after the expansion of the Union to include 25
members in 2004. In their analysis they employ capacity and cohesiveness as central
concepts signifying actorness. By the first, they mean an aggregate of the resources
that an actor can bring to bear in a given situation. The term capacity is deliberately
chosen instead of capability, since the former implies a measure of aggregate ability
that the latter lacks. The authors conclude that a Union with 25 members has a
greater capacity than does a Union with only 15 members. By definition, this means
greater actorness.
205
There are, to be sure, also complications concerning actorness that may be greater
for a Union if it consists of 25 members rather than 15. Some of these complications
are, in the analysis in Chapter 2, related to the concept of cohesiveness. This concept
has to do with similarities of perceptions in terms of values, threats, identities and
interests. It also includes the tendency for an actor to ‘stick together’ in threatening
situations in global politics, a tendency that has to be there at least to some extent
if an entity is to be regarded as an international actor. With regard to the EU’s
cohesiveness, the authors find two complications arising from the entry of 10 new
members in 2004. The first is that the number of countries entering the Union at the
same time is greater than has ever been the case in the past. To put it simply, if it
was difficult to take decisions at 15, it must be even more difficult to take decisions
at 25. The second complication for EU cohesiveness is that the Union of 25 contains
a group of member states that are vastly more diverse than has ever been the case
before. This is also bound to make it more difficult to come to decisions on the
security issues that mainly interest us here.
While the effects on EU actorness of the latest enlargement of the Union thus are
complex, there is – as Arita Eriksson shows in Chapter 3 – another development
going on in the Union which is bound to affect its actorness in a decidedly positive
way. This is the build-up of a more or less independent military capability in the
EU. This process started in 1999, after the new Labour Government in Great Britain
in 1997 had dropped its insistence that all common European defence capabilities
that could be employed in an alliance context had to be kept within NATO. There
are strongly conflicting assessments of what this development means for the
transatlantic security system. One interpretation, which is the one supported by
Arita Eriksson, is that what has been started is a process – the Europeanization of
national defence policies – that over time is bound to lead to a greater role for the
EU in military matters in Europe, to the detriment of NATO. Another interpretation,
often expressed by long-time experts on transatlantic security issues, is that
whatever the EU is up to in matters of security and defence, it is insignificant in
comparison to NATO. One common expression of this view is that as long as the
EU has 100 military planning officers, while NATO has 15,000, there is no question
where the anchor of transatlantic security will continue to be, at least for the
medium-term future. Moreover, several EU members, most notably Great Britain,
still insist that the EU’s defence policy institutions should be closely tied to NATO
and thus complement the US-led alliance, not compete with it.
Fredrik Bynander in Chapter 4 focuses on one fascinating aspect of the uncer-
tainty regarding what organization will be the anchor of European security in the
future. He studies how two new members of both NATO and the EU – Poland and
the Czech Republic – handle the inevitable cross-pressures that are bound to exist
for a new member state in two organizations with at least some competing pretences
to be the fulcrum of European security. As Bynander shows, Poland in particular
has a strong affection for the United States, coupled with a deep mistrust towards
the ability of some European powers to honour their commitments when the security
of Poland is threatened. Warsaw must thus be said to have entered both organizations
JAN HALLENBERG AND HÅKAN KARLSSON
206
with a very strong preference for NATO when it comes to security and defence
policies. Bynander’s analysis shows that for this commitment to NATO to change,
Poland would have to be exposed to both an American disengagement from European
security affairs that goes much further than has been the case after 11 September,
as well as the development of a more cohesive EU in military affairs. The conclusion
is roughly the same for the Czech Republic, even though the attachment of that
country to NATO and the US appears somewhat weaker than in the case of Poland.
In the final chapter of our section on the EU, Adrian Hyde-Price covers the
circumstances under which France and Great Britain might consider using the
military forces in what in the literature has been called strategic coercion in an EU
context, rather than in a purely national one, or a NATO context. He finds it very
unlikely that France and Great Britain may use this military power in a strictly EU
context at least during the next decade. It is much more likely, however, that these
two countries may play a leading role in constructing ‘coalitions of the willing’
where like-minded countries might intervene militarily in security situations
deemed threatening. Such ‘coalitions of the willing’ may sometimes be formed under
the auspices of NATO, sometimes perhaps in an EU setting, as has already happened
with the mission led by France into the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003.
The picture that thus emerges from the analyses in this book that bear upon the
actorness of the EU is a complex one. On the positive side there are at least three
factors indicating an important and growing role for the Union in the strategic
triangle. First is the very fact of enlargement itself from 15 to 25 members. There
can be no doubt that this increases the capacity of the Union to undertake external
action, whether in the context of the strategic triangle or more broadly. Second, the
slow growth in military capabilities that the EU is able to mobilize also serves to
strengthen the Union as an international actor. Third, as analysed in Chapter 9, the
very fact that 12 members of the EU now have the same currency increases both
the potential capacity – at the very least of the eurozone – to act, and it nullifies the
previous ability of the United States to use the strength of the US dollar to pressure
the members of the eurozone to change their policies.
On the negative side, enlargement makes the cohesiveness of the Union more
problematic. To this can be added – at least temporarily – the uncertainties created
by the fact that France and the Netherlands voted to reject the Treaty on a European
Constitution in successive referenda. Thirdly, it is shown in Chapter 4 that at least
one of the new members of the EU, a member with potential ability to make its voice
heard, Poland, is at least over the medium term very likely to anchor its security and
defence in NATO rather than in the EU. Fourthly, the fact that France and Great
Britain are very unlikely to let the EU dispose of their respective military forces for
strategic coercion any time soon means that there will be clear limits to the military
power of EU at least over the medium term.
Still, the analysis in this book has also shown, as is detailed later in this chapter,
that on some issues and under some circumstances the EU has already played the
role of a legitimate actor in the strategic triangle. There can, in our estimation, be
no question that the EU sometimes is a strong actor in transatlantic security affairs.
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The EU is already, as shown in Chapter 9, a very strong actor in some economic
issues. The question is whether this economic actor capability will spread into ever
more issues with relevance for transatlantic security. It seems to us that some of the
most important developments in this field, such as the creation of the European
Defence Agency (EDA) are bound to increase the actorness of the Union. Even if
developments in the fields where the EDA is active, such as the development of
defence capabilities and weapons acquisition, are slow, it seems to us that there is
only one direction in which this development is likely to go: the creation of ever
more cooperation among members of the EU on these issues. Barring the extremely
unlikely development that the Union falters fundamentally as a result of disagree-
ments over the proposed constitution, or over the next steps in the enlargement of
the EU, it seems to us that an analysis of the greater transatlantic region in 2015 will
find an EU that is at least as important an actor as it is in 2005.
Russia in the strategic triangle
The analysis in this book has shown that there are some similarities between Russia
and the EU with respect to the roles that they want to play in the new strategic
triangle. In developing their security strategies, Russia and the EU are in fact
gradually becoming more alike, even though major differences persist in the framing
of threats and the use of force. As Charlotte Wagnsson puts it in Chapter 6, ‘the 
EU’s process of strengthening its actorness in the sphere of “not-so-soft security”,
albeit slow, evolves in tandem with Russia steadily pursuing a reverse path, from
“hard” to “soft” security’. In other words, both actors are undergoing similar
processes of broadening their approaches, albeit starting from opposite sides of the
‘hard-to-soft’ security continuum.
Russia, Charlotte Wagnsson’s analysis brings out, also clearly manifests ambiva-
lence in conducting its relations with the EU. As indicated in the quote from Deputy
Russian Foreign Minister Alexei Meshkov there appears to be a strong Russian
tendency to view nation-states as still the most important actors in the greater
transatlantic region. This tendency creates a constant problem in a region where a
non-state actor – the European Union – has been playing an ever more important
role in security policy for many years. There are – as highlighted in Chapters 6 and
9 in this volume – several examples of strategies on the part of each of these actors
towards the other, and of important agreements directly between the two. At the
same time, the uncertainty created by the ambivalence in the Russian approach to
the EU seems to create obstacles in the way of the development of ever closer ties
between the two in the strategic triangle. As studied in Chapter 9, economic relations
are to some extent an exception to this rule, as the EU is by far Russia’s most
important international trading partner. Still, even in this area, Moscow takes care
to conclude bilateral deals with individual members of the Union that it regards as
crucial, such as Germany.
Russian relations with the United States can also be characterized by the term
ambivalence. On the one hand, after the terrorist attacks on New York and
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Washington on 11 September 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin clearly
showed his solidarity with his US counterpart George W. Bush and made obvious
that Russia saw the two countries as being allies in the war on terror. On the other
hand, as shown by Håkan Karlsson in Chapter 10, there is a ‘clash of strategic
visions’ between the two countries. To quote Chapter 10, ‘the United States and
Russia have diametrically opposite approaches to the shaping of the future world
order.’ It is thus apparent that the future relations between Moscow and Washington
at least over the medium term will continue to be at least two-sided. Cooperation
in the ‘war on terror’ is very likely to continue but Russia is at the same time
determined to try to shape an international order not dominated by the United States,
a world order that is multipolar rather than unipolar.
There is a clear contrast in the economic sphere between EU–Russian relations,
on the one hand, and US–Russian relations, on the other. In the case of the EU and
Russia, economic relations have developed so much that the two parties are clearly
mutually dependent – even if Russia is more dependent on the EU than the other
way around. No such economic interdependence exists in the case of the United
States and Russia. At the risk of overstating the importance of economic ties for
broader security relations, we believe that the economic ties between Moscow and
Brussels are so strong that they are bound to influence positively the solution, or at
least the handling, of disagreements on other issues in the security sphere. There is
no such anchor in relations between Moscow and Washington. It is thus possible
to imagine a future development in US–Russian relations in which the solidarity 
in the war on terror subsides, whereas the rivalry inherent in what Håkan Karlsson
calls clashing strategic visions comes to the fore. It is very difficult, to put it 
mildly, to envisage a future in which the United States and the EU can similarly enter
a situation of strife between the two, for many reasons, not least the immensely
strong and broad economic ties between them that are detailed in Chapter 9 in this
volume.
The United States in the strategic triangle
One of the starting-points of this book is that the United States is the only actor of
the three that we have chosen to study that has the choice of whether it wants to be
an actor in Europe or not. Peter Dombrowski and Andrew L. Ross in Chapter 8 in
this volume point out that the focus of US security policy during the past four years
has not been on Europe, but rather on the Middle East and Central Asia. This change
of focus indicates that the EU and Russia have become less important to the United
States. Whether the United States still takes the other two into account when
planning and pursuing security policy depends to a great extent on what grand
strategy US policy makers choose to follow. A debate about various grand strategy
options is going on in the United States This debate has been presented and
discussed previously in several articles and books. It has been common to distin-
guish between a neo-isolationist option, an option called selective engagement, a
third option called liberal internationalism and a fourth option called primacy. The
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distinctions between these options are spelt out in Chapter 8. Dombrowski and Ross
are of the opinion, however, that what has happened in both the debate on US global
policy in the past few years, as well as to some extent in its practice, means that it
is now necessary to add a fifth vision of America’s role in the world: that of empire.
The term empire in this context is not used in terms of some type of leftist critique
against ‘imperialist’ US policies, but is rather an affirmation of a role that the United
States, in the eyes of some, ought to be happy to play.
In the perceptive analysis of Dombrowski and Ross it is really only when
Washington pursues policies that correspond to the grand strategy of liberal
internationalism that a strategic triangle in the greater transatlantic region is a
realistic prospect, if not yet currently a reality. In so far as the triangle presupposes
shared societal values, it would be in jeopardy even under liberal internationalism.
The current Russian leadership does not seem to share the standard values of
American society fully. From the US point of view, the Russia of today is not a state
that is sufficiently liberal, in the economic as well as the political sense of the term,
to be really integrated with the other two actors in the emerging triangle to the extent
necessary for there to be a strategic triangle in the full sense of that conception. 
A President with a political vision corresponding to liberal internationalism would,
however, in the view of Dombrowski and Ross, be strongly inclined to pursue a
strategy in cooperation with the EU that made it a common goal to induce Russia
to change in a liberal direction, thus creating circumstances under which a truly
functioning strategic triangle might emerge in the greater transatlantic region in the
foreseeable future.
We now turn to the possible implications for the new strategic triangle of the
grand strategy adopted by the Bush Administration. To what extent has the United
States under President George W. Bush pursued policies taking the triangular
context highlighted in this book into serious consideration? As noted in Chapters
8 and 10, the Bush Administration has chosen to follow a grand strategy of primacy.
A logical corollary of this choice is a reluctance to promote the creation of a
transatlantic strategic triangle. According to Dombrowski and Ross, there is little
incentive in primacy to construct triangles or any other multilateral arrangements
that constrain the United States. As they make clear, during his first term President
Bush cannot be said to have pursued policies that to any great extent took triangular
relations into consideration. Instead, the President explicitly played upon diver-
gences among EU member states regarding the Iraq War, thus effectively working
to deny the EU any role in this conflict. The fact that Russia explicitly sided with
two large members of the EU – that is France and Germany – against the US in the
run-up to the Iraq War also served to make any efforts by the EU to pursue a
consistent policy more difficult. After his re-election, President Bush has, however,
shown some signs that he is willing to take the EU into greater consideration when
pursuing policies regarding the greater transatlantic region. This wish was notably
manifested during the President’s visit to Brussels and the EU in February 2005.
The question is whether the visit by President Bush to Brussels in early 2005 is
just a straw in the wind, or an indication of a more substantial shift of US policy
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regarding the EU. Another question, a more long-term one, is what policy a
Democratic President taking office in January 2009 would pursue in relation to the
two other actors in the strategic triangle. Dombrowski and Ross regard it as probable
that John Kerry, had he won in 2004, would have pursued a more multilateralist
foreign policy than will President Bush. If a Democrat takes the oath of office on
20 January 2009, it appears likely that he or she would also be more inclined towards
multilateralism than President Bush has been. A larger element of multilateralism
in US policy is one precondition for a more strongly functioning strategic triangle.
The strategic triangle in the greater transatlantic region 
and beyond
This book is to a large extent centred on the question of to what extent, and under
what circumstances, the EU can be regarded as an independent actor in transatlantic
security policy. As already mentioned, there are two aspects to this question. The
first has to do with the domestic prerequisite of EU actorness – internal legitimacy
–and the second with the international precondition – external legitimacy.
Concerning internal legitimacy we strongly believe that despite the fact that the
proposed Treaty on a European Constitution has been rejected in two member states
in the spring of 2005, the EU is apt to continue to be regarded by the citizens of the
25 member states as a legitimate actor on their behalf on at least some issues of
relevance for security policy. Most clearly, we believe that this will continue to be
the case concerning economic issues, as analysed in Chapter 9 in this volume. There
is no reason to believe that the events of 2005 have made the EU a less potent actor
in terms of trade and monetary policy than it was before those events. This very fact
alone means to us that the Union does have relevance for security affairs in the
greater transatlantic region currently, and that it will continue to have such relevance
at the very least over the medium-term future.
Indeed, we believe that the Union is not only internally legitimate in economic
affairs in the greater transatlantic region, the other two actors in the strategic triangle
also grant it external legitimacy on many economic issues by accepting it as an
independent actor. Perhaps one can detect some Russian strategies to play member
states off against the Union – such as in terms of the delivery of oil and natural gas
to some important EU members – but this cannot stop the fact that Moscow on
many economic issues simply has to deal directly with Brussels.
In many economic issues, all three actors thus acknowledge each other already.
Still, the fact that Russia is such a marginal player in most economic fields –
particularly if we compare it to the other two actors in the strategic triangle who are
genuine giants in this arena – means that in economic issues there are only some
intimations of what we would regard as a strategic triangle in action, where all 
three parties take each other into account when formulating economic policies for
the greater transatlantic region. The one issue where such interaction has already
occurred to some extent concerns the process regarding the Russian application for
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It seems logical to infer that
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one of the strategies that both the United States and the EU pursue in their actions
on this important issue of political economy is that Russian membership of the
WTO would be likely to serve at least two purposes of interest for both Washington
and Brussels. The first is that Russian membership would simplify trade among 
the parties, which would be very likely to lead to increased trade among them,
particularly over time. The second is that if trade does increase, then this – in the
calculations of both Washington and Brussels – is apt to improve Russia’s adherence
to Western principles of the respect for law and for contracts. This in turn may,
following the same logic, spill over into domestic politics in Russia and serve to
strengthen democratic rights that have in some respects been curtailed during the
years after President Putin came to power in 2000.
If there is thus a nascent strategic triangle in the economic realm, there have been
a few other occasions in recent years when the relations among the three actors
under study here seem to have been at least partly governed by what we might call
triangular logic. The most recent case of triangular politics, and also one of the
most illustrative, is the complex political and diplomatic process in which the EU
and the United States cooperated in support of the eventually winning candidate
Viktor Yushchenko in the presidential elections in the Ukraine in late 2004, jointly
opposing Russian preferences for the other candidate, Viktor Yanukovich. This
process, analysed by Bertil Nygren in Chapter 7, has several interesting aspects
relevant to this book. First, the leadership in Washington on an issue with clear
implications for European security explicitly chose to cooperate with the EU, thus
rendering the latter external legitimacy on an issue that may be important for other
events in that part of Europe in the future. Second, on this issue Washington and
Brussels acted on ideational grounds, in protesting against a political process that
they initially believed to be a perversion of democracy, where candidate Yanukovich,
on very dubious grounds, was first declared the winner of the election. In this they
united against a Russian leadership whose actions were based on a combination of
geopolitical and economic considerations.
As pointed out in Chapter 8 in this volume, the new strategic triangle in the greater
transatlantic region is conceived in a different manner than the old US–Soviet–
Chinese triangle in the 1970s and 1980s. The relationships in the previous triangle
were informed by traditional geopolitical considerations, in which a balance of
power, measured primarily in terms of strategic nuclear arms, was the overriding
element. The logic underlying the new strategic triangle is, as Dombrowski and
Ross write, not as classically geopolitical. This is not to deny that geopolitical
concerns may play a significant role in the new triangle as well. It is, rather, to suggest
that the relations among the three parties depend at least as much on ideational and
material (i.e. economic) factors. The actions of the United States, the EU and Russia
during the Ukrainian election crisis tend to support this proposition.
At the same time, the case of the tug of war over the Ukraine also reminds us that
interaction in the new strategic triangle is not necessarily only about partnerships
and common interests among all three actors. It may involve temporary alignments
of two against one faintly reminiscent of old-time great power games. On the
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Ukrainian election issue, Russia to its surprise faced a united front of the United
States and the EU. Only a few years earlier, Russia tried to align itself with the EU
against the United States on the issue of preserving the ABM Treaty. Although
EU–Russian relations are currently under strain for several reasons, Russian leaders
continue to view the EU as contributing to their pursuit of a multipolar world without
US domination.
In a second case of what is here termed triangular politics, the United States has
also at least nominally acknowledged the role of the other two parties in the Middle
East, another area bordering the greater transatlantic region. Since 2002, the peace
process in that region has at least to some extent been undertaken under the umbrella
of the Road Map, a plan for peace in steps underwritten by the ‘quartet’ of the
United States, Russia, the EU and the UN. The very fact that the United States has
accepted the inclusion of the other two parties in the strategic triangle in this process
must be regarded as an acknowledgment that both Moscow and Brussels are
regarded as legitimate interlocutors to Washington on the issue of peace between
Israelis and Palestinians.
The two clearest examples of triangular politics on security issues with relevance
for the greater transatlantic region have thus occurred under a President – George
W. Bush – whose policies have been widely characterized, including by Dombrowski
and Ross in this volume, as containing a large dose of unilateralism, as well as
corresponding to the grand strategy of preserving US primacy in the world. The
policies of the US President in office since 2001 have, on this analysis, not been
conducive to the type of multilateral considerations that are necessary for the
strategic triangle to exist in practical politics, at least if, by the new strategic triangle,
we intend to denote only a relationship among the three parties that are based on
‘shared values and compatible institutions’, as Dombrowski and Ross put it 
in Chapter 8 in this volume. Nevertheless, there have been at least two clear
examples where what we term triangular politics has clearly taken place in recent
years.
There are two important questions that should be posed and tentatively answered
here regarding the future of the United States as an actor in our putative new strategic
triangle. The most immediate question concerns whether or not the second Bush
Administration after the President’s re-election in 2004 is more prone to multilat-
eralism, perhaps even willing to follow a slightly modified grand strategy containing
more elements of what Dombrowski and Ross term liberal internationalism than
was the case during the President’s first four years in office. In the summer of 2005,
it is not possible to draw any definite conclusions on this point. If one wants to
believe in some of the rhetoric, as well as some of the actions, emanating from
Washington after January 2005, then there is some room for hope for those who wish
for a more multilaterally inclined United States administration pursuing policies that
are more liberally internationalist than before. The President’s second inauguration
speech paid homage to the role of ideational forces in today’s world in supporting
the spread of democracy, a process that the President stated should be based on
internal developments and that could and should not be imposed from outside.
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A second hopeful development from this perspective was the President’s visit to
Brussels in February 2005, in which he hailed the role of the EU as an important
partner of the United States. It remains to be seen how much of that statement was
mere rhetoric, and how much of it may translate into policies that take the EU’s
interests into account. A third positive development from this perspective is that the
new Secretary of State – Condoleezza Rice – has taken control of US diplomacy
after succeeding Colin Powell. While Powell in office represented a more multi-
lateralist outlook, Secretary Rice clearly has the President’s ear and thus has much
greater leeway in conducting diplomacy, as well as more direct influence on the
President, than her predecessor had. There has been at least one concrete change of
position as a result of this that indicates a greater US acceptance of multilateralism
during the second Bush Administration than during the first. This concerns the fact
that before 2005, the United States consistently vetoed all attempts to use the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in cases where crimes against human rights are
suspected, in addition to pursuing bilateral deals with many states in which the
other party acknowledged that US citizens would not be party to trials by the ICC.
The US change of position came in the first half of 2005 on the issue of the possible
prosecution of some suspected perpetrators of crimes against human rights by
people in the region of Darfur in Sudan. Whereas before the United States had
consistently resisted involving the ICC in international conflicts, on this occasion
the US representative on the UN Security Council abstained, thus permitting a
majority on the Council to decide to involve the international court. The role of the
ICC has been one prominent bone of contention between the United States and the
EU in recent years, and the US abstention on the Security Council vote at the very
least indicates that Secretary Rice is prepared to listen more to the concerns of the
EU, among others, on questions of multilateralism.
The more long-range question regarding the role of the United States in the future
in the new strategic triangle is of course what happens when a new President
succeeds George W. Bush in January 2009. In a world of terrorism and war in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not easy to try to look into the future of international
politics, and it is not any easier to reflect upon how such changes may influence 
the notoriously difficult to predict US electorate. Still, it is reasonable to assume 
that barring any major terror attacks on the US homeland, and surmising that
developments in Iraq are at best likely to continue to be very unstable and thus
problematic for the Bush Administration, a strong Democratic candidate for
President would have a very good chance of getting elected. As also stated in
Chapter 8, it is much more likely that such a candidate would pursue multilateralist
policies that could be classified as at least resembling liberal internationalism than
would be the case if another Republican were elected. If a Democrat is thus elected
President in 2009, we believe that this would increase the chances that relations
among the three parties in the new strategic triangle would be more characterized
by triangular considerations than has been the case during recent years.
For the strategic triangle to become even more apt as a concept by which to
understand relations among the United States, Russia and the EU, Russia would also
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need to develop in a direction in which democracy to a greater extent permeates the
Russian polity than has been the case in recent years. As this book has shown, there
are developments that point in this positive direction in Russian politics, as well as
other developments that point in the opposing direction.
In conclusion, we believe that we have shown in this book that the metaphor of
the new strategic triangle has helped us better understand relations in security policy
among the United States, Russia and the EU. It is not the case that all three parties
in recent years have consistently taken each other into account when formulating
their security policies on issues that are pertinent to this area of the world. Still, we
have been able to document some cases on which this has indeed occurred. If we
return to study changing transatlantic security relations in 2015, the strategic triangle
may perhaps prove to be an even more apt device for understanding relations among
the three actors that we have chosen to highlight here. For this to be true to any more
developed extent, however, each of the three actors will need to change. The United
States will need to pursue a global strategy that is more clearly multilateralist and
contains more elements of liberal internationalism than has been the case in recent
years. Russia will need to become a member of the WTO, continue to develop its
market economy as well as to develop into a more true liberal democracy. As for
the EU, it will need to develop more internal legitimacy, including a stronger ability
to take and implement decisions in security policy, as well as to become more
legitimate in the views of the other two parties in the triangle. The likelihood that
each of these three broad developments will indeed occur over the coming ten years
is not something that can be determined by the scholars who wrote this book at the
present time. It is our hope, however, that we have given our readers a better basis
on which they can come to their own conclusions regarding the ways in which
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